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COMPUTATION

OF THE

Increaſe of *LONDON*,

And PARTS Adjacent;

WITH SOME

CAUSES thereof, and REMARKS thereon:

PARTICULARLY,

With Reſpect to the Influence ſuch Increaſe of the Capital may have on the Body of the Nation, its Conſtitution and Liberties.

LONDON:

Printed in the Year 1719.

ERRATA,

PAge 5. l. 30, for *pain*, r. *Plan*, p. 6. l. 13. read thus to the end of the Paragraph; *extent, have furnish'd great variety of Town-Traffick, and Employment, and these have turn'd to so good Account, as to raise up many Families, and produce many new and shining Equipages which has increased Servants in propotion, and created many Dependants.*

Page 7. after *impoverish'd*, add *and*; l. 3. for *hath*, r. *have*; p. 12. l. 21, for *inspective*, r. *Inspection*; p. 14. l. 9. for *Case*, r. *Ease*; p. 15. l. 19. for *to*, r. *by*; l. 21. for *Countries*, r. *Courtiers*; l. 24. for *Countries*, r. *Counties*; l. last, after *Power*, add *tho' they make those pay and suffer*, &c. p. 17. l. 31. r. Privilege; p. 19. l. 15. r. Freedom.

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A COMPUTATION OF THE Increaſe of *London*, And Parts Adjacent.

THE Computation is made, and founded upon the Increaſe of the Importation of Coals into the Port of *London*, for ſeveral Years laſt paſt; and referring the Reaſon for the ſame, to their proper Place, it is as follows.

In 7 Years ending in	Chalders of Coals imported into the Port of *London*.	*Medium* of Chalders imported, and conſumed yearly	Yearly Increaſe of Chalders.
1695	. . . . .	315,427	
1702	2,265,083	323,583	1,165
1709	2,412,518	344,645½	3,009
1716	2,628,168	375,452½	4,401

The Reaſon of beginning this Account in 1695, is, becauſe there was a nice, and well-grounded Calculation made of Houſes and People within the Bills of Mortality at that time, which ſtated the Number of Houſes at 105,000, and the Number of People at 530,000, then

By the *Medium* is meant, the yearly Quantity of Coals which ſerved for Conſumption, one Year with another, for each of the ſeven Years reſpectively; as for Example, The *Medium* for ſeven Years ending in 1716, being 375,452½ Chalders, ſhews, that in thoſe ſeven Years that Quantity was imported, and conſumed yearly, one Year with another; and that leſs than that Quantity would not then ſupply *London* and its Dependencies; and the Increaſe of Buildings ſince, may ſhew, that a much greater Quantity is at this time neceſſary.

From hence may be ſtated a Computation of the Number of Houſes, and People within the Bills of Mortality, becauſe the Increaſe of the Importation is owing to the Increaſe of Buildings, and Inhabitants, and theſe will ſtill bear a Proportion to one another, till ſome other ſort of Fuel is more generally uſed inſtead of Coal, than is at preſent; nor can it be fairly urged, in Contradiction to this Aſſertion, that Glaſs-Houſes, printing and damasking of Cloths and Stuffs, conſume large Quantities, ſince thoſe very Manufactures entirely depend on the Growth and Improvement of the City, and (if rightly conſider'd) are a farther Evidence of the Poſition here laid down.

This then being premiſed, the Computation thereupon is as follows,

Year.

Year.	Chalders of Coals requiſite for Conſumption.	Number of		Yearly Increaſe (in each 7 of the 21 Years) of	
		Houſes.	People.	Houſes.	People.
1695	315,427	105,000	530,000		
1702	323,583	107,715	543,704	388	1,957
1709	344,645½	114,726	579,094	1,001⅘	5,055
1716	375,452½	124,981	630,856	1,467⅕	7,394

Which is ſomething above five heads *per* Houſe, and a little more than three Chalders of Coals *per Annum*, *per* Houſe, one with another.

A Calculation may in the ſame manner be made for Years backward, from 1695, and for the two Years forward from 1716, (if any think it worth their while to look either of thoſe ways) in the mean time, it may be allowed, that there has been of late Years, a vaſt Increaſe, both of Houſes and People, within the Bills of Mortality; and as Coal is the general Fuel, the Increaſe of the Importation of it, ſeems to be a good Foundation for judging of, and computing the Increaſe of Buildings, and Inhabitants, and perhaps as equal, and juſt an one, and bears as near a proportion as any other, in the preſent Circumſtances of this great, and growing City; however the applying the Importation of Coals to ſuch a Computation, can be no prejudice to any other, nor ('tis hoped) will hinder it in any one, who has any pain, and intention for it.

But let that be as it will, the Increaſe both of Buildings, and People, is too evident to be deny'd, it were rather to be wiſh'd, it could be ſaid, that an Increaſe of Trade, contributed to the other Increaſe; but there ſeems to be much

ſtronger

ſtronger reaſons for beleiving, that it is chiefly owing to other cauſes, whereof the Union of *England*, and *Scotland*, may be reckoned one; and another (altogether as conſiderable) may be the *Publick Funds*, which have occaſioned the erecting of ſeveral New Offices, and Societies; and (beſides the ſupplying theſe with People, to execute, and manage them) have brought great Numbers of other People to live in, and about *London*; ſome upon the Income of their Fortunes, placed in the Exchequer, Bank, *&c.* to great Advantage; and others to deal in Stocks, and Funds, which being of that largeneſs, and extent, have furniſh'd new and ſhining Equipages, which has increaſed great variety of *Town-Traffick*, and *Employment*, and theſe have turn'd to ſo good Account, as to raiſe up many Families, and to produce many Servants in proportion, and created many Dependants.

And if continuing the Army be added here, as another cauſe of the Increaſe of People, in and about *London*; it ſeems not only to carry *Weight*, but *Demonſtration* with it, becauſe the *General, and other Officers* chiefly centre here, on Account of the Court, their Military Poſts, or Seats in Parliament, and their Families, Equipages, and Dependants, are not the leaſt, either for *Grandeur, or for Number*; all together however, ſeem to have added greatly to the Increaſe of People, that is, to bring People to *London*, of one ſort, or other, tho' with reſpect to theſe laſt be it ſpoken, they may juſtly be reckoned ſuch, as are of equal *Benefit, and Security* to the City in particular, as to *Engliſh* Privileges in general.

But at the ſame time, it may perhaps be found, that other parts of *England*, as well as all *North-Britain*,

Britain, are both impoverish'd, diminish'd, and that this in one effect of the Increase of *London*.

What other effects there hath been, or may be to both Kingdoms, is left to those to calculate, and consider, who have had a hand in these changes, have already felt any of those effects, or apprehend, and foresee any other.

In the mean time, as there have been Notions, that the Increase of People (let them come how, and from whence they will) is an addition of Riches to a Nation; so *England* has not been wanting in making some Experiments, and, not long ago, that remarkable one of bringing over a great Number of poor *Palatines*; but with what Success, or Profit to the Nation, is not yet forgot, tho' may easily be summ'd up; and the bringing them hither, maintaining them here, and sending them back again, or to some other Country better adapted for them, having cost the Nation some Money, may shew, that those Notions do not at all Times, and in all Cases hold true. And besides, to bring over People, merely for the Sake of Numbers, without Regard to useful Hands, or to disposing them properly, must be a Burthen, instead of any Advantage to a Nation.

But, if Foreigners who come hither, by Invitation, or Permission, come prepared for Manufactures, Tillage, or some other useful Business, and bring Money, and other Effects of Value along with them, whereby to have something to work upon, as well as with, it may make some Alteration in the Case, and better support the Notions mention'd, than can be done by *empty Comers*. But it happen'd to be quite otherwise in the Instance of the *Palatines*, who came with nothing but themselves, and some *Distem-*

pers.

pers. They all were *poor*, and that humble Epithet (with abundant Charities) was beſtow'd upon them, and large Collections were made for them accordingly; on which Account, it can hardly be inſiſted on, that *England* was the richer or the better for them; or that it ever can be, by the Addition of ſuch Hands.

And whether the Matter is mended ſince, by the Acceſſion of ſome People from other Countries, (who are come to *England*, and ſeem not wholly to diſlike it, or what they find here) does not yet appear by any Account, or Eſtimate made thereof. This however may be ſaid, that Numbers of Forreigners are arrived among us, and by ſome *Aids* (of one kind or other) live in Splendor, and make a Figure here; and theſe again are another Increaſe of the Numbers of People, in and about *London:* But whether they add Wealth, or drain it, is left to thoſe to conſider, and compute, who have Talents for ſuch Enquiries; and 'tis left to the Nation to take the Benefit thereof, with all the Conſequences.

And now that a Calculation is made of the Increaſe of Buildings, and Inhabitants within the Bills of Mortality, and Reaſons given for ſupporting it, together with ſome Cauſes of the Increaſe; the next Computation propoſed, is, How much *London* and *Middleſex* may reaſonably pay more to the Land-tax, than they did in 1695, by reaſon of ſuch Increaſe; which ſeems to be very plain, and no more to be requiſite for it, than to ſtate the Proportion, by that of the Increaſe of Buildings; for which ſome Reaſons, (as well as why *London* and *Middleſex* ought to pay higher than other Places) ſhall afterwards be given.

Then, as by the Computation of Buildings, the Number of them in 1716, was 124,981,

there wants but 19 to make the Increaſe 20,000, from 1695 to that time; which is an Increaſe of $\frac{4}{17}$ of the whole; and that is ſo near $\frac{1}{4}$, that conſidering the great Number of new Buildings from 1716, to 1718, a full fifth of the whole in 1695, (increaſed by 19) added to the Number of that Year, may reaſonably enough be admitted for the Number of Houſes in 1718, *viz.* 126,000, which in the two Years is but an Increaſe of 1,019, whereas by the Computation before mentioned, the yearly Increaſe for ſeven Years together, ending in 1716, was 1,467$\frac{5}{7}$, which if admitted for the Increaſe of each of the two laſt Years, the preſent Number of Houſes would be 127,916, and conſidering how new Buildings have been hurry'd on in that time, there ſeems no roour for making any Objection againſt this laſt Number, or one ſomewhat greater, for being neareſt to the preſent Number of Houſes. But that Conceſſions, and Allowances on this Score, may be paſt diſpute, and that there may be no Colour for Cavils about the ſame, let the preſent Number of Houſes be ſuppoſed only to be 126,000, the Increaſe of the Land-Tax will be in the Proportion following; *Its* 105 to 126. So is 100,000 to 120,000, that is, for every 100,000 which *London* and *Middleſex* paid to the Land-Tax, in 1695, they ought now to pay 120,000. Suppoſing them to pay to the full, according to the Rates at that time, which that they did not by a conſiderable deal (one with another) there are not only ſufficient Reaſons to be given, but a plain Calculation of what they did pay ſhort, if the

ſame was requiſite, or that the Parties concern'd, ſhould not more willingly wave, than inſiſt upon it; therefore at preſent that Matter may eaſily be paſs'd over, and let it be as it will, the Proportion here ſtated will ſtill hold good, as well for what they did pay, as for what they ought to have paid in 1695; and for taking a more eaſy View of this Proportion, the following Table is preſented.

For every Sum in this Column, which *London* and *Middleſex* did pay to the Land-Tax in 1695.	In 1718 they ought to pay
l.	*l.*
10	12
20	24
30	36
40	48
50	60
100	120
1,000	1,200
10,000	12,000
100,000	120,000
200,000	240,000
300,000	360,000
&c.	*&c.*

Now

Now, if it be here objected to this Purpose, " *That this Computation of raising* London *and* " Middlesex, *in Proportion to the Increase of Build-* " *ings, is made, as if the Tax was charged, and* " *levied on Houses only, whereas it was raised on* " *Rents of Lands, (no small Article in* Middle-" sex) *Houses, Pensions, personal Estates, and Of-* " *fices, all together; and therefore they ought to* " *be distinguished for making a right Estimate of* " *what ought to be added on the Score of these* " *new Buildings.*

It may be answered thus,

That the Number of Houses in 1695, being 105,000, suppose they had been rated at 3*l.* *per* House, to a Tax of four Shillings in the Pound, which is but a Rent of 15 *l.* *per Annum* *per* House, one with another, and at a *Medium*, which seems to be so moderate, as easily to be admitted; the Tax at that Rate would have amounted to 315,000, for the Tax on House-Rents only; and whether all together paid so much to the four Shillings in the Pound, need not here be mentioned, because 'tis so easy to be known; but it may serve to shew, that, by including the Land-Rents, personal Estates, Offices and Pensions, in what *London* and *Middlesex* did pay, they were so far from being over-rated, that they were much under the full Rents and Values of what was chargeable; and at the same time sufficient Allowance would have been made for empty Houses; and there-

fore an Addition to that Sum in 1718, in Proportion to the Increaſe of Buildings, ſeems not to want either Support or Reaſon. Then as the Increaſe is computed at 21,000 Houſes, ſuppoſing the Rents thereof to be only as the other, (tho' 'tis known they are much more) the Tax thereon to four Shillings in the Pound will be——————————— 63,000 *l.*

To which adding for the Computation in 1695, as before, *viz.* } 315,000 *l.*

The Total will be————378,000 *l.*

for the Sum, that *London* and *Middleſex* might reaſonably pay to a Tax of four Shillings in the Pound, in 1718.

But now in Caſe it be urged farther in the Behalf of *London* and *Middleſex*, that tho' they did not pay to the full of the Land-Tax, at a *Medium* of the Rents, yet they paid more, and higher, than other Parts of *England*, as being nearer to the Eye, and inſpective of the Government: It may be anſwered, That at the ſame time it is allowed they did ſo, Reaſons may be given why they ought to do it, and they are theſe.

1. Becauſe of the great Advantage *London* has by Trade, above other Places, the greateſt part of the Commerce of the Nation centring, and being negotiated, and tranſacted there, and conſe-

conſequently, as 'tis thereby the great Receptacle of the Gains reſulting from ſuch Commerce.

2. Becauſe of the quick Circulations, and Returns of Money, not only by ſuch Trade, but even in the Payments of the Rents, which are Quarterly in and about *London*, and in the Country but half yearly, beſides their being paid better, and more punctually in *London*, than elſewhere, according to the Rent-Days agreed on for them.

3. Tho' one Reaſon that *London* and *Weſtminſter* have paid higher to the Land-Tax, than remoter Places, may be, their being more immediately under the Eye of the Government, and neareſt to Inſpection, yet at the ſame time, even that Situation is ſo far from being a Prejudice, that 'tis a great Advantage to them; which is, by furniſhing the Court, and thoſe that belong to it, and depend thereon, with all, or moſt things for their Tables, Houſes, Equipages, and Apparel: And in like manner, thoſe of the other Nobility and Gentry, which Seſſions of Parliament, and other Buſineſs bring to Town: And then the furniſhing the many Offices of the Crown, the Revenue, the Law, *&c.* is alſo another Article of Gain to *London* and *Weſtminſter*, by their being the Seat and Centre of thoſe Offices: And another Advantage is, the conſiderable Sums paid by thoſe Offices towards the Land-Tax.

There-

Therefore, for the Reaſons mentioned, it ſeems but juſt and equitable, that remoter Places, which have not thoſe, or any ſuch Advantages, ſhould (by way of Recompence) be eaſed in Taxes; and tho' it may be computed, in what Proportion more diſtant Places have paid leſs than *London*, yet it may not be ſo material to ſtate that Matter here, as to ſhew, that by the ſame way, which that Caſe has been continued to them, it may be loſt, and ſo turn'd to the Reverſe, as that remoter Places may be brought to a *par* with *London* in the Taxes, tho' they cannot be ſo in the Advantages which have been mentioned; nor ſuch Eaſe (as 'tis call'd, and if continu'd) ſtand in Balance with thoſe Advantages.

However, as there has been a ſeeming Eaſe by Diſproportions and Inequalities, in the Rating of the Land-Tax, and that ſuch Eaſe, or Under-rating of more diſtant Places, has been continued by chuſing Gentlemen of Eſtates within, or adjacent to thoſe Places, for Repreſentatives in Parliament, who, by uniting in the Houſe of Commons *(in that Particular,)* and thereby making a good Majority, they preſerved that Eaſe in the Land-Tax to themſelves, and thoſe they repreſented. But by the ſame Rule that this Eaſe *(in that Reſpect)* has been maintained, it may be loſt to them, and turn'd another way, which is by the Majority falling to other Hands; towards which, there ſeems not only to be ſome Tendency, but

but a Progreſs already made, and that is, by chuſing *Strangers* for Repreſentatives in remoter Burroughs, and Corporations; that is, ſuch Perſons as are neither known in the Country, nor have any Eſtates there, and conſequently cannot be ſuppoſed to have its Intereſt and Eaſe ſo much at Heart, as to ſtand in Competition with Intereſts, Acquiſitions, or Expectations of a different Nature, and which lie elſewhere.

And when this comes to be the Caſe, that either through an indifference, or inactivity in Country Gentlemen, by reaſon of Diſcouragements, and Diſappointments which they meet with, or their being overborn, or out-bid in the Auctions of Burroughs, where the Electors make a Sale thereof; the remoter Parts of *England* (whence the Majority was form'd, which eas'd them in their Taxes) ſhall be repreſented to the money'd Men of *London*, and the great Societies there, by Countries, and Place-men, and by the Officers of the Fleet, and Army. One may foreſee and epect *a Turn* in the rating of the Land-Tax, and that remoter Countries may be made to pay as high thereto, as *London*; which when once effected, will not ſo eaſily be remedied, or retrieved by thoſe who gave their Hands and Voices to it, as maintained by this new, and far-fetch'd ſet of Repreſentatives, who have the Art of ſaving and improving, as well as of geting Money, and probably may not want an Inclination to ſhew it, in favour of themſelves when they get the Power, and ſuffer for it, who contributed

tributed to the Charge, and help'd them to that Power.

One effect of this is ſeen already in the prolonging of a *Triennial* to a *Septennial* Term, and who knows but this may be further prolong'd, in ſuch manner as the Poſſeſſors ſhall think fit, or rather, as to the *Principals* of thoſe Factors ſhall ſeem meet?

Power is what they ſeem both to make a progreſs in, and to underſtand; then, as to Policy, ſo little of it will ſerve, as if it was Calculated for their Talents; and as for Modeſty, Promiſes, Engagements, Conſtitution, and the like, they are too antiquated, and threadbare to have any weight with perſons thus verſed in refin'd and new Schemes, and whoſe views are of a different nature.

This then being the *happy Caſe*, and the Conſequence of Corporation and Burrough-Traffick, one may now ſee the reaſon why the Fate of the Government has been link'd to that of Stocks, and made ſo abſolutely to depend upon it, as if all Judgments were to be form'd, and all Meaſures were to be taken from it; and that, as Stocks roſe or fell, ſo was the Government to proſper or to ſink; thereby making the Auctions of *Exchange-Alley*, the Index, Rule, and Standard of Publick Conſultations, Judgments, and Deciſions, and ſetting up a Regency there, to Preſcribe, and Dictate to the *Cabinet*; which was found ſo eaſy to improve, as that from an imaginary

imaginary State-thing, it did in a manner become the real, and only one; and Burroughs by this means, coming to Market there, it was not difficult *(by proper Aids)* to get them into the hands of this Race of Jobbers; who then might well be for bringing the Fate of the Nation to their own, and for crying up its Security to depend on theirs; becauſe this their Traffick, and Dominion could only be ſupported, and carry'd on by the Methods it was begun, which was (after the Example of *their Father Satan)* by centring and diſplaying all the Riches of the Kingdom, on this charming and alluring *Mountain*, and then (as well for enlarging of the Capital, fortifying the ſame, and adding Strength to Strength, as for widening the Channel for Supplies) monopolizing Burroughs, and Corporations; which has ſo well ſucceeded, and ſuch a Progreſs hath been made therein, as that a grat part is wreſted by it from other hands; and they *(viz.* theſe Managers, and Factors) plac'd in the Election-Chair, which is ſo artfully contriv'd, as *(like Winſtanley's)* to be wafted by an Engine to any place, and for any turn the Service may require, ſo that in the next place who do's not know but that thoſe who have thus bought their Seats, may ſell their Votes, and their Country too into the bargain? While ſuch as are merely Factors, transfer theirs at bare Commiſſion-price, and by both together, the Power, Priviledges, and Right of Parliament, as well as its Fence to the Conſtitution, ſeem to be brought to ſo ſmall a compaſs, as to become an eaſy Purchaſe, *and to*

be laid aſide, or render'd uſeleſs all at once, both as to Name and Eſſence, (ſomewhat like the State of the *Convocation*?) Or, if the Name be left for Old Cuſtom-ſake, or for the ſake of any Form, or Show, or for the Pomp, and Grandeur of the Purchaſer, in the paſſing and enforcing Edicts, with the Attendance of his *Vaſſals*, ſo far this Band of *Property-mongers*, and *Traffickers of Liberty* may be honour'd, and diſtinguiſh'd, while at the ſame time the *Corporation and Burrough-Traders, and Retailers* may reflect on the *Wiſe* bargains they have made for themſelves, and for their Country, which they may look upon as their *laſt Will and Teſtament*, and that they have nothing more to do, nor to diſpoſe of; neither after this need Knights of Shires have the trouble of preparing Liſts of Commiſſioners for the Land-Tax, becauſe there may be particular, and *Short* Commiſſions for examining, and ſurveying of Eſtates, and for rating them at full Value, or indeed, *at Pleaſure*.

And whether ſuch may be favour'd, or how they may be rewarded, who have forwarded the Scheme, is more a Queſtion, than that they merit *Something*, which when they receive *It*, may be put upon their *Monuments*, in all the Languages of *Europe*, that all People may read the Acts they did, and the Ends they made, together with this Maxim, " *That* " *even thoſe who may love a Treaſon, yet hate* " *the Traitor*; And 'tis no new thing to apply each

each of these to a Country, as well as to a Prince.

But whatever becomes of these, or howsoever, they may be recorded, or remember'd, who have been the Instruments of so deeply wounding the Constitution, and letting out its Blood so profusely; or whatever be the Fate of such, who give the last, and mortal stab, and complete it's ruin; their Annals will be of as little use, or comfort to the poor remnant of the Nation, as to make these, or the like reflections, *viz.* That a Nation which hath stood its ground, and kept its privileges and freedoms for Hundreds of Years, is in less than a Third of a Century, quite undone; hath lavishly spent above 160 Millions in that time, made Hecatombs of *British* Lives, stockjobb'd *(or canonaded)* away its Trade, perverted, and then jested away its Honour, Law, and Justice; burlesqu'd its Religion; disavow'd the Divinity of its Author, then banish'd it, and in the Room thereof, offer'd Sacrifice to an *Idol* of the *People*'s setting up, which has produced Swarms of others, of Monstrous Shapes, and Forms; compounded of the Dregs of all former Heresies, Sects, Schisms, and Rebellions; hatch'd from Incest, Whoredom, and Adultery; and all centring in Atheism, Anarchy, and Confusion.

And tho' the third part of a Century is mention'd for effecting all this havock, and destruction, yet on a strict Computation, it may

may be found, that the greateſt part of that time has been taken up, in paving the way for the final Stroke, and that this laſt part has been brought about in little more than one Tenth of that Third of time; however, in the whole, an *imaginary* Slavery is become a *real* one, and with this we may ſit down, and each of us tamely mutter to our ſelves; *Oh Liberty! Oh Property! Oh my Country!* without expecting the leaſt regard for any of them, from thoſe whoſe chains, and fetters we have put upon our ſelves.

This then being our condition, and it having been obſerv'd before, how, and in what manner there hath been ſome eaſe in the Land-Tax, to places at a diſtance from the Centre, and Seat of Government; It may be added here (beſides the way already mention'd, by which it may be loſt) That as to ſuch eaſe, or any other of that kind, 'tis only to be underſtood to be ſo, while the People were in a State of freedom; for in arbitary, and deſpotic Governments it may be found to be wholly the Reverſe, and that they who are neareſt to the Eye, and Centre, fare the beſt, and freeſt from Oppreſſion, becauſe the People there, can apply ſooner and more eaſily for redreſs of Grievances, and Abuſes; and Officers are alſo kept in better awe, and more ſtrictly to their duty, as well as to the Rules, and Limitations of it; but Intendants, and other Officers who are Commiſſion'd to remoter

remoter places, to levy Taxes, may be repreſented by a *Burning-Glaſs*, and be ſaid to reſemble the Nature of it, which is to contract the Rays of the Sun (compared here to the Authority of the Prince committed to them) with that force, and to that degree, as to burn, and ſcorch in the ſevereſt manner, where 'tis pointed, and directed; And whether ſuch Officers increaſe the Revenues of the Prince by it, or not, yet they are ſure to ſqueeze and oppreſs the People, with all manner of exactions, and extortions.

And now that both States (that is, of *Freedom* and of *Slavery*) have been repreſented in ſome Meaſure, as to the Article of Taxes; one may eaſily imagine that all things, elſe which can affect a People, will take the ſame Turn; and both together, ſet before us, what we of this Nation have been, and what we are; what we enjoy'd, and what we have loſt and thrown away; and that all this is chiefly owing to the being grown ſo wanton, giddy, and intoxicated with the Name of Liberty, as to proſtitute all Virtue, Principle, and Honour; which brought on ſo great a Degeneracy, ſo general a Pravity and Corruption, and ſuch a Feebleneſs and Decay, and even Loſs of Courage and Spirit thro' the Nation, as not only ſubjected and enſlav'd it to the *Idol-worſhip* before-mention'd, but have ripen'd it for the Judgments which juſtly attend ſuch mad Proceedings, and which are already at our Doors; and then the general Indolence and Supineſs,

Obduracy

Obduracy and Stupidity, which are too obſervable, are farther Symptoms of impending Ruine, as both aggravating the Guilt, and ſealing the Miſery paſt Redemption.

There ſeems then little to be ſaid after this, but only to obſerve, That as bad as the State of Slavery is in ſome abſolute and deſpotick Governments, yet that of *England* is become much worſe, and far more grating, intollerable, and tormenting, by having the ſevereſt Yoke put upon it, and ſuffering all the Effects of Bondage, under the Name, Shew, and Shadow of Free Pepple; as if *Liberty* was now for nothing more, than for being plac'd on high, and ridicul'd in Effigie, like the Devil and the Pope; nor to be remember'd any farther than by way of Inſult, and the Mock-Acclamations of a *Hireling-Mob*, and other Attendants, on *Contribution-Bonfires*, huzzaing the Proceſſion with the Downfal and Extirpation of poor *lifeleſs Liberty*, thus dreſs'd! thus triumph'd over! and thus thrown into the Flames!

F I N I S.

AN

ENQUIRY

INTO THE

NATURE, FOUNDATION,

AND

PRESENT STATE

OF

PUBLICK CREDIT.

WHEREIN

The NATIONAL WEALTH is juſtly calculated;

THE

Preſent Inequality of our PUBLICK TAXES demonſtrated;

AND THE

Conſequences that may naturally be expected from a Diſhonourable PEACE, or the Continuance of an Unſucceſsful WAR, plainly pointed out.

By a Friend to TRADE *and* LIBERTY.

LONDON:
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(Price Six-pence.)

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AN

ENQUIRY

INTO THE

Nature and Foundation

OF

NATIONAL WEALTH,

AND

Publick Credit, &c.

FOR theſe twenty or thirty Years paſt, it has been the conſtant Endeavour of every Sett of Miniſters and their Friends, to perſuade the Publick into an Opinion of our political Sanity; and at the ſame Time, thoſe in the Oppoſition, have exhauſted an almoſt infinite Fund of Wit and Argument, to prove that we have been all along labouring under the moſt dangerous Malady, and that there ſcarce

remains a ſound Member in the Body-politick: But within theſe few Months, the Arguments have taken a quite different Turn; for we are told now by the higheſt miniſterial *Authority*, *that we are in a very bad Way*, *have every Thing to Fear*, *and almoſt Nothing to Hope for*; which Declaration, has obliged every Man in the Oppoſition to read his Prayers backward, and muſter all their Rhetorick, to perſuade the Publick, that we are not quite ſo bad as the State Phyſician would repreſent us. We are indeed bad ſay they, but not fit to be given over yet, we have Strength to undergo an Operation or two more, which if *properly conducted*, may ſet us once more *rectus in curiæ*, and reſtore us to our political Legs again. In a Word, one Side acknowledges, that by ſome Fatality or other, the Nation is brought to this Dilemma, that nothing but a Peace can ſave her from total Deſtruction, which we muſt purchaſe at any Rate, and accept of on any Terms, and the other (I hope with ſome Truth) concludes, that we are ſtill able to carry on the War, till ſuch Time as an honourable and laſting Peace can be obtained.

This is the preſent grand Queſtion in Politicks, which it is the Intereſt of every free-born Subject of *Britain* to diſcuſs impartially; ſince on it depends the future Happineſs of us and our Poſterity: The Iſſue of this War determines the Fate of *Europe*, and entails Liberty or Slavery upon this Iſland. I think it therefore the Duty of every Subject to contribute his *Quota* to elucidate that important Queſtion, with which View the following Pages are ſubmitted to the Publick, wherein

wherein the moſt important Facts, depending on that Argument, are ſtated in a Point of light, which will help the Reader to form a Judgment of the Arguments brought, either for a haſty Peace, or the Continuance of a Burthenſome, and hitherto unſucceſsful War.

Thus much for the Deſign of the performance. I now proceed to my Inquiry into the Nature and Foundation of national Wealth and publick Credit. To come at the Bottom of this, I muſt beg my Reader to follow me in Imagination, to ſome new diſcovered Iſland, we ſhall ſuppoſe in *America*.

I ſhall ſuppoſe that to this new Iſland, we have tranſported Ten Thouſand Souls young and old; that amongſt the firſt Thouſand we have divided the Property of the Iſland, both real and moveable, and have allotted the other 9000 their Labour, as the Means of gaining their Subſiſtance. Which is rather leſs than the Proportion which the labouring Part of Mankind bear to the Number of thoſe who are poſſeſſed of the Property.

Now we ſhall ſuppoſe that theſe Iſlanders are ſettled in their new Colony, and have quite forgot their Mother Country; and that the Iſland produces all the real Neceſſaries of Life, and would if cultivated, maintain three Times the Number of Inhabitants we have ſuppoſed upon it; and that by the Labour only of the 9000 Labourers originally planted.

It's plain, that ſuppoſing them to have no Communication with any Part of the Earth, they could have no Notion of Wealth; they could neither conceive the Uſe of it, nor find out the

Means of acquiring it; for if they cultivated more Land than was ſufficient to maintain them, the Overplus of the Product muſt rot upon the Earth, and ſo of every other periſhable Neceſſary. From hence it would follow that two Parts in three of their Country would continue a Waſte, and unleſs the Owners of Land gave it away for a Trifle, two Parts of three of the People muſt lye idle and ſtarve, even in that plentiful Country; becauſe the Landlord has Uſe for nothing but the Neceſſaries of Life, a few Hands and a Part of his Eſtate cultivated produces him that, and he gives himſelf no Concern about the Remainder, and if for the ſake of Pride and Oſtentation he maintained and employed more Hands than was abſolutely uſeful, the whole of them muſt be his Slaves, as dependant upon his meer Will and Pleaſure for their Means of Subſiſtance.

This is really the Caſe in *Poland*, and in ſome other Parts nearer Home, where the Land and the People bear no Proportion, and the labouring Part are all ſtarved.

Thus whatever Laws are ſuppoſed to ſubſiſt in this Iſland, it plainly appears that the 9000 labouring People and their Poſterity muſt remain Slaves to the firſt Thouſand and their Heirs, and that they can poſſeſs nothing which they can call their own, and that their Wealth can only conſiſt in an Aboundance of the meer Neceſſaries of Life.

As the Property of this Iſland is ſuppoſed equally divided amongſt the firſt Thouſand, it muſt follow that the Government, would remain

for

for ſome Time *Ariſtocratical*, at leaſt as long as the Equality remained among the Proprietors, that would be the natural Government: But of whatever Form we ſuppoſe the Government, we are ſure the other 9000 are Slaves, and that to keep them ſo, the Government is able to employ ſix Thouſand of the 9000 to ſupport their Authority, in conſtant Pay. For as it is ſuppoſed that the Iſland is able to maintain, with the Labour of 9000, thirty Thouſand; it follows, that 3000, may by their Labour maintain themſelves, their Landlords, and ſix Thouſand more; that is, it's ſuppoſed, that one Third of their Labour is ſufficient to maintain themſelves, and as long as they are allowed this Proportion they may live and muſt ſtarve in Proportion, as that one Third is diminiſhed.

Now hitherto we muſt ſuppoſe, that dealing between theſe People is carried on by Barter, that the Landlord is paid his Rent, in the Produce of the Ground, and the Military and other Servants of the Government, in the ſame Manner; but that in proceſs of Time, to remedy the Inconveniency of tranſporting Goods, and to aſcertain more equally the Value of Things exchanged, ſomething is to be found out more portable, which is to become a common Medium or Standard to meaſure the Value of every Thing elſe. This Medium, of whatever Materials it is compoſed, whether of Shells, Leather, Paper or Metal, may be called Money, and has in itſelf no intrinſick Value; but receives its Nominal Value from the Uſe that is made of it, which encreaſes

creaſes and diminiſhes in Proportion to the Plenty of itſelf, or the Scarcity of the Commodities of which it is to be exchanged.

If we ſuppoſe then theſe Iſlanders as ſome People in the *Eaſt-Indies* to this Day, ſhould chuſe Shells for their common Medium; the Value of Shells would encreaſe in Proportion either to their Scarcity, or that of the exchanged Commodity: Thus if every Body had a large Quantity of Shells, the Quantity given in lieu of Grain would be proportionably large; but if Grain was in Proportion plenty, the Quantity would be ſcarce; but this new Kind of Riches, which to the Inhabitants would appear ſo, would add nothing to the Wealth of the Iſland in general; their real Wealth muſt ſtill conſiſt of the Produce of the Earth, without any Regard to the Quantity of Shells.

Suppoſe they had choſen Gold or Silver for their Medium, and Mines of that Nature in their Country, ſtill if they remained without Commerce with the reſt of the World, they would be no richer than before; they muſt meaſure their Wealth by their Flocks of Cattle and Store of Grain, *&c.* and not by Silver or Gold, which to them would be as uſeleſs as Cockle-Shells, except as to the Convenience of exchanging with one another, for which Uſe Shells would anſwer the Purpoſe nearly as well.

From all that I have ſaid I would infer, that an Iſland, tho' never ſo fertile; tho' abounding with all the Neceſſaries of Life, and enriched with the moſt precious Metals, muſt remain Slaves, and

and cannot properly be ſaid to enjoy any Wealth without the Benefit of Commerce and Intercourſe with their Neighbours.

But ſuppoſe this new Iſland as I have deſcribed, with no other Money amongſt them but Sea Shells, and that by Chance, they had ſtumbled upon the Art of Navigation, and made Diſcoveries of neighbouring States, who wanted ſome Part of the Commodities this Iſland produced or might produce, and could ſpare many Things for the Conveniency of Life which theſe Iſlanders wanted; the Caſe would be widely different, the Uſe of Silver and Gold, would ſoon be underſtood, and they would find their Account to make it their Standard, ſince with it they could purchaſe all the product of the Earth: The fertility of this Iſland would invite Strangers to ſettle amongſt them, and thoſe of themſelves who enclined to labour, would find a Vent for their Commodities, and could live independant of their Landlord, ſince they could earn their Bread without his Aſſiſtance.

From hence it would follow, that as the Labour of every Man was able to maintain two beſides himſelf, and that he could bring his Labour to Market, that the Iſland in general muſt encreaſe annually in Wealth and Riches; that is, that two Thirds of the annual Produce of the Iſland muſt be converted into Gold and Silver, and remain in the Iſland, to be converted into whatever Purpoſe the Owner pleaſes; by which Means theſe Iſlanders would become both rich and free.

This

This encreaſe of Wealth we may ſuppoſe as large as we pleaſe; but we cannot ſuppoſe it ſo large, but it may be exhauſted and the ſame rich free Iſlanders may again become Slaves and Beggars.

Let us ſuppoſe then this Ballance of Trade, or this Specie which is paid in lieu of Commodities, they export more than they import, to be a Million Sterling. This Sum divided amongſt the People would make Money very plenty, and conſequently encreaſe the Price of Labour, and that would naturally introduce Luxury, and an itching for many of the Superfluities and Expences of the neigbouring Nations. The Effects of this would not be felt all at once, but by ſlow and certain Degrees. For as the Importation of Luxury encreaſed, the Ballance in Specie would diminiſh, while the Expence of their Exports encreaſed, and their Profits inſenſibly dwindled: For if at the beginning of Trade the Manufacturers wrought for Six Pence a Day, but now require Two Shillings; the Merchant loſes the advanced Price out of his Profit, and thoſe Countries who are our Rivals, and work for leſs, are enabled to underſel him at all Markets. By this Means firſt one Article of Trade may be loſt and then another, 'till at laſt few are left; and theſe return not as Ships loaded with Specie, or Materials for our Manufactures; but with the Luxury of the Eaſt and Weſt: Where then is the Million of a Ballance, that, may be againſt us, and our Iſlanders may be exhauſting the Capital; which when done, they muſt return to their former Poverty

Poverty and Bondage with infinitely worſe Circumſtances: For we may now ſuppoſe the Iſland ſtocked with People, two Thirds of which depended on the Trade and the Manufactures; that being gone, they cannot ſtarve, but muſt be maintained by their Pariſhes, and ſo ſtarve the Farmer, and render him as miſerable as the Merchant, which is a worſe Situation than what they were in before they were a trading People, becauſe then, the one Third laboured for the other Two, yet there was Plenty for the whole; but now one Third labours for the other Two, and there is not ſufficient to maintain one half of the whole.

Thus Luxury may beget Trade, is neceſſary in ſome Meaſure to ſupport it; but without prudent Management, it muſt in the End deſtroy it: Tho' that is not the only Enemy to Trade, ſhe has a great many more; but of theſe I ſhall have Occaſion to take Notice in the Application of what I have ſaid to *Great Britain*.

By this Detail of a ſuppoſed Iſland, my Reader will eaſily comprehend, that I mean to convey to him an Idea of the Means of acquiring and loſing National Wealth, and that in ſome ſuch Manner, the Iſland of *Great Britain* became a rich, flouriſhing, and powerful Nation.

It muſt occur, that we are an Iſland, naturally fertile, which produces all the Neceſſaries of Life, and that it is able to maintain a great many more People than now inhabit it, though that Number has at leaſt encreaſed one Third ſince we became a trading People. We have no Mines of

Gold or Silver, and conſequently our Wealth muſt conſiſt in the Produce of the Country and the Labour of the People, a Kind of Wealth which renders us much more powerful than the richeſt Mines could do; as may eaſily be ſeen from the miſerable State of *Spain*, ſince her golden Acquiſitions, tho' poſſeſſed of all the Treaſure of the New World, yet from one of the moſt powerful States in *Europe*, ſhe is become almoſt the moſt inſignificant. Whereas we, who were ſcarce heard of, but as a barbarous People, at the Time when *Spain* flouriſhed, are by the proper Application of the Genius of our People, and our natural Situation become at leaſt, one of the moſt conſiderable States on Earth. How long we are to continue ſo is in the Power of our preſent Stateſmen to determine; for none but they can put a Period to our being what we have been for Two Centuries paſt.

In our Calculation then of the real Value of this Iſland, we are only to compute what is the annual Produce of our Land, the Amount of the Labour of the People, and the Profits gained by Trade; theſe being all the Funds of Wealth we poſſeſs. It is true our Mines of Tin, Lead, and Fiſheries bring us in ſome Money; but they bear ſo ſmall a Proportion to the Whole at preſent, that we may very well lump them in the Article of Trade or Land Rent. I ſhall therefore proceed to bring our Wealth to a Balance by Way of Debtor and Creditor.

GREAT BRITAIN, Creditor.

AS the Land Tax at 4 Shillings in the Pound, brings in annually Two Millions, it would appear that the Land Rent of *Great Britain* does not exceed Ten Millions; but as the greateſt Part of *England* is under-valued, and as *Scotland* pays of that Sum but forty-eight Thouſand Pounds, I ſhall ſuppoſe the whole to be Two Fifths under-valued, and conſequently charge,

Millions.

For the Article of Land Rent, Houſes, *&c.* 14

I think the People of *Great Britain* may be computed to amount to about Twelve Millions, and that at leaſt Ten Millions of theſe live by their Labour, in which Number I neither include Merchants nor Sailors; and that each of theſe, one with another, muſt be ſuppoſed to earn *6 d.* a Day, therefore I charge,

For the Article of the Labour of the People in a round Sum. } 90

As there is a Stock of Cattle, *&c.* upon the Land, at leaſt equal to three Years Rent of the whole, and that this Stock may be ſuppoſed to produce ſomething excluſive of meer Labour, I ſhall ſuppoſe it to yield 5 *per Cent.* and charge,

For the Article of the Farmers encreaſing Stock. - - } 1 ½

As the Government employs Forty Thousand Sailors, I think we may naturally conclude that the whole Number of Sailors in *Great Britain*, may be computed at one Hundred and fifty Thousand, and that each Sailor earns at least, 1 *s.* *per* Day, consequently, *Millions.*

I charge for Sailors Wages, in a round Sum. - - 3

As the Customs at a Medium, even in Time of War, brings in one Year with another, 2 Millions Sterling, we shall suppose, that not to exceed 5 *per Cent.* *ad Valorem*, of the Goods imported, consequently that there is employed in Trading Stock 40 Millions, and between Shipping, and dead Stock in the Merchants Warehouses here and abroad, as much more, and that the Gain annually, besides the Wages of Sailors which we stated separately at 5 *per Cent.* upon the whole, I charge,

For this Article of Profit by Trade, 4

Sum Total of our Credit. 112 ½

GREAT BRITAIN, Debtor.

THE Maintainance of 12 Millions of People only, at 4 *d.* a Day each, which is the least they can be supposed to consume one with another, reckoning

Provisions

	Millions.
Proviſions at the loweſt Prices, amounts to - -	73
To the Expence of the Government in all its Branches, ſuppoſing it not to exceed what it has been for ſome Years paſt,	11
Suppoſing at the Cloſe of the Year, the National and Navy Debt which is now ſomething above Seventy Millions, ſhould amount to a Sum bearing the Intereſt of - - -	3
Sum Total of our Debt,	87
By Difference between Debtor and Creditor - - -	25 ½
	112 ½

Thus it is certain that our real Income exceeds our Outlayings 25 Millions Sterling; a prodigious Sum! And ſcarce to be credited, if the Principles from whence I have deducted it were not almoſt ſelf evident; but however large this Balance may be, yet one bad Treaty, or an ill-conducted War, may place it on the contrary Side of the Account, and place us in the loweſt State of Beggary. To give the Reader an Idea of the Poſſibility of ſuch a Misfortune, he need only look back upon the Articles which compoſe the firſt Side of the Account, for in that the conſiderable Alteration muſt happen.

Suppoſing our Commerce loſt, which is charged at ſeven Millions in the Credit Side, it would not only deduce ſeven Millions from the whole, but

but the Land-Rent muſt fall juſt that Sum, which would make it juſt 14 Millions Difference in the whole. Then I have ſuppoſed ſo many Millions to be employed in Trade; muſt not ſo many of the People as depended on Manufactures become idle, and a Burthen to the reſt of the Society? We muſt ſuppoſe at leaſt two Ninths of the labouring People thus ſet a Drift, which would reduce that Article twenty Millions; and the remainder inſtead of being able to earn *6 d.* a Day, as I have ſtated it, ſcarce able to earn their own Subſiſtance, at 4 *d.* a Day, which would reduce that Article 20 Millions more, and the Account which had before ſo agreable an Appearance, would in that Event put on this ugly Aſpect, and ſtand thus,

	Millions.
The Land Rent would then only amount to	7
The Labour of the People, -	50
The Farmer's encreaſing Stock, as before,	1 ½
Sum,	58 ½
While the other Side ſtands as formerly at	87

That is thirty-one Millions leſs than the whole Expence of the Government, and Five Millions leſs than is ſufficient for the Maintainance of the People.

I think it is as clear as the Sun, that this muſt be our Caſe upon Suppoſition that we were deprived of the Benefit of Trade; which may be more Ways than one, whether we continue a War, or conclude a Peace; but this laſt, unleſs upon equal, honour-

honourable, and lasting Terms, is the most likely to bring it most speedily about.

For if we consider that *France*, towards the Close of the last War, was scarce in a Condition to send a Ship to Sea, and had little or no Trade; and that since that Time, meerly by our Mismanagement, she has been able to work herself into one half the Trade of *Europe*: At least it is undeniable, she has at this Day as much Trade as we have. It is evident to every Man, who is not wilfully blind; that if she is allowed the Possession of the Trading Ports of the *Low-Countries*, she must, in much less Time, run away with the little we have left. For these Ports must be much more advantageous to her, than the *Dutch* or *Flemmings*; because these People, having little, or no Product of their own, are but Carriers, and cannot so easily rival us in our Manufactures; but when *France* is possessed of them, she has Materials within herself, for the Fabrick of most of our Manufactures, a Number of Hands, which a wise Government knows how to employ; and a plentiful Country to support them, and a natural Inclination in the People to Parsimony and Industry; consequently it follows, that any Peace, which encreases the Sea Ports of *France*, or does not leave *Great Britain*, at least in the same Situation she was in before, the War must bring about that untoward Event, destroy our Trade and render us national Bankrupts; but if we are no worse than we were before, the Territories of our Allies restored, at least, out of the Hands of *France*, though the War

War has coſt us a great deal, yet we may by prudent Management, ſtill continue a trading People.

From what I have ſaid above, it would appear that a War is more eligible at preſent, than Peace; ſince it is not to be ſuppoſed by any Man in his Senſes, that *France* will reſtore Things as they were before the War, 'till ſhe is compell'd to it; but then it is to be obſerved, that we may run into the ſame Misfortune by a War, which I have mentioned as the Conſequence of any Peace, which leaves *France* poſſeſſed of the *Netherlands*; and this, either by an imprudent Management of the War, the Male-conduct of our Finances, or an unequal and unjudicious Aſſeſſment of the publick Taxes.

In the firſt Place the War may be ſo conducted as to laſt ſo long as to give the Powers of *Europe*, not engaged in it, an Opportunity of becoming Maſters of many Branches of Trade, as it muſt be carried on in their Bottoms, and directing the whole into Channels, out of which it may be impoſſible to draw it again, upon the Concluſion of a Peace as honourable as we can wiſh. This is the Danger of a long War to a trading People! Our Manufacturers cannot live without Employment; they muſt in Time of War, either liſt into the Army, and ſo are loſt to Trade, or remove themſelves into other Countries to get Bread, and ſo are loſt to the Community. It was by ſuch a Chance as this, we ourſelves became a trading People. The Perſecution of the Duke *de Alva*, baniſhed hither the *Waloons*, and theſe brought with them our Knowledge in the Woollen Manufactures,

factures, the Spring and *primum Mobile* of the *British Trade*. If then, we acquired Trade ourſelves by ſuch Means, is it not natural to fear, we may loſe it by the ſame, eſpecially as all the Powers of *Europe* ſeem fully appriz'd of the Benefit of Commerce and Manufactures; are each of them jealous of every Encroachment on what they have, and anxious to embrace every Opportunity of encreaſing it.

But I ſuppoſe thoſe for a War may anſwer, That to prevent a lingering War, our whole natural Strength ſhould be effectually employ'd againſt the Enemy; and that our Marine ſhould be put upon ſuch Footing, as by frequent and ſtrong Convoys, and a careful Look-out on the Enemies Ships, to keep up the Spirit of Trade, and by that Means keep our Manufacturers from Starving and Deſpair, 'till an honourable Peace be concluded, which would make ample Amends for their Sufferings during the War.

I grant if I could be ſo ſanguine as to believe that to be the Caſe, hence forward, of which by looking back on paſt Events, we have little, very little Reaſon to hope, I ſhould willingly give my Vote for the Continuance of the War.

But there is more neceſſary than a prudent Conduct in the Direction of the War itſelf, to render the Effects of it beneficial. The Conduct of our Finances in ſuch Circumſtances may affect us, if not regularly managed, with all the Miſchiefs of an inglorious Peace. A profuſe ſquandering of the publick Treaſure, affects every Subject and heightens the Miſery of War, and being

 nigardly

nigardly ſparing may continue the War for Ages. That we have not been over-above parſimonious hitherto I ſhall grant, but then what we have given to our Allies with a profuſe Hand, has not anſwered the End propoſed: We have not reaped the Fruits of it, nor has the Supplies, in lieu of which it was granted, been ever made forthcoming in the Field. So that tho' *G. B.* has paid for as many Troops as might have made Head againſt all the Power of *France*; ſhe has always found herſelf in a Manner alone in the Field, tho' on the Muſter Rolls, her Armies have been made up of *Auſtrians*, *Dutch*, and others who lived upon her Treaſures; but either fought their own Battles, or betrayed the Poſts they were entruſted with.

Without then, care is taken that the Nation's Money is not given for nominal, but effective Succours, we are empoveriſhing ourſelves, to feed the Avarice of our Allies, and can never expect an End to the War, but ſuch as depend upon the Generoſity of the Conqueror.

Again, ſuppoſe the Succours engaged for by our Allies, were actually brought into the Field, and Treaties and Covenants literally and honeſtly performed, there is ſtill behind a conſiderable Article to be adverted to, as of the utmoſt Conſequence to the Succeſs of Peace or War; that is, an equal Aſſeſſment of the publick Taxes, which in the Caſe of a War, muſt be ſuppoſed to encreaſe annually.

That we are not yet Bankrupts, nor near it, I have made appear, and that we are able, on urgent Neceſſity, ſuch as the Preſervation of Liberty

and

and Commerce, to bear a much greater Proportion of Taxes than at preſent, I have demonſtrated; but then this muſt be underſtood with ſeveral Reſtrictions, and the Chief is, that ſuch Taxes as are levied, be equally aſſeſſed upon the whole Body of the People, and in Proportion to the Abilities of each diſtinct Claſs.

Were the Taxes we now pay equally levied, I may venture to affirm, that the People would not feel them ſo ſenſibly, and might continue them much longer; but at preſent, the Merchant and Manufacturers feel all the Burthen of the State, they have been rack'd ſo much, that a little farther Stretch may deſtroy the whole Machine. For I think, except two Millions, which the Land Intereſt pays; the remainder of Ten or Twelve Millions is paid by the Merchant and Manufacturer, that the Merchant pays more than his Proportion appears; that tho' it's ſuppoſed his Profits do not exceed Four Millions, (and I dare ſware that is the utmoſt,) yet he pays two Millions to the Crown, which is one Third, while the Land Intereſt pays one Seventh, notwithſtanding his Rents are encreaſed from Seven to Fourteen, by the Merchant's Means.

As this Diſproportion runs through the whole of the Publick Funds, it is eaſy to imagine that the Merchant and Manufacturer are not able to bear more, which is the only Reaſon why the Publick is impreſſed with that Notion, that we are taxed to the full of what we can bear; which is only true in this Reſpect, that thoſe who have hitherto paid all the Expences of the Publick, are

not able to pay more; yet it does not follow, because the Merchant and Manufacturer thinks one Third of what they have, as much as they can spare to the Service of the State, that there is not a Method to levy the Present, and double the Quantity of Taxes, without any one Man in the Kingdom paying more than one Third, the present Proportion which the Merchant now pays.

The Disproportion of the Taxes will still appear more glaring, when we consider that there are a Class of People in the Kingdom, worth as much Money as the Merchant, who makes near the Matter as large Profits upon the whole, and yet does not contribute one Shilling towards the Expence of the Publick. The Class I mean is the money'd Interest. They have in the Funds very near four-score Millions; a Sum equal to that employed in Trade, and divide at least, 4 *per Cent.* without any Trouble or Hire, out of which they do not pay nor are not assessed one Shilling towards the Exegencies of State, but prey upon her as often as it is in their Power, by Ways and Means, which they only are acquainted with.

By what I have said I would not be understood, as if I wanted the Land Interest to be higher taxed, or the money'd Men to be meddled with on any Account; but I urge it, to shew that the Government really falls heaviest on the Merchant, and that the Burthen of our Taxes is rather owing to an unequal Assessment, than the Disproportion they bear to the Wealth of the Kingdom. For, supposing the annual Income of the Nation, as I

have

have computed it to amount to 112 Millions; and the whole Sum raiſed upon the People for the Charge of Government, to amount to 14 Millions, which it perhaps may do, including Pariſh Rates, publick Buildings, High-Ways, and the Charge of collecting the whole, the Proportion on the whole is only one Eighth, which equal Aſſeſſment would relieve the Merchant more than one Half, and the landed Intereſt, who pays now one Seventh, would pay only one Eighth.

But if any additional Tax is laid on, according to the old Method, the Merchant and Manufacturer muſt ſuffer the whole; and I leave it to every Man to judge what may be the Conſequence, if the Merchant is rated, ſo as not to have a living Profit out of his Goods; he quits Trade and throws his Money into the Funds, and ſo inſtead of helping the Publick, lives meerly upon her Spoils. If the Miſchief would ſtop here it would be tolerable; but for every Thouſand he carries out of Trade, at leaſt a Hundred People become idle, and a Burthen to their Friends and Pariſhes, and if that becomes univerſal (as there is nothing to hinder it from becoming ſo) the whole Body of Manufacturers ſtarve, the Land-Rent ſinks, and the whole increaſe of the Nation is not ſufficient to maintain the People.

From what I have ſaid on this Head, I would inculcate on my Readers the abſolute Neceſſity of an equal Aſſeſſment of ſuch new Taxes as may be neceſſary to be levied for the Continuance of the War, and that an additional Tax cannot hurt us, if it is not laid upon the Merchant and Manufacturer;

facturer; but if it is they that must bear the additional Charge, we must in a few Years meet that Ruin as effectually as if the Ministers by Treaty put *France* in Possession of all the trading Ports in the Netherlands, and some few in the Island of *Britain* itself. Whereas if they are eas'd of their present Burthen, which an equal Tax would do, we are able to hold out the War, 'till *France* has not a Ship to send to Sea, and we recover every Branch of Trade we have lost, either by Fraud or Cowardice.

Thus then, Part of the ministerial Declaration may be true, we have much to fear, but it's not from the Enemy. It's from their bad Management of the War, their Profusion of the Publick Treasure, or their obstinate persisting in loading Trade and our Manufactures with all the Charges of it, and we have still something to hope, which is likewise from them; we may hope and almost be assured, that our natural Strength properly and wisely applied, is able to beat the Enemy out of all her Robberies, and restore *Great Britain* to the State from which she is fallen; which no Man in his Senses can expect from any Treaty (as things are now circumstanced) though conducted by the wisest and most honest Statesman in *Europe*.

F I N I S.

AN HISTORICAL

ESSAY

UPON THE

BALLANCE

OF

CIVIL POWER

IN

ENGLAND,

From its first Conquest by the *Anglo-Saxons*, to the Time of the REVOLUTION; in which is introduced a new DISSERTATION UPON PARTIES:

With a proper DEDICATION to the Freeholders and Burgesses of *Great Britain*.

LONDON:

Printed for M. COOPER at the *Globe* in *Pater-Noster-Row*, 1748.

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TO THE

FREEHOLDERS, BURGESSES, and other Parliamentary ELECTORS of *Great Britain.*

GENTLEMEN,

AS the following Pages were written for your Information, I humbly beg the Honour of recommending them to your Peruſal, Favour, and Protection. They contain an hiſtorical Detail of the Balance of civil Power amongſt us, from the firſt Foundation of our Empire by the *Anglo-Saxons* to the preſent Times; ſhort indeed, but convincing, I preſume to hope, and ſatisfactory. Nor is this a merely ſpeculative Point, or matter of Curioſity only, which 'tis indifferent whether you concern yourſelves about or not; but, on the contrary, one of the moſt important and intereſting, which can poſſibly engage your Attention as Lovers of *Old England*, as true Patriots, as devoted to the Conſtitution of your Country, and reſolved to ſupport it.

For if it be of the very Eſſence of our civil Eſtabliſhment, that there be an equal Poiſe

of Power between the three ſeveral Orders which conſtitute the ſovereign Authority, and that each of theſe be able to act freely and independantly of the others——'tis neceſſary that you ſhould at all Times be made acquainted with the true State of our political Ballance, as this Knowledge will furniſh you with the beſt Rule, for examining into the parliamentary Behaviour of your own particular Repreſentatives, as well as of judging of the general Conduct of thoſe Miniſters, into whoſe Hands his Majeſty ſhall pleaſe to entruſt the publick Adminiſtration.——Ignorance in the Slaves of other Countries, whoſe only Buſineſs it is to obey the Commands of their ambitious and imperious Maſters, is ſalutary and even meritorious; but in you, Gentlemen, who make ſo conſiderable and diſtinguiſhed a part of our Common-wealth, 'tis inexcuſable not to pay a proper regard to every means of Information, which your happy State of Freedom has thrown within your Reach; 'tis the Extremity of Folly to be hurried away by Paſſion or Prejudice, and not to act agreeably to what Reaſon and Examination will ſoon convince you to be moſt conducive to the general Happineſs.

The great Clamor, I know, has lately been, (quite contrary to the Doctrine which you will find eſtabliſhed in the following Sheets) and I doubt not but the ſame frightful

ful Alarm will be again repeated,——"That "the Power of the Crown has been con- "tinually increasing ever since the Revo- "lution; that the regal Scale is become "vastly too heavy; that by means of an "immense Civil List, a standing Army, "numerous Imposts, and a corrupted Par- "liament, the Throne has more than its "due Influence upon the other Branches of "the Legislature, and holds them both in a "slavish Dependance; that our very Li- "berties and Properties are become pre- "carious, and lie at the Mercy of the King "and his Ministers; and that unless this "exorbitant Power be soon restrained, by "throwing more Weight into the Scale of "the Commons, our *All* will quickly be "swallowed up by a rapacious Court, ex- "cessive Taxes, and Armies kept on foot "to carry on affected Quarrels, and Wars "groundless and unprofitable."——These therefore have been the annual and beaten Subjects of real Incendiaries and pretended Patriots; these Colours have served to set off an Opposition to his Majesty's measures as capricious, as virulent; they have been the only Support of all the late popular Schemes of humbling the Court, and introducing Place-Bills, annual Parliaments, *&c. &c.*

But are these Things so? and is this a true Representation of the present State of our political Ballance? Think for your-

ſelves, Gentlemen, and, I doubt not, you will find the Caſe far otherwiſe: examine for yourſelves, and, as in all other Matters of a ſimilar Nature, ſo in this likewiſe, let Evidence, let Facts only inform and direct your Judgments. Condemn or acquit the Views and Intentions of your Superiors, by what you actually feel and experience from their Conduct, rather than by what your own gloomy Imaginations may ſuggeſt, or the malicious Gloſſes of lying Papiſts and ſelf-intereſted Malecontents may inſinuate to their Prejudice.

In whatever Hands the Overbalance of the national Property lies, there the great Weight of national Power will always be found. This is an indiſputable Maxim, illuſtrated by the conſtant tenor of your own Hiſtory, as well as by that of all other States and Kingdoms. But the Property of this Nation, four Fifths of it or even more, is moſt undoubtedly in the hands of the People, as a diſtinct body from the King and the Lords: with them therefore is the Overbalance of our national Power entirely lodged; and a King of *England*, who, in a Situation like this, ſhall attempt to invade the eſtabliſhed Rights and Privileges of his People, whether civil or religious, muſt neceſſarily fail in his daring Undertaking, and ſhare the Fate of the willful and ambitious *Stewarts*. " *In a Government balanced as*

" *ours*

" *ours is, to contend with the People is to* " *throw all into their Hands.*"

The Danger therefore to your preſent happy Conſtitution, if there really be any, ariſes altogether from another quarter; and your greateſt Fear and Precaution ought to be, leſt the *People*, or more properly their Repreſentatives, who have been gradually gaining upon the King and Lords, ever ſince the Time of *Henry* VII, ſhould become too heavy for both at laſt. For you may aſſure yourſelves, Gentlemen, tho' this is a Point not often enough, nor ſufficiently attended to by you, that your excellent Eſtabliſhment is broke thro', and as much endangered, when the Houſe of Commons has too great, as when it has too little a ſhare in the Government; and perhaps the inconveniencies to the governed would be found full as grievous in the one caſe as the other, at leaſt if we may be allowed to draw any conſequences from thoſe immenſe Impoſitions, and that terrible State of Miſery and Confuſion, which happened amongſt us in the laſt Century, when the Deputies of the People became in fact the Head of the Common-wealth. ——In the preſent Situation of the *Crown*, could we ſuppoſe his Majeſty, by ſome ſtrange Metamorphoſis, to have ever ſo great an inclination to overturn the Conſtitution, yet could he not poſſibly effect his purpoſe: the *Commons*, on the other

other hand, have it always in their Power, and therefore may do it; tho' I am very ready to own, and 'tis with the greateſt Pleaſure that I take this Opportunity to make the acknowledgement, that ſuch is the happy Choice, which you have generally made in your late Elections, there is not the leaſt Shadow of Probability to imagine they will attempt it. The regal Authority has its certain Limits already preſcribed by the Laws, which it dares not paſs at any time; but Liberty, when once it begins to degenerate into Licentiouſneſs, knows no Reſtraint, nor will be contained within any Bounds.

'Tis true, Gentlemen, you have long had a ſtanding Army of regular Troops amongſt you, ---but as it was the perilous Situation of affairs in *Europe*, and the Security of your own Liberties both civil and religious, which firſt perſuaded your Governours to enter upon this Meaſure, ſo the ſame dangerous Alarms ſtill force them to continue and increaſe thoſe Troops. For you are too well acquainted with the ſudden and violent Effects of Ambition, to think that we can ever be too much upon our Guard, when our implacable Enemies, the *French*, have more than 200,000 Men in conſtant Pay, even in Times of Peace, always ready to invade us with, or, without Pretence, the

firſt

firſt proper Opportunity that offers. 'Tis a very good Maxim in Politics, a Maxim, which 'tis for our Intereſt to hope our Superiors never will forget, that "*no State is* "*ſufficiently ſecure, which is not fully pro-* "*vided, both at home and abroad, againſt all* "*Accidents.*"

If there was no ſtanding Army maintained in this Iſland formerly, it was becauſe the Circumſtances of the Times did not require it; it was becauſe every Man in the Nation was born a Soldier, and obliged to obey the Calls of his Prince or Superior, as often as the State thought a War neceſſary; it was becauſe there was little or no Trade to employ our poorer Hands; it was becauſe there was no ſtanding Army kept up in the Kingdoms, which were contiguous to us---But the great Alteration which has been made, within a Century paſt, in almoſt all the neighbouring States, from limited now reduced to abſolute Monarchies; the ſtrict Union between the *French* and *Spaniſh* Kingdoms, and the very different Manner or Art of fighting in Uſe now, from what was anciently practiſed in *Europe*, when mere Strength was as much valued, and did almoſt as much Execution in the Day of Battle, as the greateſt military Skill, theſe conſiderations, I ſay, when well examined, will ſoon convince you, that however wiſe the Contrivers may imagine themſelves to

be, a national Militia can never be ſo ſettled amongſt a trading, free People, as to be depended upon in any very great Emergency.

But after all, whoſe is this *ſtanding Army*, that carries ſo much Terror in its very Name, about which ſo much Clamour has been raiſed, and ſo many anniverſary Harangues made, bothin Parliament and out of it? 'Tis called indeed in common diſcourſe the King's! but for what Reaſon, is hard to ſay. Does he, is he, indeed, able to maintain it out of his own private Revenue? 'Till he can do this, however wiſely he may be intruſted with the general Charge and Direction of it for the common Good, yet will he never be able ſo far to influence and command it, as to render it ſubſervient to any private Views of his own, diſtinct from the general Intereſt of the State. Whilſt our Officers have many of them independant Fortunes; whilſt our Forces are paid by the Nation, are a Part of the Nation, generally reſide in the Nation, and are ſubject to the ſame Laws with the reſt of their Brethren, they never can be ſo modelled as to bring the leaſt Danger to our Civil Liberties. ——'Tis the Army of the People, more properly than of the King; and as it owes its *Being* to, and receives its *Subſiſtence* wholly from, the Commons of *England*, muſt immediately diſband itſelf, as ſoon as that Power ſhall withdraw its annual Support. For it has

has long ſince been laid down, and muſt be admitted, as an undoubted Truth, that "*where an Army ſubſiſts upon the Pay, or* "*Riches, of a ſingle Perſon or of a Nobility,* "*that Army is always monarchical; but* "*where an Army ſubſiſts not by the Riches of* "*a ſingle Perſon, nor of a Nobility, that* "*Army is always popular.*"

Again; I doubt not, Gentlemen, but as you have already frequently had it rung in your Ears, ſo you will again have it reiterated to you, as an irrefragable Argument of the prodigious Extent of the *Influence of the Crown*, that for theſe many Years paſt it has conſtantly had a Majority of both Houſes, to ratify whatever Motions have been made in its Favour; that it has always been able to procure a parliamentary Sanction to all its Meaſures.——Where then, will it be aſked you, is your Security? and is not your excellent Conſtitution in the utmoſt Danger of being ſubverted, whilſt its Guardians ſuffer themſelves to be thus fatally lulled aſleep, or, what is worſe, corrupted into an abject State of Dependance upon the Court?

But as you are wiſe, Gentlemen, you will be very cautious how you ſuffer yourſelves to be amuſed with fine Words and ſeducing Harangues, without ſufficiently attending to Things themſelves; the former may deceive you, the latter cannot. The

Parliament is, in reality, no more dependant upon the King when it confirms his Meaſures, than when it ſets a Mark of Diſgrace upon them and rejects them, any more than the King in his turn is dependant upon the Parliament, when he gives his Aſſent to a Bill, which it was in his Power to have refuſed.

If the Crown for ſome Time paſt has generally had the greater Part of the Parliament on its Side, is not this, in fact, the higheſt Encomium which can poſſibly be given to his Majeſty, and to thoſe worthy Perſons, who under his Auſpices have been thus happily concerned in the Adminiſtration? the moſt natural and rational, as well as the moſt good-natured Concluſion which can be deduced from hence, is, that all our great Affairs of State, both foreign and domeſtic, have been conducted with ſo much Care, Wiſdom and Circumſpection, that there has been no Room for cenſuring, no plauſible Pretence for publickly condemning them.

" There is a wide Difference, ſays a late " Author, between ſuch a Majority on the " Side of the Government, as will ſuffer " publick Buſineſs to go on, by placing " ſome Confidence in the Adminiſtration, " and by aſſiſting the Crown in purſuing " vigorous Meaſures, when ſuch are neceſ- " ſary againſt its Enemies, on the one hand;

" and

" and ſuch a Majority, on the other, as will " hearken implicitly to the Voice of a Mi- " niſter, without any Attention to the Good " of the People. Without the former of " theſe, no Adminiſtration can ſtand a " Moment, nor even the Government it- " ſelf ſubſiſt. ---But of a Majority of the " latter kind, I thank God, our Annals can " produce no Inſtance: For I may chal- " lenge the moſt malicious Male-content, " during all the Time in which the Cla- " mours againſt Corruption have run ſo " very high, that they have been echoed " by the moſt corrupt amongſt us, to pro- " duce one ſingle Inſtance of any Law, " which hath ſtruck at the Root of our " Conſtitution, or which hath attempted to " undermine our Liberties."

But ſuppoſe, Gentlemen, for Argument's ſake, you ſhould even go ſo far as to grant theſe pretended Patriots, that all our late parliamentary Complaiſance to the Throne, has been entirely owing to that very Influence, which is ſo miſerably complained of —— what would be the conſequence of this Conceſſion? that the Crown is increaſed in real Power ſince the Revolution, and, unleſs more Reſtraints are ſoon laid upon it, in the ready Way to ſubvert the reſerved and diſtinct Rights of the other two Branches of the Legiſlature? quite the reverſe! 'Tis, I think, a cogent, an irrefragable

refragable Argument of the Weakneſs and Dependency, rather than the overbearing Strength and Authority of the Crown; 'tis an Argument, that the other Members of the Legiſlature, eſpecially the Houſe of Commons, are become thro'ly ſenſible of their own Weight and Importance in the Government, and will therefore be flattered, courted, gratified, and even payed for paſſing thoſe Votes, and confirming thoſe very Meaſures, which the wiſeſt of them, at leaſt, know at the ſame time to be abſolutely neceſſary for carrying on the great Buſineſs of the Common-wealth. Very different were the Methods, as Hiſtory will fully inform you, which *Henry* VIII. and *Oliver Cromwell* took, when they wanted to procure a Majority of the Parliament, in Favour of their arbitrary and illegal Schemes.

But here, you will be told, the Hazard begins; for if the Crown has Power enough, thro' Means of Money and Places, to get ſome Bills to paſs, which would not otherwiſe, perhaps, ſo eaſily have been admitted, how do we know where the fatal Miſchief will ſtop? May not this ſame baneful Influence be at length ſo far extended, as to get ſuch Laws enacted, as ſhall reſign our *All*, our Liberties and Properties, into the Hands of an ambitious, rapacious, and ever-watchful Court?

But

But this Suppoſition, Gentlemen, in whatever Light you ſhall pleaſe to conſider and examine it, will be found moſt manifeſtly weak and ſelf-contradictory; and thoſe very Perſons, who out of ſome private Views of their own, have taken ſo much Pains to frighten their honeſt Neighbours in the Country with the imaginary Phantom, cannot but know it. "As ſoon as King "*Charles* II. (ſays the Author of the *Diſ-*"*ſertation upon Parties*) was evidently in "an Intereſt different from that of his "People, neither their Places nor their "Penſions could hinder Courtiers from "voting, on many ſignal Occaſions, againſt "the Court; nor protect either thoſe who "drew the King into ill Meaſures, or thoſe "who complied with him in them."—— and ſuch will ever be the Event, unleſs we can ſuppoſe that the Majority of both Houſes of Parliament, that 500 Gentlemen of the firſt Quality and the largeſt Share of Property in the Nation, where there is no Army, no external Force to compell them to the baſe Act, ſhould ſuffer themſelves to be ſeduced into a Conſpiracy, as it were, to deliver up themſelves, their Wives and Children, their Relations and Friends, bound Hand and Foot, into the King's Power! as eaſily, and with full as much appearance of Probability, may it be ſuggeſted, that

that the Majority of both Houſes may be perſuaded, influenced or corrupted to deſtroy themſelves.

And *for what* are they imagined capable of thus giving up their Underſtandings, of committing all this abject Meanneſs, and of becoming guilty of this enormous Breach of Truſt? What is that almighty Temptation, which is ſuppoſed powerful enough to ſubject them to this unnatural Influence, and to blind their Eyes to their own certain Ruin? *Money!* and *Places!* But the Gentlemen of *England* have too long taſted of the delicious Sweets of Liberty, to part with it for ſuch Trifles; and are too far advanced in Hiſtory and Politicks not to know, that from the Moment they have gratified their Sovereign with abſolute Power, neither their *Money*, nor their *Places*, nor any thing elſe they may chance to be in Poſſeſſion of, can be firmly relied upon as their own, but will all remain entirely at the Command and Diſpoſal of their arbitrary Maſter.

But after all, Gentlemen, if you will examine the Point in queſtion to the Bottom, you will find the very Foundation of all theſe affected Out-cries againſt the increaſing Power of the Crown, and the precarious Situation of your Liberties, to be weak and abſurd; ſeeing 'tis a moſt undoubted Fact, a Fact confirmed by the Experience of every Seſſion of Parliament for theſe many Years paſt,

paſt, that the Commons of *England* were in general never richer, never enjoyed a more entire Liberty, never had more Influence and Authority in the State, or exerciſed a greater Share in the Government than at preſent, except at one certain Period in our Annals, which no wiſe or good Man, I am certain, would wiſh to have revived. Freſh Laws are continually paſſing in their Favour, the abſolute Command of all the Property of their Country is veſted in them; in their Hands are depoſited almoſt all the Places of Truſt and Profit in the Nation; and even the ſovereign right of Peace and War, however his Majeſty may be complimented with the Name, in reality belongs to them; at leaſt he will never be adviſed by his Miniſters to conclude either the one or the other, without being previouſly aſſured, as far as the Nature of the thing will admit, that what he does with regard to theſe high Points, will receive the Approbation of his faithful Commons.

When you are told therefore, as you frequently have been, that *an excluſive Place-Bill* would not only put an end to all Bribery and Corruption for the future, but likewiſe add more Weight to the popular Scale, and render the lower Houſe of Parliament in a great meaſure independent of their Sovereign —— Be ready likewiſe in your turn, Gentlemen, to aſk theſe Republicans in

Maſks, the following queſtions: whether encreaſing the Power of the Houſe of Commons, be the moſt natural way of leſſening Bribery and Corruption in order to obtain a Seat in it? or rather, whether it will not augment the Value of the Commodity, and conſequently enhance the purchaſe-money? has not the Houſe of Commons ſufficient Power and Authority already? has it not full as much as the Conſtitution ſuppoſes it ſhould have? and may not any farther addition made to it be extremely dangerous to the Common-wealth? can it poſſibly be of any advantage to the Public, to have the Commons in a perpetual Diſtruſt, and always at Variance with the Crown? ever oppoſing its Meaſures, and finding Fault with the Adminiſtration, right or wrong? what foreign Power will venture to negociate with us, or indeed may ſafely confide in our Reſolutions, upon this Suppoſition? how ſhall the great Affairs of the Nation be properly carried on, if the Men of Buſineſs and Abilities are excluded from the Honour of ſerving their Country in the Houſe of Commons? or, how ſhall the high and important Offices of State be duly diſcharged, if ſuch as are beſt qualified to ſhine in them, can *only* be employed in Parliament?

'Tis probable enough that ſuch an *excluſive Place-Bill*, as is contended for, was it ever ſuffered to paſs into an Act, would indeed ren-

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der the Parliament entirely independant of the King——But what would be the conſequence of ſuch an anticonſtitutional Independance ? what it might come to in *England* in time, I ſhall not preſume to gueſs ; but what, in fact, are the bleſſed effects of a ſimilar inconnection between the King and Diet of *Poland*, I hope I may take the Liberty of laying before you, without giving offence to any one.——The moſt wretched civil Regulations of any State in Chriſtendom ; the moſt ſhocking and intolerable Tyranny of the Landholders over their Boors or Tenants ; no Encouragement given to Trade and Induſtry ; a national Army almoſt without Pay, without Officers, without Diſcipline ; fenced Towns never in proper Repair ; Borders ſubject to the continual Inroads of all the neighbouring Nations ; Territories ſtill decreaſing ; a Common-wealth corrupted by foreign Gold, diſtracted and torn to pieces by mutual Jealouſies and Suſpicions, with a King at its Head, frequently impoſed upon it by an Army of Strangers ; a Republic of little or no Weight in the Ballance of *Europe*.

'Tis much in the ſame manner likewiſe, that the ſeveral States of the *German* Empire are independant of one another, and of their Emperor : but are they better governed, or more eaſy and happy on that account ?

or rather, are they not by this very means rendered much weaker, more obnoxious to diſunion, and more liable to be attacked from without and ruined? "*Germany*, ſays the famous Mr. *Harrington*, "thro' a "Defect in her Policy (intending one Com-"mon-wealth, has made a hundred Mo-"narchies in her Bowels, whoſe croſs In-"tereſts twiſt her Guts) has been the The-"atre of the ſaddeſt Tragedies under the "Sun." To the ſame Purpoſe is what Mr. *Vertot* obſerves of the ancient Conſtitution of *Sweden*; "ſo much Indepen-"dance, ſays that Author, in the Subject, "an Authority ſo extremely limited in the "Prince, and ſo little Union or Con-"nection between the different Orders of "the State, all this has been the Occaſion, "that this Kingdom has ſcarcely ever been "free from Revolts and Civil Wars." And ſo well founded, and ſupported by the Hiſtory of that Country, is this remark of the learned Frenchman, that ſcarcely in *Scotland* itſelf, another of theſe inconnected and independant States, do we read of more Invaſions, Seditions, Rebellions, Depoſitions, and murthering of Kings than in *Sweden*.

And is it for ſuch Polities as theſe, Gentlemen, that your pretended Friends would perſuade you to quit your preſent excellently-well-tempered Conſtitution? are theſe the envied Bleſſings of an abſolutely independant

dant Diet or Parliament? dare to be wise enough to know when you are well; and rest satisfied with keeping things as they are, lest thro' too eager a Desire of mending the Constitution, you deprive yourselves of the substantial Blessings, which you at present enjoy! For I shall not scruple to assert, that, notwithstanding the heavy Wars you are so necessarily engaged in, and that consequent Load of Taxes which you labour under, you are not only the most free, but might be likewise the most happy People in *Europe*, would you but trust to what you really feel yourselves, rather than to what you are told you feel by others. "'Tis often of pernicious Consequence, says "a very famous Politician, to endeavour at "being better than well; and not only pri- "vate Men, but Bodies politic, will have "very ill Constitutions, who are always "tampering and trying Experiments with "themselves."

A little Self-examination is sometimes as necessary in the political, as it is in the moral World, when a Man is sincerely resolved to acquaint himself with his true State and Condition——Am I, then, in any Danger of losing my Life, my Limbs, or my Liberty, by the mere Caprice of a wanton and malicious Courtier, or the impetuous Commands of a head-strong Tyrant? is my Property safe from all-devouring Ordon-

nances of an abſolute Monarque? are there any other Taxes levyed upon me, than ſuch as the united Wiſdom of the Nation in a free Parliament has thought expedient to impoſe? and would not an Army of ſavage *Highlanders*, or plundering *French*, were they to live at free Quarters upon my Eſtate but a few Days only, deſtroy more of my Property, than I have contributed to the neceſſities of the Publick for theſe many Years paſt? are not the true Intereſts of Trade duly ſtudied, encouraged, and protected? are not the Laws of my Country impartially executed? are they ever repealed, ſuſpended, or diſpenſed with, by the mere Will or Prerogative of the Prince? or are they not made the invariable Rule of the King's Conduct as well as of mine? "Is "not the Spirit, as well as the Letter, of "the Conſtitution he is to preſerve, the "ſole Rule of his Government, and the "ſole Support of his Power"? Am I not permitted, without the leaſt Reſtraint laid upon my Conſcience, to ſerve Heaven in my own way? what then can a Subject reaſonably expect, or deſire, more than this from the wiſeſt and beſt of Princes? The wiſeſt and beſt of Princes can but protect the Lives and Properties, the civil and religious Liberties, the Trade and Commerce of their People? ——You may therefore boldly defy the beſt-read Hiſtorian, to aſſign a

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ſingle Reign in all our Annals, when theſe great Ends of Government were more religiouſly intended, or more generally obtained than under his preſent Majeſty's auſpicious, mild, and ſteady Adminiſtration: nay, you may boldly challenge the moſt diſcontented and querulous of all his Subjects to point out that Nation under Heaven, where he will venture to aſſert, that he could live ſo happily, in all reſpects, as he does in *England*.

Are theſe Bleſſings then to be encreaſed to yourſelves, Gentlemen, or can you even hope that they will be continued to your Poſterity, by leſſening the royal Power, by rendering it contemptible, and throwing more weight into the Scale of the Commons? the Hazard is certainly too great for any wiſe Man to wiſh the Experiment made ——" Our Conſtitution is a Monarchy, and " and tho' limited, yet muſt the Crown be " permitted a conſiderable Share of Power, " without which our Government, whatever " we may afterwards think fit to call it, " will become of another Species; a Spe- " cies, which certainly we are not fitted " for, and which, as in former Times, we " ſhould ſuffer all the Evils of Confuſion " in attempting to procure, and which, " when procured, we never ſhould be able " to maintain." .... " This Conſtitution, " 'tis true, may have its Imperfections, but faulty

" faulty as it is, our Anceſtors, at the Ex-
" pence of an immenſe Treaſure and an
" Ocean of *Engliſh* Blood, have conveyed
" down Liberty to us thro' this Channel,
" and we ought to continue it on, as well
" as we can, to our Poſterity, and not to
" give way to the new-modelling Schemes
" of every extraordinary Genius. It would
" certainly be new-modelling the Conſtitu-
" tion in a great meaſure, to take a con-
" ſiderable Part of that Power, which is
" left to the Crown, from the Crown, and
" throw it into the Hands of the other
" Branches of the Legiſlature."

But we hope better things; and have good grounds for theſe Hopes, when we conſider the happy Choice, which you have ſo lately made, of proper Perſons to repreſent you in the enſuing Parliament. You have ſhewn, in the moſt effectual manner, the great Regard which you bear the ancient Conſtitution of your Country, by having generally conferred the high dignity of a Seat in the Houſe of Commons, upon ſuch Perſons as have moſt diſtinguiſhed themſelves for their zealous Affection to their King and Country; upon ſuch Perſons as know, that as the King never has purſued any Intereſt diſtinct from that of this Country, ſo this Country can neither be happy, nor ſafe, but in the ſteady Support of the Proteſtant Succeſſion.

Entruſted

Entruſted in ſuch hands, it will require no great Skill in Divination to foretell, that notwithſtanding all the malicious Forgeries of lying Papiſts, the affected Out-cries of deſpairing Jacobites, or the lamentable Declamations of diſappointed Malecontents, your Liberties, his Majeſty's royal Prerogative, and our native Conſtitution will be preſerved pure and inviolate. You may now reſt ſecure, that under the preſent Adminiſtration ſupported by a Whig Parliament, every Thing will be done for the common Good, which the hazardous Circumſtances of the Times will permit. 'Tis not in the beſt-laid Schemes, or the wiſeſt Mortals to command Succeſs; all that can reaſonably be expected from our Governors, is, that every thing be done which may deſerve it. ——No! Gentlemen! you may at all times aſſure yourſelves, that you have no internal Dangers to fear for your darling Conſtitution, but from Tories and Republicans. When either of theſe Parties, thro' ſome fatal Coincidence of Circumſtances, ſhall gain the upper Hand, ſhall get the Superiority, 'tis then indeed time for you to look about you, to ring the Alarm-bell, to put yourſelves upon your beſt Guard, and to watch every Motion of the deſperate Enemy.

The *Republicans*, indeed, act entirely upon Principle; 'tis their great and eſpecial

Buſineſs to raiſe and encourage Differences between the King and his Subjects, to introduce Confuſion into the State, and thereby to pave the way for their *Oceanas* and *Utopias*. Only the Gentlemen in this Way of thinking would do well to reflect a little more attentively, than they uſually do, upon the preſent State of *Great Britain*, "that it is too far advanced in Luxury, "Magnificence, great Eſtates, and high "Titles, to return to a Common-wealth in "any Shape whatſoever; that the Envy, "Emulation, and Ambition of the proud "and popular Land-holders would be "a perpetual Occaſion of their tearing "one another, and their Country to Pieces, "were they not all ſubordinate to one ſu-"preme Head"——"Without a previous "Agrarian, ſays Mr. *Harrington*, there "can be no equal Common-wealth:" and "a "vicious and corrupt People, as *Machiavel* "well obſerves, is not ſo much as capable "of one."

As to the *Tories*, conſidered as ſuch, their political Conduct is all over weak and ſelf-contradictory. Their Principles and Practice are at a perpetual Strife and Variance with each other. They ſoberly maintain the divine Right of Kings to their Thrones, and yet are ever railing at the Succeſſion in their own State, and labouring all they can, with Safety to their Perſons,

ſons, to weaken and ſubvert it —— They pretend to be the moſt zealous Advocates for the Prerogative of Princes, yet are always attempting to leſſen that of their own ——They profeſs a paſſive as well as active Obedience to the ſupreme Power; yet ſtrenuouſly oppoſe every Meaſure, which is thought to come from it, whether right or wrong——They only are the true Friends of *Old England*, tho' at the ſame time they are perpetually murmuring at, and complaining of every vigorous Step, which is taken by the Adminiſtration, for preventing the ambitious, faithleſs, and encroaching *French* from becoming Maſters of the whole neighbouring Shore, *&c.*——Their Words, 'tis true, are the Words of Patriots and honeſt Men, but their Actions are the Actions of concealed Jacobites. I would by no means be thought to fix this odious Appellation upon the generality of them; for we have their own Words, as well as their moſt ſolemn Oaths for it, that they from their Souls deteſt, and abhor, both the Thing as well as the Name—If it be abſurd therefore, as the Author of the *Diſſertation upon Parties* tells us it is, to impute to the Tories that now are, the Principles which were laid to their Charge formerly, is it not, at leaſt, incumbent upon the Gentlemen of this Denomination, either freely to own

that they are now become downright Republicans, or elſe to give us a more certain Clue whereby we may be able to trace out and explain the Grounds of their preſent political Conduct? for that they are not Whigs, nor deſire to be looked upon as ſuch, the Healths they drink, the Songs they ſing, the Inſinuations they are continually dropping, and a thouſand other Circumſtances, will ſufficiently inform us.

Nor let the *Whigs* be charged with Inconſiſtency, and accuſed of having receded from the Principles which they formerly profeſſed, when they become Advocates for the Crown, and Aſſertors of the royal Prerogative. They always were, and every true Whig ſtill is, for maintaining an equal Ballance of Power between the ſeveral Orders of the Legiſlature. This is the ſure Characteriſtic by which you may always know them; they are againſt an overbearing, a domineering, an unconſtitutional Power in whatever Hands it may chance to be lodged. Does the Ballance ſeem to incline to the Crown? they are for lightning that Scale: does the Side of the Nobility, or Commons, preponderate? they are for throwing more Weight into the other Scales. ——'Tis Tyranny, 'tis Oligarchy, 'tis Confuſion they oppoſe; 'tis the Conſtitution, which they are always labouring to preſerve

preſerve free and inviolate. " Theſe are " they who walk, as it were, the Per- " ambulations of the Government, and who " think it their Duty to keep the true " and old Boundaries and Landmarks of " the State, and not to ſet up new. " Theſe are they who guard Prerogative, " Privilege and Liberty, ſo as none of them " intrench upon the other:" Theſe are they, who preſerved you from the threatning Dangers of the laſt Rebellion, and from whom alone you muſt expect Relief, ſhould the ſame threatning Alarms once more attack you: theſe are they who are continually watching for the Preſervation of *Europe*, and from whoſe ſteady Counſils and Advice to their Sovereign, you can alone hope to put an honourable End to this burthenſome, tho' neceſſary, War.

In ſhort, a true and conſiſtent Whig is a Balancer, a Mediator; always againſt Violence, and againſt Encroachment from whatever quarter it is derived——Under a *Henry* VIIIth, a *Charles*, or a *James*, he is a Countryman; under a *William*, or a *George*, he is a Courtier—— Still a Friend to Law, Truth, Juſtice and the Eſtabliſhment. Such were the great *Clarendon* and *Southhampton*; ſuch the Lords *Somers* and *Godolphin*; ſuch was the late Earl of *Orford*, and ſuch are thoſe illuſtrious Perſons, who

who are, at preſent, generally ſuppoſed to enjoy the greateſt Share of his Majeſty's Favour and Counſils.——*I am,*

Gentlemen,

Your Moſt Faithful

and

Moſt Devoted

Servant——

A N

AN HISTORICAL

ESSAY

Upon the BALLANCE of Civil Power in *ENGLAND.*

ALL Hail to Old England! may ſhe for ever flouriſh! may ſhe ſtill enjoy her liberty, her laws, and ancient Conſtitution!——Theſe are the pious breathings of nature and virtue, the daily prayers of patriots and true *Engliſhmen*, and even the cant of traitors and pretenders —— but what are the ideas annexed to theſe popular and darling terms? what the *Old England* ſo frequently toaſted, and ſo loudly talked of, and what that ancient government and conſtitution ſo fairly avowed, and ſo ſtrongly recommended both by Friends and Enemies?

The *whole people of* England, *together with their king*, are to be conſidered as one body, and may be affirmed to be a limited or popular monarchy; a kingdom of freemen; a realm, where nothing is abſolute but the law; where no law can be made, reverſed or altered, but by the common conſent of the king and each houſe of parliament; and where the rights, as well as duties,

duties of both prince and people, are preſcribed and bounded by the laws in being.

The *King* is ſupreme, and to be obey'd in all lawful commands.

The *Nobility* have an authority natural and hereditary, and are conſtituted a ſtanding council to the throne, and the chief court of judicature over the people; and it is preſumed their advices will be ſalutary to their country, when their property is ſo conſiderable; and that their decrees will be conſiſtent with that honour, which they ought to prefer before life itſelf.

The *Commons* have a power temporary and delegated; but as they avowedly repreſent the whole body of the people, as they are choſen for that office in preſumption of their virtue, their large property, their ſuperior wiſdom, their loyalty to their king, and their love to their country, the law ſuppoſes, that theſe will be the principles to guide their debates and fix their reſolutions.

Without the common conſent of each of theſe orders, no law can be made of any force or obligation; but when once made, for the prevention of factions and animoſities, and for the better regulation and diſpatch of buſineſs, the execution thereof remains entirely in the king, whoſe officers, from the higheſt to the loweſt, tho' his own perſon be unchallengable and ſacred, for the ſake of public juſtice, are always liable to have their conduct examined into by either houſe of parliament, or may be arraigned and condemned for any male-adminiſtrations, even in their maſter's own courts.

But as the three orders above, are the eſſential and neceſſarily-conſtituent parts of the *Engliſh legiſlature*,

legiſlature, ſo its virtue and continuance depend entirely upon the juſt and proportionable weight and influence of theſe orders; ſo that each of them be able to contribute its part, and diſcharge its office with freedom and independence; that neither have power to invade the diſtinct and reſerved rights of the other two, or of either of them ——This is *Old England*, and this its *conſtitution*, and whoſoever makes uſe of theſe expreſſions with other ideas or contrary intentions, he muſt be either weak in his underſtanding, or an enemy of his country.

Not that we are to ſuppoſe this excellent conſtitution, to have been firſt brought into being in its full proportion, ſtrength and vigour! it has had its infancy, its weakneſſes and extravagancies; and has grown up to maturity thro' a thouſand dangers, toils and ſtruggles. It has been forced to encounter with foreign invaſions and domeſtic treaſons, and after various ſhocks and convulſions, it has ſtill recovered itſelf with new life and vigour.

The *equilibrium* neceſſary to the preſervation of the whole, has been deſtroyed by the exorbitant ſwellings of the parts, and has ſeverally given way to the ambition of kings, the factions of nobles, and popular tumults and inſurrections. We have ſeen the *barons* ſetting up and depoſing monarchs at their pleaſure, *monarch* in their turn who have arbitrarily trampled upon the laws, and inſulted their parliaments; and again *parliaments*, who have given up their ſovereigns to priſon and to death. We have ſeen a *clergy* ſetting up for themſelves a power independent of all, and ſuperior to all, under the vain pretence of a papal ſupremacy; and an inſolent *ſtratocracy* has taken upon them to purge the ſenate, to degrade

the nobility, to arraign and murther their lawful ſovereign, and to govern all by the ſword.

How much then are we indebted to providence, and to the virtue and wiſdom of our brave anceſtors, that after ſo many conflicts we are yet unvanquiſhed? How can we be thankful enough, in what characters ſhall we deſcribe or expreſs our gratitude, that we are yet freemen and *Engliſhmen*, that we are yet in poſſeſſion of our laws and properties, that our juſtly boaſted conſtitution has ſurvived ſo many dangers, and even been improved and made perfect thro' ſufferings?

But all this will better and more diſtinctly appear, if we take a ſhort hiſtorical view of its beginning and progreſs.

This Kingdom, like all others of the *Gothic eſtabliſhment*, was originally founded upon this plaineſt principle of nature or common ſenſe, that *what concerns all ſhould be ultimately determined by all.* A ſenate conſulting and propoſing, a whole nation aſſenting, and a ſingle perſon executing, as it was one of the earlieſt, ſo is it perhaps the moſt perfect plan of civil empire, which can be invented. This, however, was that form of government, under which our brave *Anglo-Saxon* anceſtors lived in their native country, during their abode upon the continent, and this the very model which they brought with them, and erected in this iſland, after they had with almoſt infinite labour and difficulty conquered it from the ſtruggling *Britons*.

The governors of each ſhire or diſtrict, with ſome few others, whoſe years, experience, and offices in the ſtate, gave them the character of a

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ſuperior wiſdom, with the king at their head, regularly compoſed the *Senate* of the commonwealth; whoſe peculiar province it was to watch over the general intereſt of their country, to give audience to foreign embaſſadors, to decide controverſies between the ſubjects in the laſt reſort, to correct and reform the old cuſtoms, and to draw up new laws and orders; whilſt the body of the people, that is, all the native freemen, were either ſummoned to attend by the ſupreme magiſtrate, or met of themſelves at certain ſtated times, to determine of peace and war, and to accept or reject whatever elſe might be propoſed to them by the king and ſenate, for their deliberation.

In ſpeculations of this nature, we are too apt to ſuffer ourſelves to be deceived with our modern views and notions of things; we compare ancient with preſent times, and generally prefer the former to the latter, tho' perhaps there is ſcarcely any foundation in nature, even for making the compariſon, much leſs for giving the preference where we uſually do. For not only our own manners, cuſtoms, laws, trade, increaſe of wealth and people, improvements in the ſciences, and other circumſtances, are in a perpetual flux and variation, and become quite different in a long ſeries of years, but thoſe likewiſe of the neighbouring nations undergo as conſiderable a change, and yet are we, in prudence, obliged to alter in a great meaſure our uſual conduct, and to ſteer our political veſſel by their motions.——Give me leave therefore plainly and ſimply to deſcribe perſons and things, juſt as they appear to me to ariſe out of the remains of our ancient hiſtory: and as I am utterly againſt drawing invidious parallels myſelf, between theſe very

remote ages of our common-wealth and the preſent times; I may preſume to hope, that my reader likewiſe will ſpare himſelf the needleſs trouble, and not do it for me. But to procede —

During this infancy of our *Engliſh conſtitution* as no civil taxes were ordinarily impoſed, as neither ſlaves nor foreigners were uſually admitted to bear arms for the ſtate, as the militia of the kingdom was compoſed entirely of the landholders, who were all ready to ſerve their country in perſon at their own expence, and the king had very little more property than what aroſe from the demeſnes of the crown, and the product of his own private eſtate, which was not much more conſiderable than what many of his ſubjects poſſeſſed, there could not be the leaſt danger of his being able to introduce a tyranny; there could be no ſtruggle between him and his people for the ſuperiority: for as the overballance of property was entirely on the ſide of the latter, there likewiſe was the whole weight of the national power.

It was the great buſineſs of the king to lead his brethren, the army of the State, againſt their foreign enemies, (at which times he ſeems to have been veſted with an extraordinary power) as likewiſe to take care that the civil regulations were duly executed at home. But as theſe regulations were by no means of his own making, ſo dared he not at any time to tranſgreſs them, without violating the ſecurity he had given, and the oath he had taken upon his admiſſion to his high office, to obſerve the laws and cuſtoms of his country, and thereby rendering himſelf obnoxious to the diſcontent, and ſuperior power of his people. For not only in this kingdom, but in *France* likewiſe

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and *Spain*, in *Italy* and *Germany*, wherever the *Gothic* form of government was originally inſtituted, and the ballance of power lodged in the ſubject's hands, if their princes at any time wantonly attempted to ſet up for arbitrary and independent power, and to govern by their own wills, inſtead of making the cuſtoms of their country the rule of their conduct; if their enormous vices, or natural incapacity, rendered them unfit to preſide at the head of the adminiſtration of war and peace, they were eaſily, and without much ceremony, ſet aſide from reigning, and another of their family placed upon the throne in their ſtead.

The factions therefore, or parties, which we read of as ſubſiſting in theſe early ages of our *European* governments, were not, properly ſpeaking, between the kings and their kingdoms, but between the prince and ſome particular overgrown governor of a province, or general of an army, whoſe extenſive property, whoſe ſkill and reputation in war, whoſe numerous relations and dependants made him a match, even for the ſupreme magiſtrate himſelf. This was exactly the caſe, during the Confeſſor's reign, between that prince and the famous *Godwin* and his family. For the great conteſt with the earl of *Kent* was not about national grievances, whatever might be falſely pretended by *Edward*'s enemies of his partiality to the *Normans*, but, in reality, for the preheminence, which of them ſhould be the ſuperior, and give the law to the other as well as to the reſt of the kingdom—and if theſe inteſtine diviſions did not happen oftner, as might have been expected amongſt a rough, fierce and ambitious people, it muſt be wholly imputed to the

the efficacy of that ancient law of nature, which ſtill obtained amongſt our anceſtors, of dividing the father's whole eſtate, both real and perſonal, amongſt his children. For this diſtribution of the father's property, like a natural Agrarian, fixed the ballance of civil government in the hands of the many, preſerved a kind of perpetual equilibrium amongſt the landholders, and kept the great men from overpowering one another or their prince.

The acquiſition of *England* by the Duke of *Normandy* introduced a conſiderable alteration in its civil government, and placed the ballance of power upon a very different footing from what it had hitherto been. The demeſnes of the crown, as well by the addition of the immenſe private eſtate of the laſt king and his family, as by other large confiſcations, were ſo vaſtly augmented, that what with the arbitrary contributions raiſed at pleaſure upon the affrighted *Engliſh*, and his own ordinary income growing out of more than 1400 manours and lordſhips appropriated to the crown, the Conquerour's whole revenue has been computed at more than 1060 *l. per* day;—an immenſe ſum this at that time, when there was no intereſt money to pay for debts, when there was neither army nor fleet to maintain out of it, and which in the hands of a modern *French* politician, would eaſily have purchaſed the liberties of his people. —But it was happy for his ſubjects, that their king, truſting entirely to the ſtrength of his arm, thought he had no need of a formal conveyance and ſurrender of what he was able to ſeize at his pleaſure.

Nor was this all; for *William* the more effectually to maintain the *Engliſh* in their preſent ſtate of ſubjection, and to take from them all probability

probability of ſucceſs, ſhould they hereafter attempt to recover their ancient rights, and to ſhake off the grievous yoke which he was endeavouring to faſten about their necks, not only plundered the moſt conſiderable of them of their perſonal eſtates, and ſeized upon their lands; but farther, when he diſtributed theſe lands amongſt the leaders of his victorious army (which he did, not as lord of the fee, but as their general only, and according to the compact he had entered into with them before they undertook the hazardous expedition) it was with this expreſs condition annexed to the grant, that each man and his heirs for ever, in proportion to the quantity of land which ſhould be aſſigned to him, ſhould be always ready upon every lawful ſummons, with a determinate number of able men, to defend the perſon of the king, and one another in their newly-gotten eſtates, againſt all attacks whatever, both foreign and domeſtic.

This kind of *tenure*, or *aſſociation* rather, as it was originally intended to be, and might not improperly have been termed, towards the latter end of the conqueror's reign, was extended to all the reſt of his kingdom; which, for that purpoſe, was pretty accurately ſurveyed, and divided into about 62,000 knight's fees, each of which was to ſupply one ſoldier, when its proprietor was duly called upon. For the harraſſed, oppreſſed, and enſlaved natives were glad to hold the poor remains of their paternal fortunes under any conditions, rather than to let them continue, as they then were, precarious, at the will and command of their inſolent maſters.

Thus was a new kind of influence, and authority over the whole nation, acquired by the crown;

crown; but as it was not at firſt ſufficiently underſtood, ſo neither was it kept, or turned to ſo advantageous an account, as it might have been. For the king by an ill-judged liberality, or profuſion rather, transferred the ballance of property from the body of the people, where he found it when he firſt entered the iſland, into the poſſeſſion of a few of the greater *Norman* Barons. To *Hugh Lupus*, for inſtance, was aſſigned the whole county of *Cheſter*; to the earl of *Moreton* and *Cornwall* were given 739 manours; to *Alan* earl of *Britain* and *Richmond* 442; to *Geofry* biſhop of *Conſtance* 280; and to others other grants were made in the ſame extravagant proportion. Thus whilſt the monarch was labouring to deſtroy the foundation of a ſucceſsful rebellion in his new ſubjects, he ran with violence into the other extreme, and laid the groundwork of perpetual factions in his old ones.

The king, however, elated by his continual ſucceſſes in war, and puffed up with the high reputation which he had acquired from his many conqueſts, tho' he had thus parted in a great meaſure with the ſinews of power, yet thought he might ſtill go on to rule by the mere terror of his name. Bold, daring, intrepid, the judgment which he ſeems naturally to have had, was too frequently obliged to yield to the violence of his paſſions. He imagined that as nothing was too difficult for him to attempt, ſo no one would have courage enough to withſtand or diſpute his commands. His ſubjects therefore in general, both *Normans* as well as *Engliſh*, he now began to treat as his ſlaves and vaſſals; the laws of his kingdom, which, with ſo much ſolemnity, he had ſworn to obſerve, he deſpiſed; nor would

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he ſubmit to any other counſil, or direction, than what his own impetuous will ſuggeſted.

Here then it was that his ſuperior *nobility*, thoſe perſons more eſpecially who had been enriched by his profuſeneſs, who had gotten the greateſt part of the property of the *Engliſh* nation into their hands, and who were, indeed, the only perſons who had any thing conſiderable to loſe, began to catch the alarm, to perceive the ruinous tendency of the encroaching power of the crown, and to take early meaſures to prevent the fatal conſequences of it. They ſaw plainly, that their haughty maſter was pleaſed to look upon himſelf as actual lord of the whole fee of his kingdom, and his people as his tenants, and mere dependants. The ſervices which he exacted from them, and their families, for the lands which they had been put in poſſeſſion of as joint adventurers, as ſharers with him, and aſſiſtants in the conqueſt of *England*, were continually growing upon them; and thoſe very conditions under which, for the ſake of the common good, they had agreed to hold their eſtates, that original *aſſociation*, which they had at firſt entered into, as the beſt and ſureſt means to defend their new acquiſitions, was now made a handle to draw their chains the cloſer.—However plentiful the revenue of the king might be, however great his forces, they could not in the end but be found unequal to the united ſtrength of his nobility.——The party therefore is ſoon formed; the *Normans*, or ſuperior barons, take the lead, whilſt the generality of the *Engliſh* join in the alliance, to defend their ancient rights and privileges againſt the exorbitant invaſions of the crown, and to reſtore the equitable laws and cuſtoms the nation had ſo happily

lived under, during the reign of good king *Edward*.

Such was the original of thoſe long and heavy wars, which enſued between our firſt *Anglo-Norman* kings, and their barons. It was, indeed, a diſpute for the ſuperiority, which of them ſhould give laws to the reſt of the kingdom, and have the chief management and direction of the riches and ſtrength of the nation.——But it was a diſpute between our kings and their barons only; nor was the body of the people, the bulk of the kingdom, any otherwiſe concerned in the fierce and ruinous contention, than as their particular attachments, connections, or dependencies, compelled them to follow one ſide or the other.

But neither force, nor art, nor policy will long avail againſt the overballance of property. The Barons, in conſequence of their large eſtates, at length, gain the upper hand: their kings are obliged to give way to the ſuperior power, and to ſubmit to ſuch laws and limitations of their ſovereignty, as the conquerors were pleaſed to impoſe upon them; the royal prerogative is reſtrained and bounded by public acts and charters; and the form of government from a popular-monarchy, as it had been in the *Anglo-Saxon* times, was now become an ariſtocratical one.

But vain had been all their ſtruggles, and ineffectual the utmoſt efforts of the barons, had not the Conqueror himſelf (as has been hinted above) been guilty of a fundamental error in his politics, upon the firſt eſtabliſhment of theſe fees, tenures, or baronies, in ſuffering them to become hereditary, and in conſenting that the eldeſt ſon ſingly, or the next heir of the defunct baron, as ſoon as he was able to perform his homage, and the other

ſervices

ſervices required of him, ſhould of courſe ſucceed to the vacant fee. For by this means not only the name, but the attachments likewiſe, and intereſts, of the firſt family were ſtill preſerved entire; the tenants and dependants remained faithful to the children or ſucceſſors of their former lord, and that natural Agrarian, which had formerly maintained a kind of ballance between the ſeveral landholders, was taken away. For had not this been the caſe, and had theſe eſtates been originally ſo granted, as to have been made revertible to the crown, as an eccleſiaſtical benefice returns to its former patron upon the death of the incumbent, and as *thane-land* was formerly beſtowed upon their attendants by our *Anglo-Saxon* kings, the power of the barons muſt ſoon have been reduced, and rendered as obſequious to the commands of their prince, as the *Turkiſh* Timariots are to thoſe of the Grand Seignior.

After the laſt great and moſt ſolemn publication of the *grand charter* in *Henry the third*'s time, our beſt and wiſeſt princes, well knowing how vain it was to ſtruggle againſt the letter of written laws, and to break thro' the mighty power of their nobility, with which they were environed, remained ſatisfied with that ſhare of power and authority, which the preſent conſtitution gave them, and turned their whole thoughts to military atchievements and foreign conqueſts, whither the warlike genius of their people more eſpecially invited them. We read, indeed, of ſome weak princes, now and then an *Edward* or a *Richard*, who took a contrary courſe, who endeavoured to reign independently of their nobility, and to ſhake off the yoke of thoſe laws which their predeceſſors

had, with ſo much ſolemnity, aſſented to, but they were quickly found light in the ballance and wanting; and tho' the firſt fury of the tempeſt generally ſpent itſelf upon the *Gaveſtons* and *Spencers*, upon thoſe ill-judging and hated miniſters who had adviſed the raſh attempt; yet did not the perſon of the king himſelf always eſcape the reſentment of his deceived and irritated barons.

The terrible factions, and conſequent civil wars, which afterwards aroſe, concerning the ſucceſſion of the houſes of *York* and *Lancaſter* to the crown, tho' very deſtructive of the foreign glory, and extremely fatal to the internal peace and tranquility of the kingdom, yet do they not ſo properly fall under our preſent diſquiſition, as they were merely accidental, if I may ſay ſo, and did not immediately reſult from the ballance of power. The diſpute, in this caſe, was not, as it had lately been, between the king and his nobility, but in reality, between the greater barons themſelves, the *Bauforts*, the *Nevilles*, the *Piercies*, &c. which of them ſhould have the greateſt ſhare in the government of the kingdom by ſetting up a prince of their own, who, as he owed his eſtabliſhment to their popularity, intereſt, and the force of their arm, ſhould ſtill continue to be managed and directed by their counſils.—The perſon upon whoſe head the crown chanced to be placed, had very little elſe to do but to temporiſe, to divide his potent ſubjects amongſt themſelves, and by ſiding ſometimes with one faction of them, and ſometimes with another, to weather the ſtorm as well as he could, tho' generally he was pretty ſure of being ſufferer in the event.

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The union of the two contending houſes in the the perſons of *Henry the ſeventh* and his queen, put the firſt effectual ſtop to thoſe fierce and bloody wars, which had ſo long deſtroyed the internal peace, and exhauſted the whole ſtrength of the kingdom.——This prince, bred up in the ſevere ſchool of affliction, grave, thoughtful, thrifty, provident, and eſpecially famous for his political ſkill, ſaw himſelf quietly ſeated upon the throne, and acknowledged as their lawful ſovereign by the whole nation, with a general calm around him. ——But how long could he hope that this tranquility would continue! his title, he well knew, was very queſtionable and precarious; there were many pretenders to the throne, and he had reaſon to fear, that as he owed his advancement entirely to the favour of the nobility, ſo muſt he ſtill depend upon their good pleaſure for the continuance of his proſperity. For his own experience, as well as the hiſtory of his predeceſſors, had ſufficiently convinced him, that the crown was entirely at their diſpoſal.

Was there then no way to be invented, by which he might hope to weaken this over-grown power of his barons, and in ſome meaſure to emancipate himſelf and his ſucceſſors from that ſtate of dependance, in which they had been ſo long kept fettered? By open force it was eaſy to foreſee, that, whilſt they were poſſeſſed of ſuch vaſt quantities of land, whilſt their property was ſo extenſive, and the number of retainers, followers and dependants they were able to maintain ſo great, there was no proſpect of ſucceeding; it was impoſſible to ſhake off their yoke and prevail againſt them.——Policy therefore was the only reſource he had left, to effectuate what he ſo eagerly

eagerly wiſhed for. The ſame ſhare of property, when thrown into a multitude of hands, might not perhaps be quite ſo formidable to the crown, as when retained in the poſſeſſion of few. The preſent juncture was extremely favourable to his views, and the king wiſe enough to make his own uſe of it.

The ruinous civil wars, which the nobility had ſo long ſuſtained one againſt another, had by degrees wholly extinguiſhed ſome of the moſt ancient and potent families in the nation, and greatly reduced others; their perſonal eſtates were exceſſively exhauſted, and the lands of almoſt all of them encumbered with heavy debts. Thus oppreſſed in their private circumſtances, there was a general uneaſineſs amongſt them: they all wiſhed for ſome relief, but knew not very well by what means to obtain it. The moſt obvious method which offered itſelf, was to ſell ſome part of their large eſtates to redeem and clear the reſt —— but this remedy could be of no ſervice to them, as it was expreſly forbidden by the laws in being, by *magna charta* itſelf, that any free-man ſhould alienate his lands, leſt the ancient number of knights-fees ſhould be thereby reduced, and the militia of the kingdom become precarious and uncertain.—However, as it was likely to be of ſo much eaſe to his nobility, as it would furniſh them with money for the *French* war he was juſt going to engage in, the king was very ready to ſuggeſt, encourage, and give his conſent to a ſtatute, *which*, as lord *Bacon* expreſſes it, *might ſet the gate open and wide, for men to ſell or mortgage their lands, without Fines for alienation.*

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But this was not all; it had hitherto been cuſtomary for every baron, in proportion to the largeneſs of his eſtate, to be attended with a numerous and magnificent train of followers, or *retainers* as they were uſually called, ſuch as were formerly the *Comites* or *Ambachtmen* of their *German* anceſtors. Theſe *retainers* made up the baron's court, generally lived with him, were his ſecurity, and a ſtanding *guard du corps* about his perſon; they were a determined band of attendants, ready to execute all his commands, particularly, to diſcipline his tenants, and to march as officers at the head of them, as often as their maſter was pleaſed to demand their military-Service. This independent, and kingly, manner of life gave occaſion to great emulation, to frequent feuds and quarrels amongſt the nobility themſelves, and made them all in general much leſs obſervant of the public laws, or the commands of their prince, than otherwiſe they would have been.——With the permiſſion and conſent of the barons themſelves, this exorbitant number of *retainers*, this ſturdy band of penſioners, might be reſtrained and leſſened; but they were as yet too powerful, and had too great an influence in the ſtate, for any thing of this nature to be attempted, without their approbation.

The yeomanry in general was greatly exhauſted by the late conſuming wars, whilſt the lands lay every where uncultivated for want of huſbandmen to diſcharge the buſineſs of the plow; was it not highly impolitic therefore, that ſo many uſeleſs hands ſhould be detained about the Baron's perſons, merely for the ſake of their attendance, when they might be ſo much more profitably employed in tilling and improving the waſted country? Their

eſtates were already ſufficiently exhauſted and encumbered, why ſhould they ſtill continue to load them with the burthen of a long retinue of followers, with an expence altogether vain and unneceſſary? how much relief, therefore, would it yield their private fortunes, could they be perſuaded to diſmiſs a part of that idle and ſuperfluous train, which was wont to live upon them, and to waſte and devour their ſubſtance?—Theſe, and other arguments of a like nature, induced the nobility to agree to an act of parliament, to reſtrain the exceſſive number of theſe *retainers* for the future, and expreſly to limit how may each baron ſhould have about him in his family.—— From this time therefore, from the enacting of theſe two ſtatutes, the very foundation of that power and influence, which had been formerly exerciſed by the nobility, was ſo entirely ſapped and ruined, that we hear very little more of it ——but ſo it is, the proſpect of preſent eaſe and relief, will always be found to operate much more ſtrongly upon the minds of mankind, than any diſtant and future inconveniencies, however great and certain they may be.

I know not, wiſe as he is generally thought to have been, whether King *Henry* was quite politician enough, to diſcern the remote tendency of theſe laws: however, they ſo far anſwered his preſent purpoſe, as to weaken the exceſſive influence of the greater nobility, and to reduce it a little more upon the level with the crown, than it had been for ſome ages paſt. But if he really imagined, that the power, which was thus taken from the barons, muſt neceſſarily fall into the royal ſcale, and encreaſe the authority of the prince, the event ſhews that he was extremely miſtaken

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in his politicks. For from the aſhes of the barons, ſoon ſprang up another power of ſuperior weight in the common-wealth, equally troubleſome, and far more dangerous, to the throne: ſo that, even as early as Queen *Elizabeth*'s days, Sir *Henry Wotton* was uſed to ſay, that "this very reign of *Henry* VII. had ruined the *Engliſh* monarchy."

In the *Anglo-Saxon* times, as there was no hereditary nobility, there could not, properly ſpeaking, be more than two diſtinct orders in the ſtate, the *Clergy* and the *Commons*. By *Commons* I would be here underſtood to mean the bulk of the nation, all its land-holders in general, and thoſe only. For as to that lower claſs of people, conſiſting of ſlaves, of freedmen and their deſcendants, as at this time they had little or no ſhare in the land, ſo were they of ſmall eſtimation in the eye of the laws, and ſcarcely reckoned, or regarded, as a part of the community. The *Commons* therefore, as they were all equal to one another in their legiſlative capacity, ſo were they all alike noble, and all ſat together, with the clergy, in their general aſſemblies. For tho' ſome of them were diſtinguiſhed above the reſt of their brethren, by the offices they bore in the public adminiſtration under their prince, yet were theſe honours entirely perſonal and temporary, and did not uſually deſcend to their families. Even the Senators of our anceſtors, more like thoſe of *Athens*, than of *Rome*, were not regarded as a diſtinct order in the common-wealth; but as they were originally taken from amongſt the Commons, ſo did they ſtill continue to be eſteemed as a part of them.

After the *conqueſt*, upon the diviſion of the kingdom into knights-fees, and the inſtitution of military ſervice; as it was thought moſt expedient, for the ready and more certain execution of this law or aſſociation, that the eldeſt ſon, or one ſingle heir, ſhould ſucceed to all the anceſtor's eſtate, authority and titles; this practice, by degrees, introduced a third order amongſt us, or *an hereditary nobility*: and as the overballance of property, by the Conqueror's profuſe liberality, was entirely inveſted in them, the whole weight of the government ſoon fell into their hands, whilſt the commons of *England*, now ſunk into an inferior order, and made up chiefly of tradeſmen, yeomen, and the leſſer land-holders, had very little influence or authority in the ſtate, as they had very little property left in their hands, but what was merely dependant and perſonal. "The land in the nobility and clergy, "ſays *Harrington*, 'till the time of *Henry* VII. "cannot be eſteem'd to have overballanced the "people's poſſeſſions, leſs than four to one." Nor had the Commons, as yet, any great hopes given them, of being able to mend their preſent low and ſlaviſh condition, and of riſing to any greater ſhare of authority in the legiſlature, however diligent and induſtrious they might be in improving their minds, or increaſing their wealth, as the national laws would not yet permit the barons or greater landholders eaſily to alienate their eſtates.

The towns which, in the *Anglo-Saxon* times, for the better encouragement of trade and induſtry, had formerly been incorporated and endowed with lands, were ordered by our firſt *Norman* princes, at the repeated requeſts of their diſcontented ſubjects

jects (especially when subsidies began to be frequently demanded, and general taxes were thought necessary to be imposed) to send their deputies to the parliament; whilst the inferior landholders in every county, or *lesser barons* as we find them sometimes stiled, to ease themselves of the common burthen of appearing in person, (unless any of them were summoned to attend by a particular writ, addressed to them for that purpose from the throne,) chose two or more persons out of their body, to represent them in the same august assembly; for the number of these *Knights of the shire*, as they are now called, was at their first institution somewhat uncertain.

Of these respective deputies from the counties, and ancient borroughs, and cities, was the house of commons originally made up, after the clergy and superior barons, some time, I think, in *Henry* IIId's reign, had separated themselves from them, and taken their seats in a different room.— But surely very light and inconsiderable must their weight and influence, at this time, have been, in the great legislative assembly. Our annals, I believe, would bear me witness, was I even to assert, that it was little less than impossible, that the *house of commons* should in those days, in any sense of the words, be a free and independent body. For neither could the Corporations on the one hand, nor the Freeholders of the county on the other, choose any other representatives, than such as were pointed out, and recommended, to them by the king or the nobility, in whose vassalage they generally were; nor dared the persons, that were elected, to vote otherwise than as they were directed, as the greater part of them were under the espe-

cial influence of, or rather wholly dependant upon ſome ſuperior power for their very ſubſiſtance. "Moſt of the firſt members of the houſe of "commons, *ſays a late author*, thought it an "honour to retain to ſome great lord, and to "wear his blue coat; and when they had made "up their lord's train, and waited upon him "from his own to the lord's houſe, and made a "lane for him to enter, they departed to ſit in "lower houſe of parliament."

The *Corporations* therefore, in fact, would many of them, moſt gladly have got themſelves exempted from this unprofitable burthen of ſending their deputies to parliament, and bearing their expences whilſt there; but this favour could be indulged but to very few of them, as their preſence and conſent were thought neceſſary, to give a proper ſanction to ſuch bills, more eſpecially, as were intended to raiſe money upon their conſtituents. The *Lords* might tax themſelves in what proportion they thought fit; and the *Clergy* be as liberal as they pleaſed with their tenths and fifteenths; but none but the *Commons*, as they were ſuppoſed to be beſt acquainted with the circumſtances of their properties, could regularly lay any impoſition upon the bulk of the leſſer freeholders, and upon the trading part of the nation.

But things now began to appear with another face, and to take a very different turn; as the *ſtatute of Retainers* had vaſtly increaſed the number of yeomen in the ſeveral parts of the kingdom, and in the literal ſenſe of the words, had beaten their ſwords into plow-ſhares; ſo *that* whereby the freemen were permitted to ſell or mortgage their lands, without being ſubject to fines of alienation,

nation, had opened a new ſcene of hope, and laid the broad foundations of an encreaſing trade and commerce. It was now become worth all their pains for the *Commons of England*, for the lower order of the nation, to be careful and induſtrious, as they might reaſonably expect to reap the moſt ſolid fruit from their labours, and had very little left to fear from the caprice of their imperious patrons. If their ſuperior ſkill and diligence in agriculture, if their manufactures brought them in a flow of money, the wiſdom and indulgence of the legiſlature had now placed it in their power, to diſpoſe of it in the beſt and moſt advantageous manner, in the purchaſe of a more laſting wealth. They might always be certain of meeting with needy landholders enow, who would be even glad of the opportunity of exchanging their acres for ready money to anſwer their neceſſitous demands. The power, grandeur, and magnificence, of the ſtates of *Genoa* and *Venice*, the flouriſhing condition of the *Hans-towns* more eſpecially, the ſplendor of their merchants, and their great influence in the affairs of *Europe*, ſufficiently evinced what vaſt things might in time be effected, if navigation and foreign commerce were properly ſupported and purſued.——Animated, therefore, by theſe motives, puſhed on by the diſcovery of a new world full of gold and ſilver, and encouraged by that unuſual domeſtic peace, with which they ſaw themſelves bleſſed, the people of *England* in general now began to make a proper uſe of their ſituation, and to exert that univerſal genius, which fits them for every thing they will diligently apply themſelves to.

In

In this interval, whilſt the ſcale of the nobility was every day loſing ſomewhat of its ancient weight, and that of the people gaining in the ſame proportion, *Henry the eighth* began his reign. This prince, perhaps, was the moſt arbitrary monarch that ever ſat upon the *Engliſh* throne, not excepting the *firſt William*, and that with the leaſt trouble and hazard to himſelf. If we enquire into the cauſes to which this anticonſtitutional greatneſs, and perpetual ſun-ſhine of good fortune are to be imputed, we ſhall find it by no means owing to his ſuperior abilities, and ſkill in the art of government. His capacity, indeed, was good enough, could he have been perſuaded to have made the beſt uſe of it. Knowledge likewiſe he had, but it was that of the pedant rather than of the great prince; and in the ſcience of policy his father far exceeded him: he was, moreover, proud, vain-glorious, oſtentatious, and a lover of pleaſure rather than of buſineſs. Much leſs was his extravagant power the purchaſe of thoſe immenſe ſums, which his predeceſſor had ſo carefully, not to ſay oppreſſively, amaſſed together. For theſe were all quickly ſquandered away in uſeleſs pomp, and the magnificent parade of luxury.——The only way therefore, I think, to give any tolerable account of this king's uncommon greatneſs, is to conſider the critical juncture when he mounted the throne. ——The *ancient nobility* had already loſt a conſiderable part of that authority, with which they uſed to influence the counſils, and to ballance the weight of the crown; and tho' they could not but be moſt feelingly ſenſible of thoſe immenſe ſtretches of his prerogative, with which their

their king was continually exerciſing their patience, yet as they were not well able to controul his arbitrary meaſures, without much hazard and difficulty, they thought it the moſt prudent way to connive at his encroachments, and to ſit down as eaſy under the yoke as they could. ——The *Commons*, on the other hand, were as yet but forming; ſtate matters were regarded as above their comprehenſion; they had ſcarcely found their legs, to uſe a plain phraſe, or knew their own force and importance in the public adminiſtration. ——So that between both, the Monarch remained at full liberty to act as he thought fit, with very little left to oppoſe or controul that will, which the violence of his paſſions prompted him to make the only law of his ſubjects.

If it be aſked, whether it was in King *Henry*'s power, to have tranſmitted this ſame degree of authority to his ſucceſſors, and to have eſtabliſhed arbitrary power in the crown, as well as in his own perſon? I own, I think he might eaſily have done it, conſidering the circumſtances of the times he lived in, the religious animoſities which divided his ſubjects, and the other favourable opportunities which fell in his way: and therefore the people of *England* have much greater obligations to this prince's memory than they uſually imagine they have. For if, after he had deſtroyed the papal power, he had reſumed all the church and abbey lands into his own hands, and annexed them for ever to the crown, as *Charles* the eleventh of *Sweden* did upon a like occaſion; or, if he had diſtributed them amongſt the leaders of thoſe armies, which he carried over with him into *France*, to hold of him and his ſucceſſors, as temporary lay-benefices, under the condition

condition of military ſervice, (either of which he might eaſily enough have brought about, in the then fluctuating and unſettled ſtate of the kingdom) this would have thrown the overballance of property ſo entirely into the diſpoſal of the crown, as muſt for ever have ſecured it the abſolute command of the whole national power.——But neither deep-thinking nor conſiſtent-acting ever made an eſſential part of this king's character. Pleaſure therefore, and ſome romantic views of his own or his favourite miniſter, always diſſipated his wealth in vanity, and loſt him thoſe favourable opportunities of eſtabliſhing the authority of the crown, which the ſeaſon ſo fairly offered.——Let us, however, be ſo juſt to this prince's memory, as to confeſs, that he ſeems never to have had any ſettled ill deſigns upon the liberty of his ſubjects: conſtant ſupplies of money to ſupport his magnificent extravagance, and their preſent obedience, was all his impatience demanded of them; and as for his ſucceſſors, them he left to ſhift, as well as they could, for themſelves.

The church-lands, therefore, with all their rich appendages, ſuch as plate, furniture, and ſtock of cattle, were ſoon ſquandered away in exceſs and folly; and, inſtead of contributing, in the leaſt, either to the weight of the crown, or to the power of the Barons, within the compaſs of a very few years, fell, the greateſt part of them, into the poſſeſſion of thoſe induſtrious men, whoſe ſkill in trade, and commerce with foreign nations, had furniſhed them with ready money enough to ſeize the favourable opportunity. For the nobility, hurried away with the pleaſing luxury of a ſplendid court, and emulating the pomp

pomp and extravagance of their vain maſter, as being obliged to be frequently about his perſon, could make but very little uſe of the junćture to enrich and aggrandize themſelves. This then was the harveſt of the commons, and a very plentiful one they found it. For as theſe lands in general, for reaſons of ſtate, were ſold at very low prices, this increaſed the number of purchaſers, and threw them into the greater multitude of hands.

Edward the ſixth's minority would have afforded the *Barons* an excellent opportunity of recovering ſome part of their ancient authority, had they known in what manner to have made a proper uſe of it. But not agreeing amongſt themſelves who ſhould be uppermoſt, who ſhould govern the infant prince and his kingdom, both *Seymour* and *Dudley*, the two great and oppoſite heads of the Nobility, were each of them obliged, in his turn, to make his court to the commons, and to be continually granting them freſh favours. By this means, they not only pointed out on which ſide the nodding ballance of power was now beginning to incline, and where the great ſtrength of the ſtate lay, but likewiſe added freſh weight to that ſcale, which, if they had conſulted only their own intereſt, they ſhould have endeavoured to have lightned as much as they could. ——The ſale of church-lands ſtill continued as in the laſt reign, and however they might originally be intended to be beſtowed, the largeſt ſhare of them ſoon came amongſt the middling and lower ſort of people, the yeomanry and tradeſmen of the kingdom.

Wyat's attempt to prevent *Queen Mary* from concluding a marriage with *Philip* King of *Spain*, ſeems to have been the firſt exertion of power in the popular party, as ſuch. For with reſpect to thoſe tumultuary inſurrections, which had happened in *Henry the eighth*'s and *Edward the ſixth*'s time, as they conſiſted chiefly of mere mob, and of the loweſt dregs of the people; as they had neither a head to conduct, nor any fixed principles of union to cement them, after the violence of the firſt effort was paſt, the danger to the ſtate was immediately blown over — but *Sir Thomas Wyat*'s party was made up more eſpecially of men of ſome property and eſtate; and his attempt may be conſidered entirely in a civil view, intended as it was to preſerve the freedom and independence of this nation, as well as of the reſt of *Europe*, from the *Spaniſh* tyranny, of which the *Indies*, the *Low-Countries*, the kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily*, and the dutchy of *Milan*, afforded recent inſtances.—But the ſtrength of the *Commons* was not yet arrived at its maturity, nor had they found out the true place of ſhewing their power, by their united repreſentatives in parliament. The weight of the crown, therefore, in the then-tumultuary and fluctuating ſtate of the public affairs, ſoon prevailed; and the well-intended, tho' crude and ill-concerted, attempt of the *Kentiſh* yeomanry, was blaſted in the bud and came to nothing—During this reign, thirty nine members of the houſe of commons, were proſecuted by indictment in the king's-bench, for departing from parliament without *ſpecial leave* firſt obtained from the King and Queen; ſo that, as Lord *Coke* has ſomewhere obſerved, "the poor commons, members of parliament,

"*in*

" *in diebus illis*, had no great joy to continue in " parliament."

Queen Elizabeth was very little leſs abſolute in the execution of her high office, than her father had been before her, tho' ſhe was obliged to uſe greater caution, and to be much more circumſpect in her conduct. What the one commanded to be done, in the moſt haughty and inſolent manner, the other brought about by the more gentle arts of perſuaſion, inſinuation, and policy. The father conſulted nothing but his own inclinations; was proud, wilful, obſtinate, and would be obeyed; the daughter, tho' equally fixed and unmoveable in her reſolutions, had ever the good of her people in her mouth, was ſupple, ſoft, obliging in her general behaviour, and therefore was obeyed. *King Henry* exerted his authority as a maſter, as one who had the ſtrength, and could command ſubmiſſion to his will; nor would *Queen Elizabeth* ever permit her abſolute power to be limited, or even queſtioned, tho' ſhe prudently choſe to ſcreen and cover it by the compliments and conceſſions of her loving ſubjects—It was not ſo much her averſion to the principles of Popery, as the circumſtances of her birth and paſt life, which placed this artful princeſs at the head of the proteſtants, and cauſed her to be chiefly directed by their counſils and advice, during the courſe of her reign.

Both ſhe and her miniſters ſaw clearly enough which way the torrent of power was beginning to run. The riches of the *Commons* had now given them a flow of ſpirits, which their fore-fathers knew nothing of. They even venture to approach the throne of their own motion; they give advice to the crown; they petition the

queen to marry ; they debate of what is moſt expedient to be done, both in church and ſtate ; and act in all reſpects as a diſtinct branch of the legiſlature, and as an independent body. The queen ſometimes threatens, and ſometimes attempts to bring them over to her meaſures, by the gentler methods of perſuaſion ; now ſhe flatters, and again ſhe is ready to chaſtiſe the moſt bold and forward of them. She govern'd them, 'tis true, but it was in ſuch a manner, as none but a very wiſe prince, and an honeſt, reſolute, and able miniſtry, muſt ever preſume to follow.

As the people ſtill went on increaſing in wealth, by means of a growing trade, and a long and ſucceſsful war with *Spain*, both in *Europe* and *America*, they became every day more and more conſiderable in their own conceit, as well as in the ballance of government ; and this overweaning opinion of their high worth and importance, eaſily paved the way for the admiſſion of *Calvin*'s doctrines, which greatly prevailed in the nation about this time ; and, whatever their author might really think, or pretend to the contrary, tended, in the event at leaſt, to introduce an equality in the ſtate, as well as in the church.

Theſe doctrines, however, were as vigorouſly oppoſed on the one hand, as they were induſtriouſly propagated on the other : ſo that in this reign, the foundation of all our later diſputes in religion, at leaſt amongſt proteſtants, was laid, and the two parties of *Whig* and *Tory*, were firſt virtually formed. I hope I ſhall not be thought to take too great a liberty with hiſtory, if by anticipation, I venture to give theſe well-known aud general

general names, to the *Puritans* and *Church-of-England-men*; tho' I readily own, they are very far from exactly corresponding with the ideas, which we are now wont to comprehend under these terms. But I intend, as I proceed, to point out the several additions and alterations, which time and passion have made in them.

Originally, therefore, these parties were entirely religious; the *Tories* consisted of such as defended the hierarchy, and the rites and ceremonies of the church of *England*, as they were at that time by law established: the *Whigs*, on the contrary, or *Puritans*, were for a second and more thorough reformation, for levelling the superior dignities and orders of the church, and introducing an equality amongst its ministers. —But as the court, and far the greatest part of the nobility, suspected at least, that the transition would be but too easy from pulling down the superior magistrates in the church, to levelling those in the state likewise, the *Tories* had the lead during all this queen's reign; and however active, industrious and turbulent the opposite party might be, they were able to gain very little ground, towards overturning the religious establishment, or making any considerable innovations in it.

King *James the first* wanted the steady conduct of his predecessor. Of a light, trifling and most unkingly understanding, vain and excessively conceited of his own sufficiency, his administration was accordingly, feeble, unsettled, irregular. Dazzled with the splendor of being placed at the head of three mighty kingdoms, fond of absolute power, and fully persuaded in himself of his right

right to it, he was ever talking of his uncontroulable authority, and exerting it on all occaſions; but wanting, as well the capacity to conduct, as the opportunities neceſſary to ſupport ſo high a claim, he generally came off with diſappointment and diſgrace in his attempts. By graſping at more than he was able to lay hold of, he even loſt that power, which otherwiſe would never have been diſputed with him. He ſeems in general to have wiſhed well to his ſubjects, and was inclined to have done every thing for them, which might have promoted their happineſs; but the misfortune was, he would ſerve them only in his own way, and every act of kindneſs to them, or compliance with their requeſts, was to be looked upon, not as their right, but as a mere matter of grace and favour in him. But he was utterly unequal to the part he was acting, nor able to diſtinguiſh the mimick from the monarch; and as he had neither ſtrength nor ſkill ſufficient to bear up againſt the ſtorm, which was gathering round him, no wonder that he was driven before the wind, and his authority loſt in the violence of the current.

During this general weakneſs and relaxation of the nerves of government, the *Whig-party* was continually gaining ground by the acceſſion of freſh numbers. For all thoſe who were diſcontented at the meaſures of the court, all who diſapproved of that abſolute power, which the king was every day claiming as his right and endeavouring to eſtabliſh, all who were for limiting the prerogative, and ſetting up the laws of their country above him, whoſe great office it was to ſee them duly executed; all theſe, I ſay, fell in by degrees with the clamour of the *Whigs*,

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and joined themſelves to them ; ſo that by this means, they became the majority of the nation, and we are from henceforward to regard them, not only as a religious, but as a civil party likewiſe. Or, perhaps, more intelligibly, the *Whigs* of King *James* I. as well as thoſe of later times, may be divided into two parts ; one of which wanted, and was continually puſhing for, a farther change in the diſcipline of the church ; whilſt the other was only for putting ſome more certain bounds to that authority of the civil magiſtrate, which they felt ſo groſsly abuſed. However, as they united in one common oppoſition againſt the ſtretches of power, both in the court and hierarchy, whatever might be the diſtinct intentions of their hearts, they may properly enough be conſidered in this Eſſay as one party.

This great addition of ſtrength to the ſide of their enemies, made the *Tories* adhere ſtill more cloſely to the king, to connect their intereſts with his, and to become more ſtrenuous advocates in defence of his authority, as they had now no other refuge left, nor proſpect of ſhelter, but under the ſhadow of the throne —— As the *Church-whigs*, therefore, were always quoting the authority of the ſcriptures, in ſupport of that new form of eccleſiaſtical polity, which they were ſo deſirous of introducing ; the *Tories* likewiſe, in their turn, had recourſe, and that with the moſt happy ſucceſs, to the ſame weapons in defence of the eſtabliſhed church —— and they would have done very well had they ſtopped here ; but not contented with their victory, out of gratitude to their royal protector, and that they might ſtop the mouths of thoſe *State-whigs* likewiſe, who were ever

ever clamouring againſt the adminiſtration, they puſh their arguments ſtill farther, and attempt, from the authority of the ſame holy ſcriptures, to prove the divine right of kings to their thrones, to the exerciſe of an uncontroulable power, and conſequently to the unlimited obedience, both active and paſſive, of all their ſubjects.——This doctrine, however loudly it was ſpoken againſt by the oppoſite party, as new and unheard-of before; however clearly it was demonſtrated to be unnatural, unconſtitutional, unſcriptural, yet was it with great induſtry propagated, and generally received by the friends of the adminiſtration, a great part of the Clergy, and the Nobility—ſome few, poſſibly, from a ſincere perſuaſion of the truth and utility of ſuch principles; but doubtleſs many more, from a view to political or private intereſts, either to increaſe the ballaſt of the veſſel, which began to totter thro' the levity of the pilot, or elſe to ſtrengthen and flatter thoſe hands, from whence they expected protection or preferment.

From this time forward, therefore, *the divine right of kings*, *the indefeaſableneſs of the ſucceſſion to the crown*, and *the abſolute obedience of the ſubject in all caſes*, may be reckoned amongſt the characteriſtic principles of the *Tories*: as the contrary opinions, *that civil government was originally the inſtitution of men, and may have its certain bounds preſcribed it by the people*, that *the ſucceſſion in extraordinary caſes may be limited*, and that *in extreme neceſſity, where the very being of the ſtate depended upon it, even the ſupreme magiſtrate himſelf might be reſiſted*, were of courſe adopted by the oppoſite party.

As

As King *James*'s laviſh liberality, and generally imprudent conduct, had rendered his adminiſtration extremely diſagreeable to the greateſt part of the nation, this made his miniſters very cautious how they ventured to adviſe him to call a parliament, as well knowing that the uneaſineſs, which now lay fermenting over all the kingdom, would kindle and flame out with greater fury by the breath of ſo many aſſembling tribunes; when the heads of the diſcontented were ſuffered to come together, to lay open each man his reſpective grievances, and to encourage one another to inſiſt upon their ſpeedy redreſs—— Tho' they had found, by experience, where the great ſtrength of the nation lay, and had already felt how heavily the wheels of government move on, when clogg'd with the diſcontent of the *Commons*, yet had they neither goodneſs enough, by correcting their faults, to remove the objections of their adverſaries, nor wiſdom ſufficient, to know how to manage the oppoſition: all they could deviſe, like miſerable ſtate-quacks as they were, was to truſt to their opiates, and to ſuffer the diſtemper to become incurable, rather than by aſſembling the true phyſicians of the common-wealth, to diſcover their own male-practice and inſufficiency to cure it.

This put their timorous and too-confiding maſter upon the conſtant purſuit of pacific meaſures, whether ſeaſonable or not; till, at length, his weak and impolitic conduct in this reſpect, rendered him the dupe, both of his friends and enemies, and made him the bye-word of all the neighbouring nations —— It was not, that the king did not ſee the neceſſity of other meaſures, particularly, of engaging in the war for the re-

covery of the *Palatinate*, and for the defence of the diſtreſſed *Proteſtants* abroad—but here was the misfortune, and this was the chief point which ſtuck both with him and his miniſtry—foreign wars could not be carried on, to the purpoſe, without large ſums to ſupport them; and this money was not to be procured, without previouſly calling a parliament, and gratifying the Commons in the immediate redreſs of thoſe numerous grievances, which they ſo juſtly complained of: but this, notwithſtanding all his affected ſpeeches and laboured harangues from the throne, was what the king more dreaded than he did all his other enemies together——for none but the beſt princes, none but ſuch as have no other intereſt but that of the nation at heart, none but ſuch as, conſcious of the integrity of their intentions, dare meet their people often, be obliged by them, and ſubmit their actions to their free enquiry, are for engaging in foreign wars.

The *Tories*, however, applaud and adopt theſe inſular, theſe mean-ſpirited and pacific meaſures of their injudicious maſter, and notwithſtanding all that variety of change, which both they and the kingdom have ſince undergone, ſteadily, it ſeems, retain the ſame narrow and contracted way of thinking even to this day — whilſt the *Whigs*, as they were chiefly made up of the trading part of the nation, found more eſpecial fault with this part of the king's conduct, embraced the contrary principles, and were, by all manner of means, for preſerving the ballance of power even, amongſt thoſe ſtates upon the continent, from whoſe ſubjects they expected thoſe ſure returns of wealth, which not only contributed to their own abundance and proſperity, but to the

grandeur likewiſe, the ſtrength and the happineſs of the whole community.

But no murmurs, no clamour, no remonſtrances of his diſcontented people, can produce the deſired effect. The king perſiſts in the purſuit of the weak meaſures he at firſt ſet out with, and is reſolved to defend his mignon, his darling miniſter, whatever trouble or hazard it may draw upon himſelf and kingdom.——Tho' bred up in the ſtricteſt principles of proteſtantiſm, and affectedly fond of the diſcipline and doctrines of the church of *England*; yet terrified by their plots, and dreading an aſſaſſination, the laws againſt the Papiſts were ſuffered to remain unexecuted, and their religion every day to gain ground—In ſhort, the government of the ſtate was ſtill going on from bad to worſe, when at length a third or *Republican-party* ſtarts up, and makes its appearance upon the public ſtage. Theſe men ſtruck at the conſtitution itſelf, as well as the adminiſtration; they were for plucking up the root, as well as lopping the branches, and for taking away the remote, as well as the nearer cauſe of their uneaſineſs: they were for removing the throne itſelf, that it might no more ſerve for a ſcreen to ſhelter weak and wicked miniſters. When all was plain and level before them, they might then perhaps be conſidered in their turn, and come in for a ſhare of that government, to which they thought they had as good a natural right, as thoſe who now ſo weakly held the reins. Their numbers, 'tis true, were as yet but few, in compariſon of the bulk of the nation, and their property not very conſiderable, but as they moſt heartily, as well as loudly, joined in the popular cry againſt the court, and were

generally men of deep thought and gravity, of much reading and a good moral character, this ſtill added a great weight to their perſonal authority, and by degrees gave them the lead in the *Whig-party*. For to this they originally joined themſelves, and under their principles, as being moſt plauſible and agreeable to the preſent conſtitution, they ſtudiouſly concealed their own.

In the midſt of all this uneaſineſs and diſcontent, this violent ferment of parties, opinions and intereſts, both civil and religious, *Charles the firſt* ſucceeded to the throne. This prince had capacity enough to have made a good king, had his education put him in a right way to have made a proper uſe of it; but bred up, and elated, with too high a notion of that ſupreme authority with which he was inveſted, he ſeems to have been reſolved, even from the beginning of his reign, never to admit of any controul from his people, from thoſe he had been taught to look upon as his property, or ſomething below the condition of free-born ſubjects. He was naturally kind, gentle, humane and affectionate, but pride ſeems to have been the moſt prevailing ingredient in his compoſition; and this ſingle weakneſs ſwallowed up the good effects of his virtues, as it made him deſpiſe the complaints of his oppreſſed people, and expoſed him an eaſy prey to the ſelf-intereſted flatteries of his queen and miniſters. Tho' he would have been very glad to have made his ſubjects eaſy, proſperous, and happy under his reign, yet was he always afraid of hearkening to their remonſtrances, or making any conceſſions in their favour, leſt they ſhould be interpreted as ſo many acknowledgments of his own having been in an error, or of their ſuperiority. Perſuaded

ſuaded of his divine right to their implicit obedience, and ſatisfied within himſelf of the rectitude of his own intentions, that he meant as well by his people as any of his predeceſſors, why ſhould he not be as great as the greateſt of them? ——Not attending to the chief art of making a crown ſit eaſy, which is for the royal wearer to accommodate his meaſures to the times, to contingencies and the circumſtances of his ſubjects, and ever to avail himſelf of their humours, faults, or prejudices.

Inſtead, therefore, of falling in with the voice of his people, King *Charles* began his reign in expreſs contradiction to it; inſtead of correcting the miſtakes of his predeceſſor, he ſtill continued the ſame hated miniſter, and purſued even more violent meaſures, 'till the weight of his little finger became heavier than his father's loins. The miſconduct of the prince added continual numbers to the party in oppoſition to the court ——the king was too haughty to amend the faults, which were ſo loudly charged upon his adminiſtration, as his people were too rich, and too ſenſible of that power which accrued from their wealth, to be rode to death by an inſolent miniſter, and tamely to ſee the ancient laws of their country broken thro' and trampled upon, by a court no leſs arbitrary than rapacious.

It was ſoon become the king's misfortune, to be in a continual want of money; that neither the demeſnes of the crown, nor ſuch taxes as had been granted him in the beginning of his reign, were found ſufficient to ſupply the ordinary charges of his court, and thoſe other large expences, which the honour and ſafety of his kingdom were perpetually calling for. His neceſſities

ceſſities therefore, notwithſtanding all his prejudice and averſion to them, obliged him ſometimes to have recourſe to a parliament for aid. But the Commons, fully ſenſible of their own weight and importance, reſolved to make ſuch an uſe of their power, as the exigencies of the public demanded. His majeſty might tell them to their faces, that their behaviour was undutiful and ſeditious, and give the name of *Vipers* to ſuch of them as were ſuppoſed to be at the head of the oppoſition; but this *aſperity of language*, as Lord *Clarendon* himſelf very properly ſtiles it, availed him little; no ſubſidies, no ſupplies were to be expected, without an accompanying redreſs of grievances, and a thorough reformation of the government.

The king was yet but in his third year, when notwithſtanding all his mean art and ſubterfuges, his evaſions, equivocations, and tergiverſations, he found himſelf reduced to the neceſſity of giving his parliamentary conſent to the famous *Petition of Right*. As this *Petition*, therefore, is not only an illuſtrious inſtance of the power of the *Commons* at this time, and a manifeſt proof on which ſide the ballance of power was enclining, but contains likewiſe a clear deſcription of the abuſe of the prerogative, and the precarious ſtate of the liberty and property of the people of *England* before this period, I ſhall beg leave to tranſcribe a ſmall part of it, tho' the whole be well worth the ſerious peruſal of all ſuch as want to be brought to a right ſenſe of the comparative happineſs of the government they at preſent live under. "The Lords ſpiritual and temporal, and "Commons in parliament aſſembled, do humbly "pray your moſt excellent Majeſty, that no "man

" man hereafter be compelled to make or yield " any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or ſuch " like charge, without common conſent by act " of parliament ; and that none be called to " make anſwer, or take ſuch an oath as is not " warrantable by the ſtatutes of the realm, or " to give attendance, or be confined, or other- " wiſe moleſted or diſquieted concerning the " ſame, or for refuſal thereof : and that no free- " man, by your Majeſty's ſole command, with- " out cauſe certified, be impriſoned or de- " tained : and that your Majeſty would be " pleaſed to remove the ſoldiers and mariners, " which have been diſperſed into divers counties " of the realm, and the inhabitants, againſt their " wills, compelled to receive them into their " houſes and there to ſuffer them to ſojourn, and " that your people may not be ſo burthened in the " time to come : and that the commiſſions for " proceeding by martial law, may be revoked " and annulled ; and that hereafter, no com- " miſſion of like nature, may iſſue forth to any " perſon or perſons whatſoever, leſt by colour " of them, any of your Majeſty's ſubjects be " deſtroyed or put to death, contrary to the " laws and franchiſe of the land."

As the king, therefore, found it impoſſible to rule his own way, with the voice and concurrence of his people, why might he not make a bold puſh, and attempt to govern without them ? as he had no inclination to come up to the terms of the conſtitution, why might not the conſtitution be made to bend and ſubmit to his ? who dared to diſpute, as his father uſed to expreſs himſelf, what a king might do in the *plenitude of his power !* if money could not be obtained of the Commons

Commons in the regular way, in caſes of extreme neceſſity, as he was willing to be perſuaded this was, recourſe muſt be had to other and more unuſual methods of raiſing it: hence thoſe various oppreſſions of *Ship-money*, *Monopolies*, *Star-chamber-fines*, *High-commiſſion-court*, &c. which ſwell the annals of this unhappy reign.

But this was ſtill adding freſh fewel to the flame——the repreſentatives of the people, therefore, when neceſſity, after more than twelve years intermiſſion of parliaments, had again called them together, grew every day more fierce and reſolute. With pleaſure they behold the indigence of the king, and the diſtreſſes he laboured under for want of money: they ſee the ſuperiority which their command of the property of the nation, muſt at laſt give them; they purſue their ſtroke; they riſe continually in their demands, the moſt ample conceſſions will now ſcarcely ſatisfy them, the king's word is not to be depended upon, the whole government muſt be put into their hands ——public buſineſs is at a ſtand; every thing tends to confuſion; either the king or the commons muſt be abſolute maſters of the commonwealth.

With the crown were the *Tories* in general, that is, the greater part of the Nobility and Clergy, and all the Roman Catholics. For not only the queen had ever been their open and faſt friend, but even the king himſelf had ſhewed them far greater favours and indulgences, than were either conſiſtent with the laws of the land, or that ſtrong profeſſion of the moſt inviolable attachment to the church of *England*, which his adherents were ever boaſting of——The *Parliamentarians* conſiſted chiefly of ſuch as were againſt

againſt the hierarchy, or for introducing farther alterations into the eſtabliſhed religion; of ſuch likewiſe as were for limiting the prerogatives of the crown, and preventing, for the future, thoſe groſs abuſes of the regal authority, which they had lately ſeen committed, and the miſchievous conſequences of which they ſtill felt. Under this banner alſo fought the *Republicans*, who upon the ruines of the throne hoped they might be, at length, able to erect their favourite plan of an equal common-wealth.

As therefore the majority of the people of *England*, the trading and monied part of the nation more eſpecially, fell under one or other of theſe latter denominations, as the overballance and command of property was thrown entirely into the oppoſite ſcale, no wonder that victory and ſucceſs followed the king's enemies, and that the raſh and ill-adviſed monarch, after a vigorous and reſolute tho' ineffectual effort, found himſelf, at length, obliged to ſubmit to the ſuperior force.

The *Supreme Power* was now fallen into the hands of the *People*; when for want of wiſdom in themſelves, and honeſty in their leaders, inſtead of being gainers for all that immenſe expence of blood and treaſure, which they had ſo profuſely ſquandered away; inſtead of having their condition mended by this exceſſive ſhock in the conſtitution; at the foot of the account they found themſelves looſers by the change, and in a far more wretched ſituation than they were when the civil war began. From tyranny they were fallen into anarchy and confuſion. For in the midſt of ſo many jarring and contending intereſts,

ſo many ignorant, haughty, inſolent, and diſcordant maſters, whoſe voice ſhall be heard ?

The firſt ſtruggle of any conſequence was between the *Whigs*, and their friends and allies the *Republicans*, which of them ſhould dictate to the nation, and take the lead in regulating the preſent diſorders of the ſtate, and bringing them to a happy concluſion. The former were for reſtoring the captive prince to his liberty, and the exerciſe of his ancient rights, but under ſuch previous limitations and reſtrictions, as ſhould be deemed ſufficient guards to the conſtitution, againſt all future abuſe of the regal power. The *Republicans*, on the other hand, were againſt all kinds of reconciliation whatever, pretending that no fetters would be found ſtrong enough to hold the royal authority within its due bounds, ſhould it be once more ſet looſe and ſuffered to range at liberty ; that the king's word was not to be relied upon, and conſequently, that there could be no ſolid and ſufficient ſecurity for the happineſs and independency of the nation, but in a free and equal common-wealth.

The overballance of property was clearly on the ſide of the *Whigs* ; and there is no queſtion but they would have carried their point, in favour of their diſtreſſed prince and the conſtitution, had it not been for a third power, more weighty, at this juncture, than either of the other two, which was entirely on the part of the *Republicans*, I mean *the victorious Army* ; where ſuch a violent ſpirit of enthuſiaſm, independence, levelling and inſolence prevailed amongſt the ſoldiers of all ranks and degrees, from the higheſt to the loweſt, as made them look upon themſelves as ſuperior to all laws, and the ſole arbiters of the fate both of the king and kingdom. The

conteſt

conteſt therefore ſoon became unequal; the *Whigs* were forced to give place; whilſt the Republicans, ſupported and encouraged by the army, for the preſent, command the ſtate. For, as *Harrington* has well obſerved, "where there is "a ſtanding-army and no formed government, "there the army of neceſſity will have a dicta-"torian power."

The king is murthered; the old conſtitution utterly ſubverted, and no new form of government ready to be ſettled in its room. In the general hurry, buſtle and confuſion, ſometimes the *Army*, and ſometimes the *new model of parliament* has the upper hand, till *Oliver Cromwell*, thro' an amazing coincidence of circumſtances, not material to be inſiſted upon in this place, found means, at laſt, to deceive and get the better of both, and to procure himſelf to be acknowledged by the greater part of the nation, as their *Sovereign Head* and *Protector*.

Thus arrived at the utmoſt height of his ambition, and placed at the helm of the new common-wealth, this Favourite of fortune ſaw two ways before him, by which he might propoſe to govern the nation, either by a parliament as in former times, or by the aſſiſtance of the army. With a parliament, he could have but a ſorry proſpect of ſucceeding to his mind, either in his foreign or domeſtic adminiſtration, as the old one was now become entirely republican, and a new one, if left to the free election of the people, would be either of the ſame principles, or, what might be ſtill of worſe conſequence, too much inclined, perhaps, to favour the baniſhed family. To the army, therefore, he bends his great application; wiſely enough concluding,

that what was gotten by violence, would be beſt retained by the ſame means : and tho' he had not a great deal to expect, even from them, in their preſent ſullen, diſcontented, inſolent and levelling temper, yet, notwithſtanding this difficulty, by puniſhing ſome, caſhiering others and placing his own creatures in their room, and paying their officers very well, he made a troubleſome kind of ſhift, thro' their means, to govern the nation for more than four years together, againſt the ballance of property and the general inclination of the people.

Upon his death chaos returns again ; a new *Protector*, the *Army*, the old *Parliament*, each in its turn, lords it at the head of the commonwealth ; whilſt the people, the bulk of the nation, the men of property eſpecially, diſtracted with ſuch a perpetual ſeries of confuſion, torn to pieces, fleeced and oppreſſed on all ſides, wiſh for a total change of maſters, and ardently long for the reſtoration of the ancient conſtitution both in church and ſtate, as the only poſſible means to relieve them under their preſent ſufferings. The *Tories* once more lift up their heads, appear abroad, defend the cauſe of the royal family, and encourage their neighbours in thoſe favourable ſentiments they were every where beginning to entertain of it. The *Whigs* frankly join with them againſt their preſent tyrants. The *Army* and *Republicans*, now ſplit into ſeveral factions and intereſts, find themſelves unequal to the weight of government ; the property and the power are departed from them. Unable therefore any longer to oppoſe the concurrent voice of the people, they plunge into the ſtream, and are carried along

along with them—the whole nation receives with the greateſt impotence of joy their returning maſter.

As *Charles the ſecond* was reſtored to the kingdom without any previous conditions, the ancient conſtitution, both in church and ſtate, immediately took place; and the kingly power, as from a ſhort eclipſe, broke out again in its full and meridian ſplendor: it ſeemed even to have recovered ſtrength from its fall, and to have riſen from the earth with renewed vigour. It was preſumed, however, that the mature age of the king, the hiſtory of his father's tragic fate, and the ſad experience of his own tedious baniſhment, would have ſet thoſe bounds to the exerciſe of the ſovereignty, which the madneſs of the times had been deficient in exacting.

But it was this prince's misfortune to have more wit than judgment, tho' he ſeems not to have been deficient even in this, the moſt diſtinguiſhing mark of wiſdom, when he would force himſelf to apply to buſineſs. He had ſenſe enough to make a lively companion, a well-bred and agreeable man, but wanted full as much more to make him a good one. His father, tho' a good man, could never make a good king; becauſe of that natural pride and ſtiffneſs of his temper, which rendered him untractable, ſelf-willed and too fond of uncontroulable power. But as ambition was not the vice of the ſon, he wanted only to have been a good man, to have rendered him one of the beſt of princes. His genius directed him rather to ſhine with men of wit in the circle, than to perplex his underſtanding and diſturb his repoſe in examining the diſtant conſequences

ſequences of his own actions, or in unravelling the intricate labyrinths of the cabinet.

Placed by a ſudden and unexpected turn of providence at the head of three powerful kingdoms, and raiſed from the moſt abject ſtate of dependance to the higheſt affluence of wealth and power, inſtead of being properly thankful to that almighty arm, which had wrought this wonderful deliverance; inſtead of exerting all the faculties of his ſoul, in promoting the true intereſt of that nation, which had thus exalted him from the loweſt deſpair, he reſolved to indulge himſelf in all that eaſe and pleaſure, to which his inclination naturally carried him, and which the misfortunes of his paſt life had not ſuffered him to enjoy in all that laviſh abundance he wiſhed for. If therefore he was fond of arbitrary power, it was becauſe it furniſhed him with the perpetual means of gratifying his darling propenſities; if he was an enemy to the liberty of his ſubjects, it was chiefly becauſe their repeated clamours at the miſconduct of his adminiſtration, diſturbed him in the quiet enjoyment of that indolent and pleaſurable life, which he had propoſed to himſelf, and in which he had placed his greateſt happineſs.

Upon the *Reſtoration* the *Tories*, who had undoubtedly ſuffered moſt for the royal cauſe, and whoſe principles were likelieſt to promote the meaſures of the court, and to preſerve the people in their future allegiance, were generally advanced to all the places of honour, truſt and profit in the kingdom; ſo that the Church, the Senate, the Univerſities, and the Courts of Juſtice, were every where taught to reſound with the favourite doctrine of *paſſive obedience and non-reſiſtance*,

ſiſtance. The *Whigs*, on the other hand, who had taken ſo much pains in the laſt reign to reduce the power of the crown within ſome certain limits, and to fix that wandering meteor, the *Prerogative*, could not be quite ſo well pleaſed, to ſee the fruits of their labour and expence all entirely thrown away, to feel the court as wanton as ever in the abuſe of its power, and to perceive their countrymen with greedineſs embracing, and with eagerneſs propagating thoſe doctrines, which could not in the end but conduct them to ſlavery. But as the general voice of the people was, as yet, entirely in favour of their beloved monarch, as he had the great weight of the national property on his ſide, they found it neceſſary to ſit down contented with the preſent ſituation of affairs, and wait till a more favourable opportunity offered itſelf, to fall in with the impetuous torrent, and to rejoice, as well as they could rejoice, with their exulting brethren. The horror of relapſing into their late miſeries and confuſions, made them ſuffer many things in the public adminiſtration, which would not otherwiſe ſo eaſily have been born with.

As King *Charles* abounded too much in his own wit to concern himſelf greatly about the truth of any religion, as well to comply with the earneſt ſolicitations of his mother, as to merit the compaſſion and claim the aſſiſtance of thoſe courts, whither his neceſſities had driven him for protection, he ſuffered himſelf to be made a convert to that form of worſhip, from whoſe profeſſors he ſaw moſt probability of being, in time, reſtored to his kingdoms. This obliged him, after his return, to live a perpetual lye; to profeſs one form of religion outwardly, and to

be of another in his heart. Hence ſprang the abundant miſeries of this reign; this was the fertile ſource of all that ill conduct in the ſtate, which was ſo loudly and ſo juſtly complained of, during the greateſt part of his adminiſtration —The *Papiſts* were connived at, ſupported, encouraged; the *Laws* of the land were ſtretched, ſuſpended, relaxed; *Prerogative* every where preſided; the *Dutch* were oppoſed, diſtreſſed, attacked, weakened; whilſt the common enemy of *Europe*, the encroaching *French*, were ſtrengthened and aſſiſted in all their ambitious enterprizes; whilſt every artifice was attempted at home, to eſtabliſh the quiet and ſettled exerciſe of that arbitrary power, which might ſo ſoon be wanted by the monarch —— But the danger was now become too near, as well as too urgent, to be any longer complaiſantly trifled with; and even that general bribery and corruption, which was ſo flagrantly practiſed upon almoſt all the members of the *long parliament*, by the then *Tory* miniſtry, was now experienced to be of no avail —— and of no avail it ever will be found, we may aſſure ourſelves, whenever the *Conſtitution* is in any real danger, till the overballance of property ſhall be transferred into other hands, from thoſe where we now find it.

The *Whigs* from about fifty, their number at the beginning of the *long parliament*, were at length become the majority of the *Houſe of Commons*. They expoſe the ruinous tendency of the conduct of the court, both in the houſe and out of it; the whole nation, by degrees, recovers from that pleaſing reverie which had ſo long poſſeſſed it, catches the alarm, ſees the terrible gulph they were juſt falling into, and are ſeriouſly

ſeriouſly affrighted for their religion, for their laws, for their liberties, and the fate of *Europe* ——and as the profuſe liberality of the injudicious king, had wantonly and wickedly ſquandered away all thoſe immenſe ſums of money, which had been ſo freely granted him by his ſubjects, and thereby reduced him to the greateſt difficulties; as the liberty of *Europe*, and conſequently that of this nation, thro' the arms and counſils of the ambitious *Frenchman*, or rather thro' the weakneſs, connivance, and under-hand aſſiſtance of the *penſioned Engliſhman*, grew every day more and more precarious, had not a ſudden death ſaved him from the ignominy, he muſt either have totally changed his former conduct, and thrown himſelf upon the affection of his people and the conſtitution, or he would ſoon have been moſt feelingly convinced, that mere *Prerogative* is but brute thunder, that the overballance of power, as well as of property, lay entirely in the hands of his ſubjects, and once more, perhaps, to uſe a phraſe of his own, been ſent abroad a grazing.

By giving his conſent to the *bill for taking away tenures in capite and the court of wards*, which King *Charles* did immediately upon his reſtoration, and before he had well attended to the conſequences of what he was about, he deprived the crown of one of its greateſt and moſt influencing branches of power, and added ſo much real weight to the ſcale of the people, as none of his later ſchemes of arbitrary government, ſuch as *penſioning the houſe of commons*, *new-modelling the corporations*, *bribing juries*, &c. could ever after recover. Both in his father's and grand-father's time, the repreſenta-

tives of the people had been attempting to emancipate themſelves from theſe laſt remains of their ancient ſlavery, but without the deſired ſucceſs, as both theſe monarchs too well knew of what mighty importance it was to their illegal and anti-conſtitutional views, to have the cuſtody and diſpoſal, during minorities, of almoſt all the large eſtates in the kingdom, and were very ſenſible, that by this means they had perpetual opportunities offered them of obliging their own miniſters and favourites, at the expence of their ſubjects, of educating the young gentry in ſuch principles as they liked beſt, of influencing and corrupting both them and their families with their own fortunes, and of creating, with good management, the moſt laſting dependencies in every county, and in almoſt every borough of the nation. The equivalent which was given to the king for this conceſſion, was 100,000*l.* a year, but had the people paid five times that ſum for it, they would have been great gainers by the bargain. For the ballance of power was by this means thrown entirely into their hands, and they were actually put into poſſeſſion of the only thing they wanted to make them a perfectly free people.

James the *ſecond* was much more like his father than his brother; the qualities of his mind were ſuch as might have adorned the private gentleman, whilſt the too high opinion, which he was pleaſed to entertain of his own abilities, and his intolerable bigotry to a foreign mode of worſhip, entirely ſpoiled the prince. His experience, capacity, diligence, and turn for public buſineſs, were ſuch as might have rendered both himſelf glorious, and his people flouriſhing and happy under his adminiſtration, had not his ungovernable

ungovernable zeal for the *Romiſh* form of religion, given a perverſe biaſs to all his deſigns and actions. Few men in his kingdom knew better the true intereſt of his ſubjects than he himſelf did, but the great misfortune was, that as his views and theirs did by no means coincide, he could not always perſuade himſelf to purſue it.

As his grateful Houſe of Commons, immediately after his acceſſion to the throne, in acknowledgement of his Majeſty's moſt gracious, free, and ſolemn declaration, that he would ſteadily maintain their religion and laws as they were then eſtabliſhed, and make them the rule of his conduct, had at once granted him a clear and independent revenue of more than two millions ſterling *per ann.* this was all he had to hope for from them at preſent; and more than this he well knew he was not eaſily to expect from their bounty, without previous reſtrictions and limitations tacked to the grant. With good œconomy, and no prince ever had more, this revenue would be found ſufficient to maintain an army at home, (for foreign wars, whatever occaſion there might be for them, he was reſolved not to engage in, theſe he left entirely to his good brother of *France*) and an army raiſed and paid by himſelf, officered with thorough-paced Roman Catholicks, and abſolutely at his devotion, would ſerve his purpoſe, he thought, full as well as a parliament itſelf: the one, he fondly imagined, might, by degrees, be ſo modelled, as to ſerve any deſign he might have in view; the other, he was ſenſible by the ſpecial experience of the laſt, as well as of his father's reign, never could ——as his great intention, as the chief aim of all his actions, was to convert his people from the

deadly ſin of hereſy, his pious inſtructors had taught him, that breach of promiſe, perjury, violation of the laws, and force itſelf was not only expedient, but might even religiouſly and lawfully be employed upon ſo holy an occaſion.

As King *James* had been educated in the ſtricteſt principles of the *Tories*, and had always ſhewn himſelf a faſt friend to them and their intereſts, ſo in return they had ever hitherto been found faithful to him, had throughly ſerved him in all his paſt troubles, and had in reality fixed the tottering crown upon his head. Fully perſuaded therefore of their ſteady and moſt hearty concurrence with him, of all their weight and influence in ſupport of whatever meaſures he might think proper to purſue, and ſatisfied in his own mind of the truth of thoſe doctrines, which had been ſo often and ſo loudly inculcated by them, of *the divine right of kings to the abſolute obedience of their ſubjects in all caſes whatever* — why might he not freely indulge his ambition, and exert all that power, which he had been made to believe was committed to him by God alone? ſurely there muſt be ſomething more than mere words in all thoſe magnificent things, which he had ſo often heard preached and taught of the omnipotence of princes! he had himſelf ſeen the happy effects of theſe very principles, in that implicit and ſlaviſh obedience, which the *French* paid to the will of their Monarque; and had lately heard, that by means of theſe ſame doctrines of paſſive obedience and non-reſiſtance, *Charles the eleventh* had triumphed over the liberties of the *Swedes!* why might not he likewiſe, in his turn, hope to ſucceed in the glorious experiment?

ment? the attempt, at leaſt, was meritorious whatever the event might be!

If, for inſtance, he alone was the abſolute, the ſupreme and uncontroulable head of the church, why might he not root out hereſy from the ſtate in what manner he pleaſed? why might he not, in imitation of the precedent ſet him by his predeceſſor *Henry the eighth*, change the eſtabliſhed religion of his kingdom, in order to introduce the ſo much better form of his own? was it not the indiſpenſable duty of his ſubjects patiently to ſubmit to all his commands?

As he had been made to believe, that he was the true ſource and origin of the civil laws, the ſole fountain of honour and juſtice, why might he not alter, ſuſpend, or even abrogate the old conſtitution of his country? why might he not, like his brother of *France*, collect money, or publiſh new ſtatutes and ordinances, as he pleaſed? as all the rights and privileges of his ſubjects flowed originally from the royal bounty, was it not ſtill in the reigning prince's power to change, to recal, or to new-model them, as ſeemed moſt expedient to his preſent views, or to his mere good will and pleaſure?

Should the murmuring and diſcontented *Whigs*, as they formerly did in his father's days, and were lately attempting to do in his brother's, endeavour to ſtir up the uneaſy and complaining people to ſedition; ſhould they go about to perſuade them to reject the yoke, which was preparing for them, and to diſobey all ſuch commands of their prince, as they might imagine were not quite ſo agreeable to the ancient conſtitution of their country, their party, he was perſuaded to believe, was the minority of the

nation ; however, at all hazards, the property and power of his old friends the *Tories* might ſurely be depended upon, in ſupport of the natural and neceſſary conſequences of thoſe doctrines, they had for ſo many years together been labouring to eſtabliſh —— *France*, he had the ſtrongeſt aſſurances, might be ſafely relied upon, for all the aſſiſtance it could lend upon ſo good and meritorious an occaſion, as weakening the proteſtant intereſt, and eſtabliſhing a prince of its own religion upon the throne of *Great Britain.*

Here then it was that the *Tories* firſt catch the threatning alarm. Their royal pupil was grown too head-ſtrong for them to manage, and the fatal effects of thoſe doctrines, which they had taken ſo much pains to inculcate, were juſt now burſting upon themſelves, as well as the reſt of the nation. The groſs abſurdity of their principles ſtares them at once full in the face ; they feel their errors, acknowledge them, give them up. They even act in expreſs contradiction to all their former principles ; they join the *Whigs* ; they oppoſe, they relinquiſh, they deſert, they even reſiſt the wretched prince, who ſeems to have placed his ſureſt hopes of ſucceſs in the daring enterprize he was attempting to execute, in their faſt and ſteady adherence to his intereſts. ——The regal weight is once more found light, and wanting, in the ballance ; the property and power of the people prevail ; the Monarch ſtands aſtoniſhed at the ſudden revolution ; his heart fails him, and he is perſuaded to quit an obſtinate and ungrateful nation, who would not ſuffer him to harraſs, oppreſs, and tyrannize over them as he pleaſed.

The

The throne was now become vacant; for the king had in fact deſerted it: nor was there any perſon left in the nation duly commiſſioned to execute the laws, to call parliaments, to diſtribute employments, to give a ſanction to the acts of ſtate, and to perform all thoſe other common offices of the ſupreme magiſtrate, which the conſtitution demanded —— what was to be done then at this great and critical conjuncture, upon this new and unprecedented occaſion? ſomething muſt be thought of, and that immediately, to reſtore the peace and quiet of the amazed people—let a *Regency* be appointed, ſay the ſecret friends of the abdicated monarch, which ſhall perform the regal office during the abſence of King *James*, and until he ſubmits to ſuch conditions and limitations of his power, as ſhall be thought moſt proper to be impoſed upon him for the public good.

But who ſhall undertake the high and arduous taſk, of appointing this *Regency*, and of conſtituting this new ſet of governors? the *Houſe of Lords*, our hereditary lawgivers? but they are only a part of the legiſlature, and conſequently unequal to the high office—let them be joined then by thoſe, whoſe happineſs is moſt intimately concerned in the due execution of the laws, by the *People of England*, either by their deputies to be choſen expreſly for the purpoſe, or, if that be thought a leſs deviation from ancient forms, by ſuch as laſt repreſented them! "Neceſſity and ſelf-"preſervation are the great laws of nature to ſo-"cieties as well as individuals, and may well diſ-"penſe with the ſtrict obſervation of the com-"mon forms of any conſtitution." For to aſſert, that becauſe King *James* was pleaſed to deſert the

the throne and leave his kingdom ; that becauſe the conſtitution had not as yet provided for ſo unthought-of a caſe, that therefore the people of *England* had no way left to help or redreſs themſelves, but muſt neceſſarily continue as they were in a ſtate of anarchy and confuſion, without any ſettled form of government, till he ſhould think proper to return to them again, is the abſurdeſt of all abſurdities, as it abſolutely ſubmits the happineſs, the laws, religion, and liberties of many millions of people, to the mere will and caprice of a weak, not to ſay a wicked, man.

For ſuppoſe King *James*, had it been put to his option, had refuſed to have returned at all, (as moſt probably would have been the caſe) unleſs his ſubjects would previouſly ſurrender their *all*, their liberties and properties into his hands, —'tis plain the nation muſt have complied with theſe extravagant demands, or, according to the concluſions of ſome Gentlemen, have ſtill continued without any head or regular form of government in it —— I ſay 'tis moſt probable that King *James*, had it been put to his choice, would have conſtantly refuſed to have returned into *England*, unleſs he was left with an unreſtrained freedom to act in it as he pleaſed. For, as the *Author of the Diſſertation upon Parties* has well obſerved, " he had ſhewn by his *firſt eſ-*
" *cape*, when nothing more was impoſed upon
" him than to wait the reſolution of a free par-
" liament, that he would renounce his crown
" rather than ſubmit to ſecure effectually the
" obſervation of the laws of his country — he
" made a *ſecond eſcape*, which was voluntary as
" well as the firſt, and made on the ſame prin-
" ciple, againſt the intreaties of his friends, *&c.*

—But

— but if the people, at this remarkable criſis, had a right to appoint a *Doge*, a *Lord Archon*, a *Regent* or *Regency*, with ſupreme authority, as is, I think, agreed on all hands, why not a *king* alſo? for to ſay that they had a right to do the one, and no right to do the other likewiſe, ſeems to me extremely weak and ſelf-contradictory, as it entirely gives up the *thing* in diſpute, whilſt it wrangles about a mere *word*.

But our fathers were too wiſe to loſe the ſubſtance, whilſt they vainly ſtrove to catch at the ſhadow — they ſaw that King *James* had *voluntarily* put it out of his power any longer to protect his ſubjects, and that he had in fact deſerted the government; they declare therefore the throne to be vacant; they exert that original right, which mere ſelf-preſervation, the laws of nature and ſociety gave them; they follow the undoubted cuſtoms of their firſt anceſtors in *Germany*; they act agreeably to the conſtitution of this kingdom before the conqueſt, as well as to the primitive practice of their *Gothic* brethren in the ſeveral kingdoms of *Spain*, *France*, *Lombardy*, &c. —— They choſe them a new king, one of the royal ſtock, and the very next in the ſucceſſion to the throne, after the family which had ſo baſely relinquiſhed it; one who had already moſt happily as well as glorioufly, delivered them from the civil and religious tyranny which hung over their heads, a hero both able and willing to defend them, as well as the reſt of *Europe*, from the impending ruin that was ſo much to be dreaded from the progreſs of the *French* arms.

To prevent, however, as much as poſſible, all future uneaſineſs, and to pluck up by the very

roots all thoſe mutual jealouſies, which had ſo long ſubſiſted between them and their ſovereign about their diſtinct rights, what had formerly been wanting at the reſtoration, they now take care moſt effectually to ſupply. For previouſly to ſuch election they form a ſecond *Magna Charta*, another *Bill of Rights*, wherein they clearly ſet forth and declare their own diſtinct claims and privileges, and fix ſuch determinate bounds to the power and prerogatives of the crown, as it may not hereafter preſume to paſs —— The new king accepts the throne upon theſe conditions, with the moſt fixed reſolution inviolably to obſerve them. ——Thus were the wide and firm foundations laid for the moſt laſting domeſtic peace and happineſs, had we but the wiſdom, the moderation, the virtue to know when we were well, and where to ſtop.

It was the *revolution* then which gave the laſt and permanent eſtabliſhment to the popular intereſt, and immoveably fixed the nodding ballance of power to the ſide, whither it had been ſo long inclining. " A king of *Britain* (*ſays* " *the Diſſertation upon Parties*) is now, ſtrictly " and properly, what kings ſhould always be, a " member, but the ſupreme member, or head " of the political body. Part of one individual, " ſpecific, whole in every reſpect; diſtinct from " it, or independent of it, in none. He can " move no longer in another orbit from his peo- " ple, and, like ſome ſuperior planet, attract, " repel, influence, and direct their motions by " his own. He and they are parts of the ſame " ſyſtem, intimately joined and co-operating to- " gether, acting and acted upon, limiting and " limited, controuling and controuled by one " another;

" another; and when he ceaſes to ſtand in this " relation to them, he ceaſes to ſtand in any; " the ſettlements by which he governs are plainly " original contracts. His inſtitution is plainly " conditional; and he may forfeit his right to " allegiance, as undeniably and effectually, as " the ſubject may forfeit his right to protection. " There are no longer any hidden reſerves of au- " thority to be let out on occaſion, to over- " flow the rights and privileges of the peo- " ple. The laws of the land are known, and " they are the ſole ſprings, from whence the " prince can derive his pretenſions, and the " people theirs."

The *Revenue* of the kingdom, under the preſent auſpicious ſettlement, can be no more ſquandered away in luxury and extravagance, or abuſed to the much more dangerous purpoſes of advancing the arbitrary meaſures of the crown, of maintaining forces independently of the conſent of parliament, and of overturning the civil and religious liberties of the ſubject. For the public money is now all appropriated, and deſtined to its ſpecific, diſtinct, and proper uſes from the very moment it is granted; the *regal expence*, if I may term it ſo, is wholly ſeparated from that of the kingdom, and the miniſters of the crown muſt be ever ready to give an exact account of the due application of the national treaſures, at the hazard of their lives and fortunes — I would not be thought to go ſo far as to ſay, that according to the preſent method of making our parliamentary grants, 'tis abſolutely impoſſible that any of the public money ſhould be ever applied to uſes different from thoſe originally intended by the *Houſe of Commons*, but what I aſſert, as a very advanta-

geous conſequence of the *Revolution* in favour of the ſubject, is, that ſuch ſaving, ſuch miſapplication can be but very ſmall in compariſon with what it frequently, yea generally, was, before ſuch appropriation took place, when the crown had the entire diſpoſal of all parliamentary grants whatever — at leaſt, that it can never be great enough to endanger the liberties and independance of the nation.

This total ſeparation of the *civil liſt*, as 'tis uſually called, from the ordinary as well as extraordinary expences of the kingdom, gave a much greater blow in the event to the regal authority, than was, I believe, ſuſpected either by them who firſt propoſed the ſcheme, or by him who accepted of it. For if the power, which ariſes from wealth, ariſes only from the ſuperfluity of a man's income, 'tis impoſſible that any great and laſting influence can be created with a bounded eſtate, even of a million *per ann.* where the greateſt part of it muſt be expended, in maintaining the neceſſary pomp and ſupporting the grandeur of a court.

Let it be obſerved farther, *that no payments in money, no payments which are made from cuſtoms, exciſes*, &c. as is the caſe of our preſent civil liſt, can give half that power and authority to the receiver over thoſe who pay it, as a like ſum would do, was it to ariſe, (as the ſtanding revenues of our kings before the reſtoration did,) from *lands, feodal duties, wardſhips*, &c.—" and " as to thoſe employments, which are ſaid to be " ſo much increaſed ſince the *Revolution*, they " are actually cut off from their influence up- " on the conſtitution, as far as written laws " can do it, in innumerable inſtances. Since the

" the 5th of *William* and *Mary*, 1694, no new " employment in the revenue, can be held by " any member of the *Houſe of Commons*: and " ſince the 4th of Queen *Anne*, 1705, no new " eſtabliſhment whatſoever, excepting in the " navy or the army ..... The *Cuſtoms*, *Ex-* " *ciſe*, *Poſt-office*, and a multitude of other civil " officers, which exiſted long before the *Revolu-* " *tion*, (and not, as is falſly conceived, of later " inſtitution) have been alſo weeded out of par- " liament."

If we add to all theſe arguments, that the *Trade* and *Riches* of this nation, its rental, its ſtock, its whole income, and conſequently its power, have been continually increaſing ever ſince the Revolution, we ſhall, I hope, effectually put to ſilence the raſh and impertinent clamors of thoſe ignorant pretenders to a ſuperior foreſight, as well as patriotiſm, who are ever ſounding in our ears the immenſeneſs of the preſent Civil Liſt, and the certain danger, which muſt neceſſarily accrue from thence to the liberty of the ſubject — For what has been thrown into the regal ſcale, as an equivalent, for all that vaſt acceſſion of weight, which has been made to the popular ſide of the ballance? even the 600,000 *l. per ann.* which was granted to King *William*, was more, in proportion, than what is now ſettled upon his preſent Majeſty, conſidering the different circumſtances of the times, the increaſe of luxury, *&c.* " Before the Revolution, ſays that accurate hiſtorian the reverend Mr. *Carte*, " a man could " live better, and provide better for his family, " upon 500 *l. per ann.* than now upon 1500 *l.*" Whether, indeed, this proportion be well grounded, or only given out at random, as too many of this

this learned gentleman's calculations have been found to be, I ſhall not take upon me to aſſert; ſeeing 'tis ſufficient for my purpoſe, ſufficient to ſupport the propoſition I have before advanced, if in general the *relative value* of money be leſs now, than it was about the time of the Revolution.

" At the Revolution, *ſays the author of Faction* " *detected*, the numbers of the people were com- " puted nearly at ſix millions, and by the long " peace and neceſſary increaſe of procreation, " this number cannot be at preſent leſs than ſeven, " or in that proportion. The expence of the " people, *per* head, was about ſeven pounds at " the Revolution, at this time, 'tis univerſally " agreed, that this expence amounts to ten. " Now as the revenue of the people muſt in- " fallibly be, at leaſt, as much as the people " ſpend, it follows, that the revenue of the peo- " ple was at the Revolution forty two millions, " and that it is ſeventy now. The people have " therefore increaſed in their annual income " twenty eight millions, (or in that proportion) " ſince the Revolution; and as it is a maxim in- " conteſtible in politics, that power always fol- " lows property, which muſt ſooner or later " operate in every country, it is manifeſt, that " the people have acquired in the ſpace of fifty " years, more ſolid weight in the ſcale of this " conſtitution, than they could have gained, or " can gain, by all the popular laws that ever " were made, or can be made, in their favour " to the end of time."

The long and expenſive wars upon the continent, which ſoon ſucceeded the Revolution, and which it was abſolutely neceſſary that *England* ſhould bear

bear a conſiderable part in, as well in the immediate defence of her own laws, religion and liberty, as of the independence of the reſt of *Europe*, whatever may be uſually imagined to the contrary, ſtill contributed to lighten the regal, and to throw more weight into the popular ſcale, as it made the Court perpetually obſervant of, and dependant upon, the Houſe of Commons, in order to obtain thoſe large, tho' neceſſary, ſupplies, which were always wanting to fulfil engagements with foreign princes, and to maintain the requiſite armaments both by ſea and land. The kingly power, it may be depended upon, in ſuch a conſtitution as ours is, never ſuffers more, than when the intereſt of the nation obliges it to engage in wars upon the continent: and this, undoubtedly, is the true reaſon, why they were ever ſo induſtriouſly avoided by the whole family of the *Stuarts*. For 'tis an unqueſtionable maxim, confirmed by the whole ſeries of our hiſtory, that if it be neceſſary for the ſupreme magiſtrate, to meddle frequently with the people's purſes, they, in return, will be always getting ſome equivalent from him for their money.

If, in the laſt place, the *laws* of every country be thought the beſt and ſureſt teſt in what hands the overballance of the national power be lodged, I might ſafely appeal to the many popular ones which have been expreſly made in favour of the ſubject, ſince that ever-memorable period which I have ſo often mentioned—But this point has been ſo completely executed by the Author of *Faction detected*, that I ſhall not ſcruple to refer the inquiſitive reader, who lies open to conviction, to that treatiſe for his full ſatisfaction —— So true is that obſervation

obſervation of Mr. *Harrington*, " that laws made " in popular aſſemblies, or where the ballance is " with the people, muſt always be popular." — " For popular counſils, as the ſame great autho- " rity has elſewhere remarked, " underſtand no- " thing but themſelves."

F I N I S.

THE

PRESENT TAXES

COMPARED TO THE

PAYMENTS made to the PUBLICK

Within the Memory of MAN.

With ſome THOUGHTS on the poſſible Conſequences that may enſue from the

NATIONAL DEBTS.

In a LETTER to a MEMBER of PARLIAMENT, From a COUNTRY FARMER.

This Royal Throne of KINGS, this Scepter'd Iſle,
This bleſſed Plot, this Earth, this Realm, this *England*,
This Land of deareſt Souls, is now Leas'd out,
Like to a Tenement, or pelting Farm.

SHAKESPEARE.

It is not, nor it cannot come to Good.

IDEM.

LONDON:

Printed for J. MARSHALL, at the *Unicorn*, in St *Clement's Church-yard*.

M.DCC.XLIX.

[*Price One Shilling.*]

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THE

PRESENT TAXES

COMPARED, &c.

SIR, *December* 29, 1748.

MR POPE has made the MAN OF ROSS famous for his charity; but, as I have heard from a country-man of his who knew him, he was as remarkable for a drollery of humour, that ſhewed a great knowledge of mankind. As an inſtance of this, he told a ſtory which is not quite foreign to the ſubject of our laſt converſation, upon which, according to your requeſt, I now ſend you ſome plain thoughts. Not long before Mr *Kyrle* died, a neighbouring Gentleman went to viſit him, and, after the uſual compliments, enquired *How all friends did at* Roſs? *Very well*, ſays the old man, *For od's bud, Mr* A--a--a, *we at* Roſs *here are very rich. Rich, Sir!* ſays the other, *Middling, I take it; much like your neighbours. You are much miſtaken, Sir*, ſays Mr *Kyrle*; *for we are*

very rich. Why! what makes you think ſo? ſays the other. *Becauſe*, ſays Mr *Kyrle*, *we have five Attornies live here in town, and ſix or ſeven more conſtantly keep market, and yet, for all that, od's bud, Sir, we can buy bread and butter ſtill.*

What provoked Mr *Kyrle* to reflect in this manner upon a whole Profeſſion, I know not, nor ſhall I imitate him in it; but however hard this obſervation may bear on particulars, yet I think, in general, there is ſome ſenſe in it. At leaſt it ſhewed Mr *Kyrle*'s opinion to be, " That where large draughts were continually making from any ſet of people, if they were not ruined by them, they muſt at firſt have had better bottoms than was generally imagined." And if this obſervation be true, it is a much better Vindication of ſome of our former Miniſters, than ever they offered, or perhaps thought of. People grumbled at them for Taxing the Nation at the rate of ſix or eight Millions one year after another; but as *we can buy bread and butter ſtill*, it is a full proof that they knew the ſtrength of our pockets, better than the folks out of place, who condemned their meaſures.—How long, indeed, this way of going on may poſſibly hold? is another queſtion; or what conſequences it may in the end produce? may be matter of further enquiry. The gloomy Gentleman, who was with you when I laſt ſaw you, made ſeveral foreboding remarks upon the diſmal ſtate we are juſt upon the brink of. Many of them I did not underſtand, but obſerved he run much upon one, which was a kind of maſter-key to all the reſt: and you cannot have forgot, that he laid down at firſt, and always alledged this in ſupport of every thing he ſaid; " That where-ever " there is a great change made in the balance

" of

" of Property in any ſtate, it always cauſes an " alteration in the balance of Power."

This drew on much talk, in which this maxim was well ſifted. In ſupport of it, he inſtanced the firſt Barons after the Conqueſt; who, by the great eſtates which they had, were enabled to ſtand many a ſtiff ſtruggle with the Crown; nay, and were a full match for it too, where eight or ten of them joined together, without falling out among themſelves, as they uſually did. One of theſe over-grown Lords, who was Earl of *Warwick*, he ſaid, was nicknamed the *King-maker*; who, though he at laſt was killed in following that unthankful trade, yet it was not till after he had ſhewed what his great eſtate enabled him to do that way; having pulled down one King and ſet up another, as the humour took, three or four times. He alledged farther, the ſeveral conteſts which had riſen between our Kings, and the Clergy; and obſerved, that by pretending to pray Mens Souls out of Purgatory, they had got ſo much of the Lands of the Nation into poſſeſſion, that if they were not equal in weight to the Crown itſelf, yet they held the balance between it and the Barons, and ſo could turn the ſcales as they pleaſed.

He proceeded farther, and ſaid, That after the policy of *Henry* VII. had weakned the firſt of theſe, by permitting them to ſell their eſtates, and his Son had effectually brought down the latter, by taking theirs from them, that thenceforward the bulk of the national property came among the Commons, and made them conſiderable, who before had had little to do but to fight the others battles. The change of property in the laſt caſe was quickeſt, and therefore moſt taken notice of: but if the ſtate of the Barons of *England* before *Henry* the VIIth's time, and ſince,

be compared, the ſlower his project worked, the more effectually it ſeems to have anſwered his intention. However that be, it plainly appeared, that both theſe cauſes together, brought ſuch an addition of ſtrength to the ſide of the Commons, that in about a Century afterwards, when matters came to extremity, it appeared which way the ſtream had run. For, with the aſſiſtance of a very few Lords on their ſide, they abſolutely demoliſhed the Church, the Barons, and the Crown too.

This brought us down to our own times, and occaſioned ſome reflections, "Whether this "changeable buſineſs of Property was not ſtill "upon the flux, and had not in fact received "ſuch alterations within theſe laſt hundred years, "as may, at the long run, be attended with ſome "conſequences we are not yet aware of." Here the converſation began to be filled with loud complaints of the heavineſs of Taxes, in which every body joined, but a Gentleman who has lately made a great purchaſe near us. *Some* men, and *ſome* meaſures, were ſeverely cenſured; but as what I now offer ſhall relate only to *things*, and not to *perſons*, I paſs all that part of the diſcourſe by. There was a Tradeſman very loud; and though I thought ſome things he ſaid were true enough, yet I was of opinion that we Farmers feel more, notwithſtanding we grumble leſs. The *new Gentleman* contradicted us all; he inſiſted, that the very things we complained of, were for our good; and that the Taxes, whoſe weight we thought intolerable, were of benefit both to land and trade. In ſhort, that the neceſſities of the government muſt be ſupplied, and that war could not be carried on without money, which therefore muſt be had as it could be got.

A friend of yours replied, "That he thought nobody would doubt his zeal for the government, or that if such an occasion should again offer, as lately had appeared, would question his willingness to lose his life in support of it. But that he much questioned whether the present Taxes the nation laboured under were not a clog upon the Government itself, as they undoubtedly were upon Land and Trade. That the supplying the necessities of the Government in some former Reigns, by borrowing money *as it could be got*, had brought so great a load of interest upon us, that the loyalest part of the King's subjects were disabled from assisting the Crown with their purses, let its distresses be never so pressing: nay, that the interest alone, paid quarterly, was much more than had been raised in some Reigns for very important services; and the nation might some time be ruined for want of part of that money, which had just before been divided among usurers, who are sure, if times are troublesome, to keep their chests close. In a word, says he, if some remedy be not applied soon, it cannot be otherwise, but these measures will vest the bulk of the nation's property in the *Jews*."

At these last words a Clergyman, who had hitherto said nothing, observed, That this last part of his discourse had furnished a proof that these measures were entirely right: "For, says he, You know there are very remarkable promises made to that People, that in due time they shall be restored to their Country. Now, if the other Gentleman's maxim be true, that so much Money is so much Power, we, no doubt, are instruments in the hands of Providence, by which these People will be supplied with the proper means for bringing about this great end; and therefore these

Taxes, like all other diſpenſations, are a bleſſing to us."

This put old Sir *Joſeph*, who likewiſe had ſat ſilent till now, into a great heat; "What divinity there may be in this, ſays he, I do not know; but it is juſt ſuch a ſtrain of Politicks as that of another perſon, who would prove us to be the peculiar favourites of heaven, becauſe the laſt Parliament had voted to ſtand by the Q---- n of *H——y at all events*, right or wrong; and the M——y were determined to ſpend more Blood, and borrow more Money, than is proper to mention, in defence of a *Dutch* Barrier, which they would not ſtrike a ſtroke for themſelves."

By this time the converſation began to grow too particular for me to mention, and too warm to afford much light into the enquiry we were got upon, of the alteration made in the courſe of Property of late years. At my coming away, you inſiſted upon my thoughts on this head; and though the only reaſon you could have for making this requeſt, was my having more leiſure, and a great many more years over my head than you, yet I here fulfil my promiſe. Other helps in Politicks, than the experience I have gained, in the management of my own Farm, and by a ſmall compaſs of reading, I pretend to none. But as I can remember the time when moſt of the Taxes which cauſed the heats I have mentioned, were not ſo much as thought of, I may perhaps know more of the change they have wrought, than a wiſer man who has always been uſed to them.

However this may be, what I ſay ſhall have no reſpect to any Perſon, or any ſort of Perſons, but to Things only.

To be as ſhort and as clear as I can, I will confine my reflections to the ſtate of the Revenue of the Kingdom, as it is divided and proportioned between

between the two conſtitutent parts of the Nation, the Governing and the Governed. Now the Revenue of any Country, (as well as of a family, or a townſhip) or in other words, what King and People have to live upon, riſes from the natural or artificial product of that Country, either what their land or their labour furniſhes. In *England*, one ſhare of this is neceſſarily conſumed in the maintenance of the People at home; and, by the bounty of Providence, we can uſually ſpare a ſhare of both our natural and artificial product to be carried abroad. With this, we either purchaſe ſuch commodities of other countries as our own does not afford, and we want, or make our returns in money. If the bulk of the whole product of our land, labour, and trade riſes in one year, or in any number of years, to more than the Nation conſumes, that which is ſaved is the national ſtock; and according as it is greater or leſs, the Kingdom in general is richer or poorer. The people of *England*, therefore, are naturally divided into the Landed and Trading Intereſts; which, though they have been formerly thought to be in ſome points inconſiſtent one with another, are now univerſally allowed not only to be very compatible, but to be moſt intimately and even vitally united. If one increaſes, the other will riſe too; if this ſinks and dwindles, or is overloaded by Taxes, the other will decay. Theſe are truths that every man will own, and it were trifling to inſiſt upon or even mention them, were not theſe moſt important points, which every man owns in theory, either careleſly over-looked, or ſhamefully contradicted in practice. A man would be looked upon as a trifler, at leaſt, who with a grave face ſhould go about to prove, that the Land, the Manufactures, and the Trade of *England*, are the only baſis and foundation of the well-

well-being and happineſs of the People, and of the power and dignity of the Crown. And yet this ought to be inſiſted upon frequently, and clearly proved too, if required, upon account of a conſequence which it neceſſarily carries in it, that is neither ſo generally owned, nor ſo ſufficientlyattended to, as it deſerves. This conſequence is, That no other intereſt beſides theſe natural ones of Land and Trade, ought ever to be permitted to riſe or ſubſiſt in this Kingdom. That it is not good policy, when the health and vigour of the Nation conſiſts in this plain, ſimple conſtitution, to admit of any unnatural extraneous addition, which, at beſt, can ſerve only to perplex and confound things. But that it is downright madneſs to introduce and encourage any other intereſt whatever, that is either contrary to, or has a natural tendency to weaken or deſtroy the other two. And yet, I doubt, if we look a little about us, we ſhall find the conduct of ſome modern Politicians to have run contrary to this. What the effects are like to be, let us now conſider.

For, to return to the article of Revenue, which is thus ſolely furniſhed from the product of our Land, the labour of our People, and our Foreign Trade; let us trace it a little, and ſee how it ought to be applied among the ſeveral branches of the Nation, ſo as to procure and eſtabliſh the happineſs of the whole. And for our eaſe in this point, I think we may make our eſtimate very juſtly from a view of the management of any private houſe. For though in other points a Nation and a Family differ very widely, yet, I think, as to revenue and œconomy the parallel will run pretty exact. Let us then conſider a Nation as a large Family, poſſeſſed of a certain income or eſtate, by which every member in it

is

is to be ſupported and maintained, according to the rank and ſtation in which they are placed. For Governors you muſt have in both, as well as governed; and, from the nature of things, Nations, as well as private Families, are limited in number of People, and the revenue that theſe People have to ſubſiſt upon is a finite ſum, and therefore may be exhauſted.

In all well conſtituted States, this Revenue is juſtly and proportionably diſtributed among the ſeveral members that compoſe them. One ſhare is neceſſary for the Farmer, to ſupport his ſervants and manure his land; the Manufacturer is to have another ſhare, to carry on his trade; and the Merchant his proper ſtock, to traffick with; and, for the ſupport, defence, and protection of the whole, the Governor ſhould have ſuch an allotment as may not only ſuffice for barely maintaining the Crown, but ſupporting it with its due dignity and grandeur.

The Crown revenue of old conſiſted chiefly in Lands or Deſmeans, (which have, in the main, been granted in ſucceſſive Reigns to Court-Favourites, or alienated ſome other way, ſo that little now remains*) or in legal and cuſtomary Profits, riſing from the ſubjects; ſuch as Wards and Liveries, which were found grievous, and therefore aboliſhed; or laſtly, upon extraordinary occaſions, in Aids and Subſidies granted by Parliament. But at preſent almoſt the whole Revenue of the Government riſes from Cuſtoms and Taxes, which are laid in various ſhapes upon the product of our land and induſtry, or the returns made by the Merchant in trade. True national œconomy, in our preſent circumſtances, therefore, conſiſts in rightly balancing the aids furniſhed to the Crown, with the income produced by

* About 100,000 *l.* a year. See Appendix, N° 2 and 3.

by land and trade. And the *Engliſh* conſtitution, which has been ſo highly celebrated by our neighbours, for uniting the Power and Majeſty o fthe Crown, with the Liberty and Happineſs of the People, will be ſubverted and deſtroyed, if the Government has not proper ſupplies from the People, or if the payments required from the People are not proportioned to the yearly income they have coming in from land and trade.

The wealth of a Nation has been often compared to the blood in an animal body. And as a due quantity of the vital fluid ought to be derived to every member, in a given proportion, for its ſupport, nouriſhment, and ſtrength, in which the health of the individual conſiſts; ſo ought every member of the body Politick to be ſupplied with a proper ſhare of this national blood, in order to keep up the vigour of the whole conſtitution. Our wiſe Queen *Elizabeth*, was ſo ſenſible of the neceſſity of duly proportioning the different quantities in a proper manner to the ſeveral members of the ſtate, particularly in ſuiting her own Supplies to what her Subjects could afford; that in one of her ſpeeches ſhe alludes to this compariſon, and ſays, "That ſhe ſhould be very ſorry to ſee the Treaſury ſwelled like an over-grown, dropſical ſpleen, while the reſt of the Nation was in a conſumption."

Now if this be juſt, and the well-being of a Kingdom conſiſts in duly ſupplying every part of it with a proper quantity of treaſure, it will be proper to enquire what that proportion is, and what the conſequences, will be when the rules of it are not obſerved. And though the number of People in a Kingdom, and the quantity of its treaſure, with the due allotment of it to the ſeveral orders of the governing, landed and trading perſons, cannot be laid down to an abſolute exact-

neſs; yet ſome diſcoveries in all theſe points may be made in the groſs. And then, from theſe diſcoveries, a man of common ſenſe, without any great learning in Politicks, may be fully aſſured that one ſort of meaſures in the diſtribution of the national wealth among the ſeveral members of it at home, will ſtrengthen and enrich the whole, and the oppoſite conduct draw on poverty and ruin. There have been ſome perſons among us who formerly tried to make diſcoveries of this nature, and from the ſurveys made by Authority, gave us computations of the number of acres, and ſouls in the Kingdom, and the quantity of its quick and dead ſtock; and from theſe deduced, in as accurate a manner as the thing ſeems capable of, both the groſs value of the whole, and the yearly value of its product, whether natural or artificial: or, in other words, the value of what the earth produced every year for the food and ſubſiſtence of mankind, and the clear worth of the gain brought to the Nation by induſtry in manufactures and trade. The exacteſt computations of this kind were made about fifty years ago; and though the preſent ſtate of the Kingdom is no doubt different in ſome points from what it was then, yet, by making proper allowances where theſe particulars vary, we may pretty nearly gueſs what the ſtate of things is now. Mankind, we know, is continually upon the increaſe; and ſo, likewiſe, perhaps in a proportionable degree, are the ſeveral ſpecies of animals that are uſeful to man, ſuffered to increaſe too. Many large tracts of land, formerly waſte, are now cultivated; and thoſe that were barren, or produced but little, are much improved by new methods of huſbandry. And though the increaſe of People, or of the product of the Land, in a Kingdom, does by no means infer the increaſe

creaſe of its artificial product, or at all conclude, that where hands are multiplied, there manufactures and trade muſt augment likewiſe; and becauſe a country is populous, therefore it muſt be rich; yet, that I may not lie under the imputation of caſting unſeemly reflections without any proof, I am willing to grant, what many others will perhaps make a doubt of, that our manufacrures and trade have increaſed, proportionably to the inhabitants and products of the land; and that, therefore, there is a proportionable increaſe of the riches of the Kingdom in groſs. But then, whether theſe riches are made the beſt uſe of for the ſervice of the Nation, or whether they circulate in a proper manner, ſo as to promote the good of the whole, is an enquiry of quite a different nature. For it is poſſible for the wealth of a Nation to be great, and yet the poverty of this or that rank of men in it very deplorable; as is viſible on the Continent near us. And it is a caſe not impoſſible to be ſuppoſed, that the true happineſs of a Kingdom ſhall indiſputably conſiſt in the flouriſhing condition of the landed and trading men in it; and yet, by wickedneſs, or folly, or the neceſſity of the times, the intereſts of one or both theſe orders may be diſregarded and thereby grow feeble and weak: or be oppreſſed and loaded with Taxes, ſo as to be unable to ſubſiſt any longer; whereby the Nation itſelf muſt in time be ruined and undone; or the conſtitution of it in its political frame be entirely ſubverted and changed. Whether this is, or whether it is like to be our caſe, and we ſhall *be able to buy bread and butter* much longer, is worth enquiring -- Let us ſee what our political Arithmethicians have informed us as to the particulars above mentioned.

The

The Lands of *England* they have computed at 39 Millions of Acres [a]; or, as appears by a more Geographical Survey [b] you ſhewed me, at ſomething more than 46 Millions. The value of the annual Product of the Nation, 44 Millions [c]: or, as he reckons afterwards from a more particular view [d] of the ſeveral Products of Arable Land, Meadows, Paſtures, Quick Stock, and Mines, at more than 46 Millions, in which Fiſheries are not included: and, not to ſet them too low, we will call the whole Product 48 Millions.

By the Books for collecting the Tax upon *Hearths*, in 1685, there appeared to be a Million and Three Hundred Thouſand Houſes in the Nation; from whence, and the Aſſeſſment on *Marriages*, *Births*, and *Burials*, the Author before quoted, reckoned the ſouls in *England* to be Five Millions and a half [e]. The ſame Author reckoned the yearly conſumption for the neceſſary maintenance of theſe people to be about the value of 7*l.* 10*s.* apiece; which comes to 41 Millions and a quarter for the whole. So that the two Millions and three quarters remaining, (which make up the 44 Millions, computed as above to be the value of the yearly Product) will be the Increaſe of the National Stock; to be kept for a

[a] *An Eſſay on the probable Method of making People Gainers in the Balance of Trade*, 1699. pag. 70.

[b] Dr *Grew. Philoſophical Tranſactions*, N° 330. p. 266.

[c] *Eſſay on the probable Method*, &c. p. 23.

[d] Ibid. p. 72, 73, 76, 92.

[e] *Eſſay*, &c. p. 22, 52. or, reckoning ſix perſons to a houſe, as is done in an *Eſſay on Ways and Means*, printed in 1695, Seven Millions eight Hundred Thouſand. Perhaps a Medium between theſe is neareſt the Truth; and we may compute them at ſomething above Six Millions and a half, and now nearly Eight Millions.

a ſupport in time of diſtreſs, or to be turned backward and forward in foreign Trade.

Some perſons may think, that 7 *l.* 10 *s.* a head, is too ſmall an allowance for providing diet, clothes, lodging, fuel, *&c.* or in a word, all the neceſſaries of life, for one perſon for a whole year: This I will not diſpute; perhaps it may: And if it be, the yearly conſumption of the whole Nation will be more than 41 Millions and a quarter, as this Writer has ſet it. But then let it be obſerved, that if he has ſet the yearly conſumption lower than the truth, he has ſet the yearly income ſo to. He reckons it at 44 Millions [f]; but by the particulars, as referred to above, it was more than 46 Millions, without the Fiſheries; which, with other contingencies, are ſtated as above at 48 Millions total, which perhaps is not far from truth. So that upon the whole, allowing an under-reckoning on both ſides, the yearly national increaſe might in 1688 be about two Millions and a half a year. To which we muſt add, that the people of the Nation was increaſing likewiſe, and both ſtock and people liable to all the advantages or diſadvantages that War or Peace, Induſtry or Luxury, good or bad Management at home and abroad, can bring upon any community.

I have taken the ſtate of the nation, as to its number of people and yearly product, at or near to the famous æra of the Revolution in 1688; and I have done it for two reaſons; the firſt of which is, that the accounts we have of both ſeem to be more exact, and grounded upon more full informations, than any we had before: the other is, that as our conſtitution was then brought back to its original Principles, (as the modern phraſe is) or, if you pleaſe, that the Liberties of the

[f] Ibid. p. 23.

the People were ſettled upon a different, but a better and more ſolid foundation than ever they were before; ſo the diſtribution of Property, before mentioned and demonſtrated to be the very baſis of our exiſtence as a *free* people, began now to be placed in a very different ſituation to what it had ever been before: But whether for the better or worſe, whether for the preſervation or deſtruction of *Britiſh* Liberty, deſerves further enquiry. Moſt ſure it is, that at that æra, a different *method* of managing the National Income was taken up; and has, to the amazement of many, been perſiſted in ever ſince.

Whether this method is really fitted for promoting or keeping up the true Welfare of the Nation, by maintaining the Dignity of the Crown, ſupporting the Landed and increaſing the Trading Intereſts; or whether it is not more likely to lay us under the neceſſity of bringing back the conſtitution to its original Principles again, will appear from what follows; which ſhall only be a plain ſtate of Facts, how the annual Income of the Nation was diſtributed among the Governing, Landed and Trading Parts of the Nation, within the memory of man, and how it is diſtributed at preſent.

In order to ſtate this truly, we muſt go a little farther back than the memorable æra I have mentioned. For as King *James* the Second's requeſt to his firſt Parliament, *in what related to the ſettling his Revenue*, was, *that it might be continued during Life, as it was in the time of the King his Brother*; and as this requeſt was complied with, and nothing farther given, except an extraordinary Aid for ſuppreſſing the Rebellion of *Monmouth*; and two Bills paſſed for Cuſtoms on Wine and Tobacco, ap-

propriated to the Navy [g]: it will be neceſſary to inquire how this affair ſtood in King *Charles* the Second's time.

At the Reſtoration, the Supplies to be provided were of two kinds; the *extraordinary*, and the *ordinary*. The extraordinary ones aroſe either from the late happy event, or the former troubles: Of the former ſort were the neceſſary proviſions for the King and Royal Family, his Reception, Coronation, *&c.* which appear from the *Journal* of the Houſe of Commons to have amounted to about Three Hundred Thouſand Pounds in the whole; including Preſents to perſons who had done eminent ſervices, and Sixty Thouſand Pounds given to diſtreſſed loyal Officers [h].

The method I ſhall take in ſtating this Revenue, ſhall be to give a Liſt of all the Money-Bills paſſed in this Reign; which, to avoid the perplexity of a great number of figures, is placed in the *Appendix*. The ſeveral Taxes will appear from the Statutes referred to, as will the time for which they were laid. And though the uſes for which ſome of them were given, and the exact ſums they produced, cannot now be made out ſo fully as is deſirable, becauſe many of the Acts themſelves were never printed, and the Accounts relating to more are not now to be had: yet I have endeavoured to ſupply this defect as far as I can.

The articles intended for the *Ordinary Supplies* of the Government, and the *Extraordinary Aids* given for particular Services, and ſuch as were diſtinct from the neceſſary buſineſs of the Crown, as building new Ships, the *Dutch* War, *&c.* are diſtinguiſhed from one another, as far as has been poſſible.

[g] 1° Jac. II. c. 3, 4.

[h] Bill for it paſſed the Commons, *April* 11, 1662.

poſſible. And though theſe two different Services may not in ſome points be diſtinguiſhable, becauſe the King had not then any diſtinct allowance for the keeping of his Houſhold, nor had He and the Nation two ſeparate Purſes; and therefore money granted for one uſe might now and then be applied to another; yet, in the main, the branches that belong to the Ordinary, and thoſe that were ſtrictly appropriated to the Extraordinary Services of the Crown, are diſcoverable. The Commons, in that Reign, were not ſo laviſh in the Sums they gave, nor ſo careleſs about the manner how they were applied, as they are uſually repreſented. Their *Journals* are a full proof of this; and from them I have ſtated what ſums they *intended* to raiſe by each Tax, and the uſes it was deſigned for. And as it appears they appointed Commiſſioners for taking accounts afterwards, we may ſuppoſe, that where they made no complaints, they found no miſmanagement.

The Extravagancy of this Reign, and the vaſt ſums ſquandered away by the Court, have been ſeverely cried out upon on one ſide; and the narrowneſs of the Supplies, and the great diſproportion between the Money granted and the Services neceſſary to be provided for, eſpecially in the firſt years after the Reſtoration, are as loudly complained of on the other. As the ends of different Parties have wanted to be ſerved, things have been differently repreſented: and very different repreſentations have been made on both ſides, by Pamphleteers, Memoir-Writers, and ſome who have called themſelves *Hiſtorians*; but ſeem ſo unworthy of this character, that they ſeem to have forſaken wilfully the firſt requiſite of that office; and inſtead of not daring to ſay any thing that was falſe, have determined to ſpeak nothing that was true.

Let every man therefore who has pen and ink, ſtate the ordinary Revenue of this Reign for himſelf. All that I ſhall ſay about it, is, that it was intended at the Reſtoration to have been *Twelve Hundred Thouſand Pounds a Year*, as appears from the *Journals* of the Commons: but whether made good or not, does not appear. — In my own opinion, I think not at firſt; and that afterwards it was raiſed to that ſum: and by good management in the latter end of this Reign, and an addition in the next, was ſomething above *Two Millions* at the Revolution; which then carried on all the Buſineſs of the Publick, of what nature ſoever it was.

The reaſons I have for ſaying the King had not the full Proviſion of Twelve Hundred Thouſand Pounds a year, (as reſolved *Sept.* 4. 1660) at the beginning of his Reign, are theſe; 1. That at the end of that year there was a large Debt due to the Army and Navy, unprovided for. — 2. No notice had been taken of his Father's or his own Debts, which muſt be conſiderable. — 3. And laſtly, the ordinary Revenue for this firſt year, did not reach the extraordinary Expences incurred at the Reſtoration.

The firſt may be demonſtrated from the *Journals* of the Houſe of Commons, where the Eſtimates are ſtated; which, if compared with the Sums given by Act of Parliament, ſhew the difference to be as below [i].

The

[i] The ſums given by Act of Parliament, and undoubtedly appropriated for the payment of the Fleet and Army, were as marked in the *Appendix*, N° VI.

N° 1. which produced	——	210,000 *l.*
4.	——	252,167
5.	——	140,000
9.	——	420,000
		992,167

But

The second reason is proved to be a good one, by the *Report* in the Journal, *Dec.* 29. 1660. which, after mentioning other Debts, concludes with a Memorandum, " That no part of the " Debts of his present Majesty, either in *Eng-* " *land* or elsewhere, are brought into this Ac- " count."

And the third will be established by comparing the ordinary Revenue this year with the Expence. Now the Revenue was, N° 3. The

But as it appears by a Report of *Nov.* 6. 1660. that there then had been paid 250,000 *l.* and that there was then Assignments made of 413,000 *l.* out of the three first articles, amounting to 413,000 *l.* and the last sum was given afterwards, which amount in all to 1,083,000 *l.* it is plain, that 90,833 *l.* was likewise assigned out of the other Grants, perhaps out of N° 2. which, though given for 140,000 *l.* would scarce produce more than would answer this sum, and defray the charges of collecting the rest. So that this takes off six branches of this year's Grants for paying the Fleet and disbanding the Army. And yet these would not do it: for by Report given in *Nov.* 12. 1660. after stating the Receits of the three first articles above, and the Payments made out of them, there is given in as then wanting, to pay Officers and Mariners *Wages*, and disband the Army, ——— 670,868 *l.*

And for this Service the Parliament gave N° 9. in the *Appendix*, ——— 420,000

Which, besides the charge of collecting, fell short of the Wages due, ——— 250,868

There was due more for the Office of Ordnance, and the ordinary and extraordinary Expence of several years; as by said Report, ——— 429,951

And wanted for necessary Stores, as by ditto,— 200,000

In all — 880,819

Besides 25 Ships then under consideration, and those taken into the King's pay. — The Wages were stated to *Nov.* 10. but the Bill, N° 9. had not the Royal Assent till *Dec.* 29. and by Report *Nov.* 6. the charges of Fleet and Army for pay was then 1100 *l.* a day; and so would now bring a proportionable charge, besides casual charges.

Excise for five Months, about 90,000 *l.* (for *Wines* now paid Customs) N° 2. *Customs* for the same time, about 166,665 *l.* N° 6. which was about 70,000 *l.* and some part of the unknown Produce of N° 8. (for part of it was assigned to the Army; vid. *Journal*, *Dec.* 3. if not all, for the expression is dubious) so that I state nothing upon it. In all, the known Revenue came to 226,665 *l.* and the Grants made by the Convention, as appears from the *Journals*, came to above 340,000; which left another Debt of above 100,000 *l.* besides the Army and Navy Debt, his own Debts, and his Father's, and the necessary charge of the Government; which could not in all be much short of Two Millions, if you take in the Debts stated *Dec.* 29. 1660.

This was a heavy load, and no doubt occasioned the Assessment of 70,000 *l.* a Month in 1661, which made up the Revenue the year following 1,608,000 *l.* and half as much for the first half year in 1663. This, with good husbandry, might pay off some of the Debt, but not all.

In 1663, the ordinary Revenue was re-examined, and found below a Million, reckoning the Appropriations made to the Duke. This caused the Grant of the Subsidies, N°20. but after these, the ordinary Revenue had no addition but what could be made by management, till 1670, when the Impost on Wines, and the additional Excise were added, and made the 993,240 *l.* a year, which it was reckoned at in 1663, about 1,260,000 *l.* for the future; and by good management about a Million and half. So that, making due allowances for the deficiencies of the Taxes at first, and what the Revenue fell short of a Million in the beginning of this Reign, and the increase of Customs, *&c.* at the latter end, the ordinary Re-

venue, from the Reſtoration to the Revolution, does not ſeem, at an average, to have exceeded a Million and a half, yearly.

The Extraordinary Grants ſeem hardly to have anſwered the ends they were given for; at leaſt, the Commons complain of no abuſes in the application. It is ſaid, indeed, a Million was yearly got by the Crown in the ſecond *Dutch* War; but the Journals are ſilent.

This was the State of our affairs in this Nation ſixty years ago, when the Governing Part of it had about a twenty fifth part of the yearly Product paid them by way of Taxes, for the carrying on the neceſſary buſineſs of the Community [k]. And with this proportion, our political Writers have obſerved, that our affairs would go on ſmoothly, and the Nation be happy, by having its wealth properly diſtributed among the ſeveral Members that compoſe this our Body Politick; the Magiſtracy, the Landed Men, and the Traders. On the other hand, they proved to a demonſtration, that if this proportion was greatly altered, and one order of men was drained to gorge another, this alteration would greatly impair the health and vigour, if it did not bring on the deſtruction of the whole. That the ſame pernicious effects would moſt certainly enſue upon the growth of any unnatural Tumor within the Body Politick; or by ſetting on a parcel of Leeches and Blood-ſuckers without.— In both which caſes, the vital fluid would be either ſucked up by extraneous Vermin, or turned into matter of diſeaſe; troubleſome and uneaſy, becauſe preternatural, at firſt; and, if not remedied in time, mortal in the end. In a word, to ſpeak without a figure, that as the Crown would be ruined if the Landed and Trading

[k] See the Diſtributions in the *Appendix*, N° 4.

Men paid no Taxes or Cuſtoms; ſo muſt theſe laſt be undone, if taxed too much.

To what degree Taxes may be extended, before the raiſing of them becomes impoſſible, is not my buſineſs to inquire, nor do I think it would be prudence in any Miniſtry to try. — Our preſent inquiry is, Whether within theſe *ſixty* years the Proportion abovementioned has not been greatly departed from? Whether Payments have not been levied upon the Landed and Trading Intereſts, not in the Proportion of a *Twenty fifth*, but of a *Fifth*, a *Fourth*, nay a greater ſhare of their income? And laſtly, Whether the manner of collecting theſe Taxes, and the conſequences of them, are not worthy our conſideration; as hereby a new, an upſtart Intereſt has been created, different from the Governing, the Landed, and Trading branches of it; injurious at preſent to all; and, if much increaſed, neceſſarily big with deſtruction?

Theſe Inquiries are of moment; and I will give you my thoughts on them in as plain a manner as I can. But to do it, theſe affairs muſt be ſtripp'd of that obſcure language in which men uſually talk about them; and as they are in fact only matters of common Buſineſs in life, ſhould be treated in a plain manner as ſuch, and not like deep myſteries.

We found, that in the term beyond the laſt Sixty years, the Money neceſſary for the Buſineſs of the Government during any one year, was raiſed within that year, by ſome plain regular Taxes. Theſe Taxes we ſaw amounted to leſs than *Two Millions*; which ſerved all the ordinary purpoſes of the Government, and were indeed the King's, being in the main bulk granted to him for Life, and applied by him accordingly to the occaſions required; not excepting the paying

ing Intereſt for Money he had taken up out of Neceſſity, or Profuſeneſs. Upon extraordinary occaſions, as a War abroad, the Money neceſſary for carrying it on for a year, was raiſed by ſuch or ſuch a Tax within the year: and if the War was like to continue for two or three years, the Tax was laid for two or three years. If the firſt Tax proved inſufficient for the purpoſes intended, another was laid, to make good what was wanting: But this was done upon the ſame foot as the former, that the Service of the year ſhould be fully provided for by Taxes raiſed within the year; or if the Taxes laid one year fell ſhort, they were immediately made up the next. And there was only this difference between the Ordinary and Extraordinary Revenue, that the laſt was ſtrictly appropriated to the uſes for which it was given, and every penny of it accordingly to be accounted for to Parliament.

This was a plain and eaſy way of management: Income and Expence, by this method, went hand in hand; and if any difference happen'd, it was ſoon diſcover'd, and ſet right. Not that I pretend to ſay, no Abuſes did happen; I have, on the contrary, hinted at ſome: but they could not be very material; and the higheſt inſtance of ſuch Abuſes that I have ſeen, is mentioned by *Rapin*; which is this: That by the ordinary Income given to King *Charles* the Second, and the Jobs his Miniſtry had made in the conduct of his Wars, he was enabled *to enſlave the Nation*: "And that in order to make his people feel the "Slavery he had newly impoſed on them, he "affected to Review his Troops; and theſe "Troops amounted, by the return of the garri- "ſon of *Tangier*, to *Four Thouſand* men effective "and well armed." —— A noble Standing Army!

Hitherto,

Hitherto, then, the Taxes paid to the Government had been in no exceſſive proportion, and were collected in a manner plain to be underſtood. But from this time the face of things began to alter: And I find, in a treatiſe wrote upon this ſubject *thirty* years ago, that when a Club of very able men ſet upon inquiring into the ſtate of the Publick Revenue, their Committee reported, " That they found the Accounts relat-" ing to them ſo perplexed and intricate, as to " diſable them, at leaſt ſpeedily, from obtaining " any true ſtate of the Taxes, *&c.* farther than " as found in the ſeveral Acts of Parliament: " And that even the Acts themſelves, relating " to Money matters, are of late become ſo very " numerous and long, as not to be eaſily read, " and ſtill harder to be underſtood [1]."

A very pretty account this: And, no doubt, were this Club to ſit now, they would find things much mended, as our Debts, and conſequently our Taxes, are almoſt doubled ſince their time! But however this may be, and though it might be difficult for them, as *exact* Inquirers, to diſcover clearly, or as nice Arithmeticians, to ſtate exactly all the particulars of our National Affairs; yet I think it is not very difficult for a man of plain underſtanding to form a notion of them in the groſs. And in order to it, let us make a ſuppoſition of an inſtance in private Life, which may furniſh ſomething like a parallel to our publick Affairs.

Let us ſuppoſe a Gentleman poſſeſſed of a competent Eſtate, conſiſting of Copy-hold Lands, the *Fines* for which, or the *reſerved Rents*, to be *paid by the Tenants*, are at the Will of the *Lord* and *a Jury* of theſe Copy-holders, legally ſworn at

[1] *An Inquiry into the State of the Union*, &c. Printed at *London*, 1717. p. 111.

at his yearly Courts. Suppoſe the nature of this Eſtate to be ſuch, that theſe Tenants cannot well manage their Farms, maintain their families, and keep market, if the Rent paid to the Lord, for a Farm of Five and twenty Pounds a year, for inſtance, be more than Twenty Shillings. — Suppoſe farther, that either by the careleſneſs or extravagancy of the Maſter, or the knavery of his Stewards, the Income of this Eſtate will not anſwer the yearly Expences of the Lord, as it uſed to do in his forefathers days; and that hereby a Debt is contracted, or to be contracted. — If in this diſtreſs a man ſhould, upon adviſing with his Stewards, and getting a Jury againſt the next Court, to be ſo far willing to aſſiſt him, as to raiſe their own Rents, and that of their Fellow Tenants, from 20 to 25 Shillings for every 25*l.* a year; it would be thought odd management, if he took ſuch a ſtep as I am going to mention.

Suppoſe he goes to a *Jew*, and tells him he wants a large ſum of Money; and though the Intereſt he, the *Jew*, can receive by law is only 5 *per cent.* and for large ſums uſually leſs, yet if he will ſupply him he will pay ten, and for every Hundred Pounds lent, he ſhall have a Security for an Hundred and Twenty: nay, that this Security ſhall be undeniably good, for he and all his Tenants will join in aſſigning to him the advanced Rents of the Eſtate, to make his payments. — Accordingly the bargain is made. — Another year paſſes, and the Expences again exceed the Income, and more Money is to be raiſed. A new conſultation is held, a ſecond Jury obtained, and the Tenants Rents again advanced, and the *Jew* lends a ſecond ſum upon the ſame foot with the former. A third year goes on in the ſame manner, and a third ſum is to be raiſed; giving

giving Bonds for 120 *l.* Principal, upon receiving 100 *l.* and paying Intereſt for the whole, at the rate of Ten per Cent. is now found to bear hard, and that, by this way of proceeding, theſe new-grafted Principals can never be paid. New *Ways* and new *Means* of borrowing Money are therefore propoſed; and, after ſeveral Debates, it is determined to do it by way of *Annuities*; and a propoſal is made and agreed to, that every Hundred Pound lent, ſhall entitle the Lender to Twenty Pounds a year, for 20 years, and then the whole to ceaſe. This is cried up as a noble Project! For though the yearly Payments are a little high at preſent, yet in Twenty Years the burthen will be over, there being no Principal to be repaid. The Tenants Rents are to be raiſed a third time, to pay theſe Annuities; and to induce them to conſent to it, they are told, that by the help of ſome *Water Courſes*, their Eſtates ſhall be improved by the Lord, ſo as to make the payment of this third Advance a benefit to them. The Tenents are either gulled by theſe pretences, or the Jury at the Court-Leet b—d, and all their Rents raiſed again.—The Lord's Expences ſtill continue, or increaſe, and his Income grows leſs as his Tenants pay more: New Schemes are propoſed and put in practice, different in name, and various in method, but ſtill all alike in this, that *They are only ſo many ſeveral ways of borrowing Money at exceſſive Intereſt*, to be paid out of the ſweat and blood of the induſtrious Tenant; till at laſt,—ſuppoſe—the Tenant able to pay no more, and the Lord not a bit the richer!—*You may ſay*, "Let us have no more of your Sup-"poſitions; what you have ſuppoſed already is "impoſſible: For though we daily ſee men out-"living their Incomes, and ſelling their Free-"holds, yet in an eſtate ſo conditioned as you

"have

" have ſtated the caſe, it cannot be ſuppoſed; " that both Landlord and Tenants ſhould agree " to ruin one another. Where a man's Rent can- " not be raiſed but by a Jury, who at the ſame time " that they raiſe their neighbours Payments, " raiſe their own too, it is abſurd to think, that " they will, year after year, deprive themſelves " of what ſhould purchaſe the conveniencies, " and even neceſſaries of life, for themſelves and " families; and in the end, do no benefit to the " perſon under whom they live." Beſides, borrowing Money at ſuch high Intereſt is monſtrous!

Monſtrous as it is, if I am not wrong informed, it has been practiſed by very wiſe men, and the example followed by others *as wiſe*, and perhaps, *as honeſt*. I will give ſome inſtances of it in the firſt place, and then conſider the other parts of the Objection above: And bring ſome Facts, likewiſe, to confront them.

The Parliament, we obſerved, in King *Charles*'s Reign, intended the Sums, raiſed within the Year, ſhould ſerve for the Year; and if the Court were bad Huſbands, and ſpent Money before it was due, or got in, (which they did in ſome caſes) then e'en let them pay Intereſt for what they borrowed on theſe occaſions, till they could ſave enough to repay it. Complaints were made to Parliament, of *Anticipations*, but except full proof was made likewiſe, that the Money had been laid out in the neceſſary ſervice of the Nation, no Relief was given.

But in the ſecond year after the Revolution, what had before been complained of as a Hardſhip, was adopted as a good piece of Management. The Exciſe was ſettled on the King for life; and, THAT HE MIGHT NOT BE TIED TO THE HARDSHIP HIS PREDECESSORS HAD LAIN UNDER, OF WINDING

TH

THE BOTTOM ROUND THE YEAR, HE WAS EMPOWERED TO BORROW 250,000 *l.* UPON IT, TO BE PAID WHEN THIS TAX PRODUCED IT.——This was called a FUND *of Credit*; and I believe that myſterious *French* word, which has ſince been an engine of deſtruction to thouſands, was now firſt authenticated, as *Sterling* Engliſh. This Monarch did not ſit *fourteen years* on the Throne, and yet contrived to *fund*, in this manner, about SEVENTEEN MILLIONS, beſide the yearly produce of the Taxes: That is, he anticipated ſo much of the Revenue of his Succeſſors; or, in plain *Engliſh*, he borrowed ſo much, and left them to pay it, and the Intereſt of it, when their Income ſhould be greater than they could ſpend.

Perhaps, there might be a View in this, of getting the *monied men* to ſupport that Crown, which the *landed men* had put on his head, and to interweave the private Intereſt of all the Creditors, with his publick one. But ſtill, there was ſome meaſure to be obſerved in this; and after that turn was ſerved, he muſt be but a half quarter Politician, who thinks of eſtabliſhing the Throne of a King of *England* upon any laſting or ſolid Foundation, except the affections of his People: And if he gains theſe, by conſulting their Intereſts, the Baſis is immoveable.

But beſides the Debt itſelf, the *manner* of contracting it was intolerable, and the Intereſt given oppreſſive; of which I meet with theſe inſtances. The Land Tax is payable within the year, and generally paid quarterly. " In the year 1661, the " *State Officers*, and *Privy Counſellors* of that " time, became *Solicitors* to the monied men " (as the Author before mentioned tells us [m]) to " borrow only One or Two Hundred Thouſand " Pounds

[m] *An Enquiry into the State of the Union*, &c. p. 65.

" Pounds on the firſt Payment of the Land Tax,
" all payable within the Year. This, after ſome
" mean Condeſcentions, they performed, at the
" rate of *paying Twelve per Cent. per Annum in*
" *the whole.*"

About the ſame time, or ſoon after, there was about Two Millions and a half borrowed at two different times. " For both theſe Sums, (we " are aſſured upon authority of the Acts of Par- " liament, by which they were raiſed) that Ten " per Cent. per Annum was really allowed."[n]

In 1709, a Million and half was borrowed at Nine per Cent. per Annum:[o] And ſeveral Sums had been borrowed in the former part of that Reign, at about Seven per Cent.[p] And in 1711, by a method almoſt unintellig ble, Money was borrowed for the publick ſervice at about Thirty Six per Cent. per Annum.[q] One part of the method which heightened this laſt Money, was now firſt taken up, and, on account of its uſefulneſs, at preſent practiſed under the title of *Præmium*, or Advance: It was no other than the frugal way, hinted at above, of giving ſecurity for paying an Hundred and Thirty Pounds, and Intereſt for it, upon having an Hundred lent.[r]

Strange Management this, in a country where the Government have, by very good laws, provided againſt the oppreſſion of private perſons, and laid a ſevere penalty upon every Uſurer, who ſhould extort a Præmium for lending an Hundred Pounds, or dare to take above Five Pounds for the uſe of it, for a year! But where Millions have been lent, Intereſt has been paid at the Rate of

[n] *An Inquiry into the State of the Union*, p. 72. Stat. 4. *W.* and *M.* c. 3. And 5, and 6. *W.* and *M.* c. 7. [o] Ibid. p. 104. Stat. 8 Ann. c. 3. [p] Ibid. p. 98. [q] Ibid. p. 106. [r] See more Inſtances of this Management, in *Eſſay on probable Methods*, &c. p. 180.

of Ten, Twelve, nay near Forty per Cent. The only reaſon that has been given for this different way of going on is, that one is a private, the other a publick concern; that is to ſay, a Lord, or a rich Merchant, is to pay the Intereſt of Five or Six Hundred Pounds in one caſe, and in the other, this oppreſſive Intereſt, for Fifty or Sixty Millions, is to be wrung out of the ſweat of the brows of the laborious Plowman, and induſtrious Manufacturer. For if you look into the ſeveral Acts of Parliament, that gave the Miniſtry power to borrow theſe Sums, you will find the means, made uſe of to pay the Intereſt of them, is, by taking ſomething from the bulk of the People, (which contains the middling and poorer ſort) which, before theſe Debts were contracted, they had for the maintenance of their families.

For example; ſome years ago the Miniſtry borrowed a Sum of Money, and laid a Duty upon every Hide that ſhould be tanned, to be paid by the Tanner. The Tanner raiſes the price of his Leather, when he ſells it, in proportion to the Tax he had paid before; and the ſame is continued by the Currier, and Shoemaker; ſo that when a Day-Labourer comes to buy a pair of Shoes, he pays Half a Crown, for what he might have purchaſed a Year ago, before the Duty was laid, for Two Shillings, except he avoids the Duty, by going to Plow barefoot. This may, at firſt view, ſeem but a trifle; but when ſeveral of theſe trifles are added together, when every Neceſſary of Life is, by degrees, paid a fifth, a fourth, or double the price for which they might have been bought before this Intereſt was raiſed, it is plain, the Day-Labourer cannot get ſo much of them for the uſe of his family by a quarter, or half, as he did before.

It may be ſaid, the Labourer in this Caſe muſt raiſe his Wages. And the Queſtion will be, Who muſt pay him? The Farmer, no doubt, who employs him, and is himſelf equally pinched by theſe Taxes, in getting the common neceſſaries of life for his family, as the Labourer; and muſt now, beſides this, pay Fifteen, or Eighteen pence, for his Plowman's tilling a piece of land, which was before done for a Shilling. But he muſt tell his Landlord, he muſt lower his Rent: —Let it be done: And now the Burden reſts ſomewhere; and ſomewhere it muſt reſt, ſhift it from one ſhoulder to another as long as you will. Intereſt Money for EIGHTY MILLIONS Principal muſt be paid, though ſome Millions of it was never lent. And if it muſt be paid, it muſt be raiſed; and the way of raiſing it is ordered by law to be, by making every man, who eats or drinks, or wears ſhoes, or puts on a clean ſhirt, or burns a candle in a dark night, or enjoys the light of the Sun by day, to pay a Shilling, in ſome inſtances, for what he might have bought for Sixpence, within the memory of man; in other inſtances, to pay a Crown, for a Thing which formerly coſt him nothing.

Theſe Reflections are founded upon this Truth, That where large Sums of Money are raiſed upon a People, the bulk of that People are the perſons who pay the Tax. And if this be true, as it is to a demonſtration, it may be matter of wonder, that a people ſo heavily taxed, as we are ſaid to be, ſhould ſit ſo eaſy under it.

We pay Intereſt for Eighty Millions, which at Four per Cent. and the Ways of collecting it, muſt be more than double to the whole Revenue of the Crown; or to ſpeak more accurately, double to the whole Expence of the Court, Navy, Army, great Officers, and Penſioners of all de-

nominations, &c. as they were diſtributed Sixty Years ago. We pay, beſides this Intereſt Money, the ordinary Revenue of the Crown, in time of Peace, and extraordinary Taxes in time of War. But ſtill with this difference, that the ordinary Revenue of the Crown formerly ſupplied all branches of the Government, but now, means only the Royal Houſhold, or *Civil Liſt*, excluſive of all other expences: And our extraordinary Payments in time of war, which were formerly ſpent on our own Army and Fleet, are now dealt out in *Subſidies* (as they are called) to foreign Princes, or given for the hire of foreign Troops—all this may be good policy, and for the *Intereſt* of the Nation. To murmur at things I do not underſtand, is not my temper; but one thing I do underſtand, and think I have, or ſhall, put it in ſuch a light, that others may ſee it too, "That "a country Farmer, who lived upon an Eſtate of "his own of 200*l.* a Year, Sixty Years ago, and "then died, would, upon trial of a year's houſe-"keeping, if he was to be raiſed again, and plac-"ed at his Homeſtead, think his eſtate ſunk at "leaſt one half in value:" And yet this man's ſon, or grandſon, calls his eſtate 200*l.* a year, as before; though, in fact, he enjoys but half of it. His payments out of it are heavy, but many of them have been paid, as now, ever ſince he was born, and he is uſed to them; or, though real in fact, are not apparently Taxes in his eyes, and therefore he does not perceive them.

To make a calculation of this with exactneſs, can only be done by a perſon, who can come at all the materials neceſſary for ſuch a purpoſe. He ſhould have a Liſt of the *army* of Officers (I do not mean military ones, for this is printed, and their pay known, but a *worſe* kind) who are employed to gather Taxes, or to eat them up.

For

For many there are, as I am informed, who have places in the Cuſtoms, *&c.* from whence they receive an Hundred, or Two Hundred Pounds a year Salary, nay, perhaps, treble to this; and yet have no more to do in the King's Revenue, than to give a Receipt for that part of it which they themſelves receive. All theſe he ſhould know, as well as thoſe who do ſomething of real Buſineſs; together with all their *Salaries* and *Perquiſites*, what they receive fairly and above board, and what comes to pocket otherwiſe. In the next place, he ſhould know the quantity of every Commodity conſumed in the nation, for which any Tax is paid: He ſhould know the quantity of the Tax levied upon every Pound, Buſhel, *&c.* of theſe commodities; or elſe he will not be able to tell the advanced price they are now ſold at, above what they were, before theſe Debts were contracted, and theſe Taxes laid; or would be, if they were taken off. A perſon who can have acceſs to all our publick Offices, might obtain ſuch liſts as theſe; and by the aſſiſtance of a thouſand of the beſt Arithmeticians in *England*, might make a tolerable gueſs, at what is now paid for the things eat, and drunk, and wore in the Nation, more than what was paid for the ſame quantity ſixty years ago.

But this is a taſk too high for a private perſon, and too heavy for a ſingle hand. All Taxes are not like the Land Tax, where the ſum actually paid by the people, may be known with a little trouble, as well as the clear Money paid from it into the Exchequer. But in many, nay moſt other caſes, the Tax is concealed, from publick view at leaſt: Some goods of foreign growth are taxed before they come aſhore; and ſome of our own, pay duty in a different ſhape from what they appear in when they are uſed. A cup of *Ale*,

for inſtance, does not ſeem to be very dear, at the rate of Two-pence, to a thirſty Farmer, when he receives the money for his grain at a Publick-Houſe: The cup ſmiles in his face when brought in, and yet the poor creature has run the gauntlet of the Land Tax, the Malt Tax, the Exciſe, and the Hop Tax. Here are three Payments for a thing, which ſixty years ago made but one: And if we ſuppoſe that in this, and many other articles, the price is only double now, to what it was then, I think it is not out of the way. The price of Salt is raiſed ſix times higher, by the Duty, than it was before. Other things ſtill higher than this; and, what is yet worſe, ſcarce any thing has eſcaped, but pays in ſome ſhape or other; and not at all the leſs ſeverely, for the payment's being concealed. Perhaps, it might not have been good policy to have levied all theſe Taxes in the ſame open way by which the Land Tax is collected: They might have brought more to the Crown, but given uneaſineſs to the people. Exciſes and Cuſtoms upon all the Neceſſaries of life that are ſubject to them, raiſe the price of goods to the buyers of them as high, or higher, than if the Taxes upon them were gathered by quarterly Collectors: But then the payments are made quietly and privately by the firſt receiver and ſeller; and, though ſeverely felt, do not half ſo much alarm the Farmer and Manufacturer, as if they ſaw the Tax-gatherers come quarterly to their doors with a formal Aſſeſſment. The *method* of payment in theſe inſtances is like a Trap, which pinches as ſeverely, and takes hold more certainly, by being concealed; and deſtroys, only becauſe it is not perceived.

A Liſt of the ſeveral articles upon which theſe Taxes are laid, would be amazing, and therefore I ſhall not attempt it. Inſtead of ſaying what is taxed,

taxed, which would take up much paper, I can mention three or four things which are not, and therefore may deserve the Consideration of some future Minister, who perhaps, at a dead lift, may borrow money upon them, if he will but give Forty or Fifty per Cent for it. The Articles I mean are, *Wool*, *Flesh-Meat*, and *Corn:* Now a Penny a Pound Excise to be paid by the Shearer upon the first; the same upon Beef, and other Provisions, to be paid by the Butcher, Poulterer, or other Venders, for the second; and Six-pence a Bushel for Wheat at the mill, and other Grain in proportion, is humbly recommended to make the Circle compleat. If it be said, that we are not yet arrived at this terrible situation: the fact is allowed, that we are not; the hint was intended for some future Ministry, not for the present Age; and if our Sons and Grandsons go on in the same tract our Grandfathers did, perhaps somebody some time or other may thank me for it. In the mean time, let us reflect a little upon our own situation at present; and as the Management of our Forefathers has greatly affected us, let us consider what consequences our own Proceedings may carry down to future Generations. It appears, from what has been said, that the National Property has received a great alteration within these sixty years; let us enquire what *Effects* this great, this sudden alteration, may probably draw after it, either upon the Nation in general, or the *natural* parts it *properly* consists of, the Trading, the Landed, and the Governing Orders.

Besides the yearly Product and the yearly Consumption, it was before remark'd there was an Overplus yearly laid by, through the blessing of Providence upon the industry of our Merchants and Farmers, the sum total of which was called the *National Stock*. This Stock was reckoned,

in a judicious Treatiſe, publiſhed in 1699 *, to be EIGHTY SIX MILLIONS in 1688; "which, "by being employed in Trade and the improve- "ment of Lands, was then making a yearly "Increaſe of Two Millions and (near) a Half." Of this near Ten Millions was in Money, which is now ſaid to be about Fourteen.

He tell us, "That the War with *France*, "and other circumſtances of the Revolution, and "the Recoining the Money, had then actually "diminiſhed the ſaid Stock about Twelve Mil- "lions, and hindered the increaſe of about Twen- "ty Eight Millions beſides."

He tells us farther, "That the Nation would "not arrive to the ſame degree of actual Stock "which it had in 1688, till about the year 1705: "nor make the ſame increaſe it did in 1688, till "about the year 1706; *nor then neither, unleſs "the Taxes be conſiderably diminiſhed*, and there- "by Commerce fully reſtored."

This was ſaid when a Peace was concluded, which was expected to be a laſting one; but War enſued, and Taxes were again increaſed. Peace then followed, and, in the main, they were ſtill increaſed. War again ſucceeded, and they more increaſed. But whether the National Stock has increaſed under theſe changes, or not, I cannot compute. If it has not increaſed at all, or but moderately, then we may boldly aſſert (as our National Debt is about Eighty Millions) that the whole Stock of the Nation, or the value of it, which was firſt ſtored up by the Merchant and the Farmer, is now almoſt entirely poſſeſſed by Uſurers: But the yearly increaſe it is now making in their hands, we ſhall not preſume to gueſs at.

The

* Eſſay on *Probable Means*, &c. p. 156.

The effects wrought upon Trade, by this great alteration of the National Property, may ſeem a matter of no concern to a Farmer; but I think in a very different manner; and know that our intereſts are the ſame, and that what hurts him, hurts me. If I furniſh the Wool for making the Cloth he exports, or the Beef he victuals his ſhip with, he brings me home Gold for it, without which I could not pay my Rent; and when the Collector of the Land Tax comes, he might, inſtead of receiving his Aſſeſſment, drive off a Bullock; ſo that what diſables him from Trading, hurts me as a Farmer. In *what manner* theſe Taxes we pay for Intereſt Money hurts Trade, is indeed out of my power to ſay, as I was not bred to that buſineſs; but I will give you my plain thoughts about it, and lay ſome paſſages before you out of authors, who are ſaid to have wrote well upon it.

The firſt Thing that occurs is, that where Manufacturers pay heavy Duties for the neceſſaries of life, they muſt raiſe the price of their Goods; and if by this means the Merchant cannot ſell in a Foreign Market at as cheap a rate as his neighbours, the *French* or *Dutch*, he may even go home again. Compare then the neceſſaries which the Manufacturer muſt have if he will live, and the materials he muſt uſe in his trade, and the ſeveral Taxes now paid for each, with the ſame articles as they ſtood free from theſe charges formerly, and judge what a difference of price is occaſion'd by them in all the Goods we carry abroad. The author [p] quoted above, ſaid, near Fifty years ago, when our Taxes were not a quarter ſo heavy as now, that "There "are ſcarce any of theſe New Revenues which "do not give Trade ſome deſperate wound.

[p] Id. *p.* 145.

" The additional Duties upon Beer and Ale, " and the Tax upon Malt, are apparently a " burthen upon Woollen Manufactures, affect- " ing the Carder, Spinner, Weaver, and the Dyer; " who all of them muſt be raiſed in their wages, " when the neceſſaries of life are raiſed to them. " The conſequence of which will be, that our " Woollen Goods muſt come at a heavy and diſ- " advantageous price into the Foreign Markets."

Another thing that appears ſtrong in view upon this head is, the number of hands employed, and the Sums of Money circulated in Foreign Traffick, which are in fact the great inſtruments that procure National Wealth. The Strength and Riches of a Nation conſiſts in, and are procured by the number of its induſtrious Inhabitants. Laborious Farmers furniſh the materials, and ſkilful Manufacturers give the form to thoſe commodities, which the Merchant carries abroad. And when the growing, working, and exporting of thoſe Products of the Land which we do not want for our own uſe, is attended with no diſcouraging Drawbacks, and they bring a ſure, though moderate Profit, many hands and large ſums will ſoon be employed about them; that is, Trade will flouriſh.

Lay heavy Taxes on every thing that is carried out or brought in, and it will dwindle in both theſe points. For firſt, the Hands employed will be fewer; and our Author [q] ſays, " A Nation is not gainer in the general balance " of Trade by the dealing of a few, who are " able to employ in it great Stocks; ſuch may " make to themſelves an immenſe gain, but they " go but a little way towards enriching the *whole* " Publick; which ſeldom thrives, but when, in " a manner, the univerſal people bend their " thoughts

[q] Ibid.

" thoughts to this ſort of buſineſs; when every " one is ready with his little Stock and ſmall " Sum, to venture and rove about the World: " Of theſe, ſome proſper, and others are un- " done; however, in the way of Merchandize, " men who do not thrive themſelves, may yet " contribute very much to make their Country " rich, which gets by the Dealings of all, and " does not ſuffer by the unfortunate conduct of " here and there a Merchant. But when the " Cuſtoms are high, all theſe under Dealers, who " all along in *England* have made up the chief " bulk of our Trading Men, muſt hold their " Hands; though in Skill, Induſtry, inventive " Parts, and Wit, they may exceed Merchants " of more Wealth, and of a higher rank. Nor " is it indeed *practicable for men of but a mode-* " *rate Fortune to deal at all*, when *more than tre-* " *ble that Sum is neceſſary now to pay the King*, " *which formerly would ſet up a ſubſtantial Trader*, " *and maintain him in ſufficient Buſineſs.*"

He gives an inſtance of one Impoſition very hurtful to Trade, which is, the Duty upon Salt; but I do not think it worth tranſcribing. He lived in the infancy of Taxes, and might then deſcend to Particulars; *our* arguing is now to be upon *Univerſals*.

In the ſame manner he argued, that large Sums of Money, employed in the Stocks, would draw it off from Trade. And if the Doctrine of a very eminent Perſon is true, who ſays, the method of raiſing Money by Lotteries is of bad conſequence, becauſe every Million thus raiſed, hinders the circulation of three times that Sum in Trade; it is undeniable, that the Stocks are worſe than Lotteries for the ſame reaſon: " For while thoſe " immenſe Debts remain, the Neceſſities of the " Government muſt continue, Intereſt muſt be " high,

" high, and large Premiums will be given; " and what Encouragement is there for Traf- " fick, when they can ſit at home, and, without " any care or hazard, get from the State——Fif- " teen, and ſometimes Twenty, Thirty, Forty, " and Fifty per Cent? Is there any Commerce " abroad ſo conſtantly advantageous[r]?"

This he ſhews will hinder men from breeding their children to be Merchants, diminiſh the Stock employed in Trade, and contract the Bounds of it; decreaſe our Shipping, and finally weaken the very Sinews of our Nation, by deſtroying the Nurſery of our Seamen.

In a word, the only inſtance of Trade I ever heard or read of being promoted by the Stocks, is one ſingle branch of Exportation, which conſiſts in carrying abroad of Caſh, for the payment of Intereſt Money due to Foreigners. Unleſs perhaps it may appear ſome time hence, though not dream'd of at preſent, that the Dealers in them are the greateſt Paper Merchants in *Europe*.

Theſe were the conſequences, which it was foreſeen and foretold the Stocks either did or would bring upon Trade, when the Nation paid Intereſt Money for Seventeen Millions and a Half; and if the reaſoning then made uſe of was juſt, and afterwards appeared to have been ſo by facts, it muſt follow, that now our Debt is more than Four times increaſed, its pernicious influence upon Trade is extended in proportion. Some particular Branches may flouriſh; but the long liſt of Bankrupts, which, like blights and barrenneſs, every week accompanies the account of Stocks in our our News-Papers, is a very melancholy proof of the ſtate of it in general.

Let us carry our Eyes therefore to the Landed Intereſt, and try if the Proſpect will brighten upon

[r] Id. p. 185.

upon us; but here I doubt we ſhall find Matters much worſe. The value of Land depends greatly upon Trade, and if this declines, that muſt ſink; and when Money, the Product of of Trade, is ſcarce, Rents will be raiſed with difficulty, and ill paid: Beſides, all the heavy Duties laid upon the neceſſaries of life, whether of our own or Foreign Produce, which are but ſlightly felt, or ſhifted off from the ſhoulders of the Tradeſman, fall upon the Farmer with their full weight. Compare a Tradeſman whoſe Stock is Four or Five Thouſand Pounds, with a Freeholder living upon an Eſtate of his own of the ſame value, and then judge who feels theſe Taxes moſt. In the firſt place, it requires no proof that the Conſumer in the end pays the Duties, whatever they are, which are laid upon the Goods he makes uſe of; ſo that both the Trader and Farmer pay, in fact, the Duties upon Malt, Salt, Candles, *&c.* according to the quantities either of them uſe in their families.

Now the Trader can manage ſuch a Stock as I have mentioned, by himſelf and an Apprentice, or at moſt with the aſſiſtance of a Journeyman; this he does in a houſe of Twenty or Thirty Pounds a Year Rent, where he keeps a couple of ſervants; ſo that his family may conſiſt of Six or Eight perſons. The Gentleman Farmer's family muſt at leaſt be twice as large, for the management of his Farm, and conſequently he pays twice as much, to the Taxes laid upon the neceſſaries of life, as the other.

The Stock in Trade of one, anſwers to the Land of the other; and no doubt, this Stock, when firſt bought in, comes dearer to the Trader in proportion to the Duties laid upon it; but when he ſells it out again, whether in a Foreign Market or to the neighbouring Farmer, he

raiſes

raiſes the price of his Goods, at leaſt in proportion to the advanced Rate he gave on account of Cuſtoms, and thus is ſure of the ſame Profit as if theſe Taxes had never been laid. The Tax ſtill falls upon the laſt Buyer or Conſumer, and always will do ſo; and though high Duties are a clog upon Foreign Trade, and may hinder the ſale of large quantities of ſome ſorts of Goods abroad, or of ſome articles of Luxury at home, yet the Neceſſaries of Life muſt be had, and *there* the Seller's Gain will not be leſſened, however the price of his Goods is advanced. Theſe Duties then hurt not the Trader, becauſe the weight of them falls elſewhere; but the Land Tax, which is a ſort of Parallel to them, lies wholly upon the Gentleman Farmer, who for his Hundred and Fifty or Two Hundred Pounds a Year, ſhall pay Thirty or Forty Pounds, while the Trader pays Four or Six for his Houſe; and then what compleats the whole is, the utter inability the Farmer lies under of licking himſelf whole again, by raiſing the price of his Goods, as the Trader did. Wheat is the Farmer's ſtaple Commodity; and by it the prices, and conſequently the gain, upon all other Neceſſaries of Life are regulated; and this we know is about Four Shillings a Buſhel, at an average; as it was before the Taxes were laid.

I omit the Payments to Church and Poor, becauſe they are not properly Publick Payments, though the laſt is greatly affected by them. But to theſe likewiſe you will find, the Farmer generally rated at Five or Six times the Sum paid by a Tradeſman, poſſeſſed of an equal Property, merely becauſe this Property appears in a different ſhape.

In a word, he bears his ſhare of every Tax paid by his Fellow Subjects; and if in ſome inſtances

ſtances, the proportion he contributes is equal, in many others it is greater than what is levied upon any other perſon of the ſame Fortune; the Tradeſman ſeems to come neareſt him, but in truth has much the advantage of him; his way of Life is eaſier, his Profit ſurer and greater, and his payments to the Publick leſs. Let us only add one conſideration more, and we ſhall ſee where the weight of theſe immenſe Taxes reſt; I mean, that all Taxes whatever, which bring in large Sums to the Publick, riſe from the bulk of the people; but the bulk of this Nation will be found, upon a curſory view, to conſiſt of the Occupiers of Land, and perſons employed in the ſeveral Branches of Farming. And though the Traders in *London*, and Manufacturers in other great Towns, may, if our Seamen be added to to them, appear a very large body, yet if the Farmers and Huſbandmen of the whole Kingdom be compared with them, the diſproportion will immediately appear, and the inequality of all other Orders of Men to this, be fully acknowledged. So that this is a full proof, in every particular, that the main of our Taxes, whatever they are, muſt, from the number of men which this rank contains, from the manner of our Taxations, and from the nature of their Property, be in the end levied upon them. And thus the moſt uſeful, becauſe the moſt induſtrious ſet of men in the Kingdom, are the moſt heavily loaded; and whilſt they labour harder than any other people in raiſing the Neceſſaries and Conveniencies of Life, in the end, enjoy the leaſt ſhare of thoſe Products, which, under Providence, are owing to the Sweat of their Brows.

This is no new Doctrine, but was the Voice of the times, when theſe Debts began firſt to riſe to any conſiderable bulk. A Writer in 1695, who

who seems to have been a Courtier by the various Schemes he proposes for furnishing the Government with Money, delivers himself thus. " [s] All " Taxes whatsoever, are, in their last resort, a " charge upon Land." And again, " [t] If these " high Land Taxes are long continued, the " Landed Men must inevitably be driven into " the hands of Scriveners, Citizens, and Usu- " rers, except some few of the most wary Fami- " milies." And another Tract published in [v] 1698, when the National Debt was grown to Seventeen Millions and a Half, says, " Where the Pub- " lick is indebted, a large proportion of the Re- " venues, arising from the Annual Income, must " issue out to the satisfaction of those Debts; " from whence follows, that the *Land* and *La- " bour of the People* must go to enrich the Mo- " nied Men and Usurers, and not to support the " Government." And again, " [x] If we let a " Debt long continue,—we pleasure one part " of the people at the expence of the other; " that is to say, we gratify the Monied Men and " Usurers, *who are the Drones of the Common- " wealth*, at the cost of the Landed Man, the " Farmer, and the industrious Merchant."

Many more quotations might be made from the Writers of those times to the same purpose. The Debt was then but small to what it is at present, and yet they were all alarmed at the Consequences of it, and unanimously foretold, that if it was continued or increased, it would deeply affect the Government, the Trading, and the Landed Interests. They asserted, that all these, in their turns, would feel the pernicious influence of this new Constitution of the Publick Payments; but that its first, and strongest impression, would be upon

[s] *Essay on Ways and Means*, p. 153. [t] Id. p. 157.
[v] *Discourses on the Publick Revenues*, p. 199. [x] Id. p. 201.

upon the laſt; that it would ruin the Yeomanry, and diſtreſs the Gentry; and, by cauſing a ſcarcity of Money among them, would hinder the Poor from being employ'd, and by conſequence create an Univerſal Poverty.

How far theſe Aſſertions were well founded, and how truly theſe Predictions have been fulfilled, every man muſt know, who has taken a ride in the country at Eighty or a Hundred miles diſtance from *London*. A Banker in his ſhop, or a Stock-Jobber in *Change Alley*, becauſe he ſees nothing there but Gold and Silver, fooliſhly thinks that all parts of the Nation abound with it alike. But if an advantageous Purchaſe offers in the Country, let him take a view of two or three of the Villages that he has in Mortgage, or thoſe that lie round them, and he will find the ſcene much altered; a houſe that appears at a diſtance large enough, and fine enough to be the Seat of a Juſtice of Peace, or the Lord of the Mannor, it is odds will be found, on coming nearer, to have Five parts in Six of the windows it once had in it ſtopp'd up, the tiling decay'd, and out of Twenty chimneys not above One that has any ſmoke. Let him proceed from Village to Village throughout the Kingdom, and except ſome few places which have had the fortune to ſtrike out ſome Manufacture, he will find manifeſt ſigns of decay at leaſt, if not of deſolation. I need not go about producing proofs of this to you, Sir, who have inſtances enough of it in your neighbourhood. The Townſhip were you was born conſiſts of Twenty houſes; Eighteen of theſe about Fifty years ago were inhabited by Freeholders, from Sixty to Two Hundred Pounds a Year, who all lived upon their own Eſtates; at preſent there is but One man in it who owns a bit of the Land that he occupies. In the Pa-

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riſh were you now live, you obſerved, that there are Seventy odd Families, and that at the ſame diſtance of time, Forty of them were Freeholders, and Six of theſe worth above Two Hundred Pounds a year each. There is not a man in the Pariſh now, except yourſelf and the Vicar, who is not a Tenant at Will: And the Poor's Levy, which in 1708 was not Seven Pounds for the year, is now above Fifty. I do not however aſſert, that the number of Freeholders is much diminiſhed in theſe Two caſes, but that the Property poſſeſſed by them is much altered. The families that poſſeſſed Two Hundred Pounds a year, have not now above Twenty, the reſt being gone to very rich families near them. So that it is the middling men who are firſt ruined, and Eſtates are either growing very large, or dwindling to nothing.

Theſe are very ſtrong inſtances of the powerful operation of our Payments to the Publick; and though I will by no means affirm that the caſe is univerſally as bad, yet in ſome I can prove it much worſe. Theſe Taxes came upon the Farmer by degrees, the Payment was in moſt inſtances concealed from his view, and where it was ſeen in the true ſhape of a Tax, Hopes were entertained that it would be only for the preſent year, and no longer. To this the greatneſs of the Sums raiſed did not contribute a little, which ſo much exceeded all former Taxes, that the entire Reduction of *France*, at leaſt *up to the Walls of Paris*, was expected in conſequence of them every Campaign. In the mean time, the poor Farmer's Houſe Expences went on as uſual; or if ſome Savings were propoſed, they fell very much ſhort of the increaſe of his Taxes. Debts were contracted, younger children to be provided for, and the old hoſpitable Houſe-keeping to be

maintained: The land did not appear beggarly, but produced as good Crops as uſual, and the Markets were as briſk, and Corn and Cattle ſold as well as ever; and therefore, the way of living was not altered. But however fair the condition of theſe men appeared outwardly, there was a canker at the heart: The natural and artificial Products of the Nation were nearly the ſame as they had been Ten Years before, without any remarkable increaſe; the Government had at leaſt as great a Share out of theſe as uſual; the Merchant did not complain, for Trade did not greatly decline; and the Landed Men were eaſy, having lately reſcued their Liberty and Property from ruin, and fenced them with ſuch Laws, as would render them ſafe to all poſterity; and though the ſtruggle in doing this occaſioned ſome Demands at preſent, yet that would ſoon be over, and the purchaſe was cheap. In the mean time, ſome *new Men*, from *low beginnings*, appeared all of a ſudden to be poſſeſſed of vaſt Fortunes, which could neither drop out of the clouds, nor were they brought from any new diſcovered *Indies*, nor could they riſe from nothing. If this Wealth was *real*, then ſome Part of the National Store, which before was diſtributed among the three Sets of men above-mentioned, muſt have been ſnipped off from them, and put into theſe Upſtarts Pockets. —And this was in truth the caſe; for though the Hundred Pounds a Year came as uſual into the Freeholder's Pocket, yet when he went to buy the neceſſary Proviſions, or Cloathing for his Family, the ſeveral articles he wanted, were ſo raiſed by the new Taxes, laid on each of them for paying the Intereſt due to theſe *new Men*, that Five Pounds would not buy ſo much, as Three would have done a few years before. The man's Land remained in appearance as it did before,

and he received the Income of it; but as to any real Benefit that he had from it, he was as much deprived of it, as if a third part of it had been ſold away from him, or ſunk in the ſea. However, there was ſome hopes of retrieving, as many of theſe Taxes were laid only for Three Years, or a little longer, at the End of which they were to ceaſe, and would then have paid off all the Money borrowed upon them. But at Three Years end, the Debts were increaſed, and the Taxes for paying the Intereſt of them laid heavier in proportion. And happy was the Farmer, who could be ſo fortunately diſtruſtful as to ſuſpect, that what was the practice of Six Years, might be continued on perhaps for Sixty. The man who was fully perſuaded that the Payments now levied upon himſelf, and declared by Parliament to be intended only for Three Years, were, in fact, of that nature, that neither he nor his poſterity could ever have any hopes of being freed from, would take care to retrench betimes: He might think it a little hard, to have firſt one part of his Eſtate, and then another, taken from him and his Family, and aſſigned over to Harpies, who had lent Money to ſupply the wants of their Country in its diſtreſs at Forty or Fifty per Cent; but then he would take care to make the beſt of the remnant that was left: Whereas every man who had not this foreſight, and therefore went on as uſual, ſpending an Hundred Pounds a Year, when, in truth, his Income was but Fifty, would ſoon be reduced to ſuch a ſituation, as to be an object of great pity, becauſe reduced from one of the beſt ſituations in the Realm to one of the worſt. How many ſuch objects as theſe are now ſitting lonely in the corners of thoſe Villages, where their anceſtors lived in plenty, and getting a ſorry maintenance by the tillage of a nook of that Eſtate, which

would have been looked upon but as a poor retreat for their Grandfather's Shepherd, I ſhall not pretend to calculate: Let the number be as ſmall as you pleaſe, (and I wiſh it was an hundred times leſs than it is) it is plain, that if theſe ruinous meaſures are purſued by future generations, and Taxes go on to be doubled and trebled for Sixty Years more to come, the conſequences muſt be ſuch as theſe:——The beſt and moſt valuable ſet of men in the Nation, the *Yeomanry* of *England*, will be extinguiſhed; and if Trials by Juries are the greateſt Bleſſings we enjoy, we ſhall be deprived of theſe bleſſings, if the men who compoſe our Juries ſink into poverty and ignorance. A large ſhare of our National Council is ſent up by theſe people; and it would be a ſtrange alteration of affairs to hear the Knights of Shires tell the Houſe, "That their Conſtituents had many grievances to "be redreſſed, but no Money to pay."

But I ſtop my pen from going farther:—Theſe conſequences will fully ſhew themſelves the nearer they approach; and though the proſpect may be pleaſing to the eyes of a *Jew*, whoſe Harveſt it is, yet to an *Engliſhman* it can be no very agreeable object, to ſee his country reduced to a ſtate of Poverty, Ignorance, and Barbarity.

I have now given you ſome of my thoughts, what effects our preſent Taxes have, or may have, upon the Landed and Trading parts of the nation, and you perhaps will expect I ſhould carry my reflections on to the remaining order of men, who govern us: But matters of State fall not in my way of obſervation, who am a plain Country Farmer. However, not to diſappoint you, I will give you my opinion, what *may be* the fruits of theſe Taxes; wherein, if I ſuppoſe things which never have been, nor ever will be, yet if there is but a poſſibility of any thing like this coming to

paſs, it is enough for me; and may warn you, as a Member of Parliament, to promote the beſt, and guard againſt the worſt of any thing that may happen.

Let us imagine then in the land of *Utopia* the ſame way of proceeding in Money affairs to be purſued in all caſes, that the Miniſtry, about fifty years ago, purſued in ſome here; till every article of foreign Trade, or home Production are taxed to the full, and thoſe Taxes mortgaged for as much as they are worth. At this juncture, ſuppoſe the Crown to be placed on the Head of a wiſe and good Prince, whoſe penetration ſhall direct him to chooſe an able and an honeſt Council. Let every meaſure be purſued that is fit to promote the publick Intereſt; and that, among other things, it is abſolutely neceſſary for the preſervation of Trade, to engage in a foreign War. Extraordinary Supplies muſt here, of conſequence, be raiſed; and yet, by the neceſſities of former times, or the management of former Miniſters, every method of raiſing Money is foreſtalled; every avenue, from which any aſſiſtance can be got, is cloſed up! This wiſe and virtuous Adminiſtration may have the Voice of their *Landed* and *Trading* Subjects with them, pronouncing all their meaſures right and good: But if the ordinary charge of the Government, and the payment of the annual Intereſt due on former Debts, be the utmoſt that theſe men can raiſe, their Approbation will be only an empty, fruitleſs applauſe. — If in this exigency a Scheme be at laſt propoſed, which, though it affects the very vitals of the Community, will be a preſent relief, and bring in Two hundred Thouſand Pounds a year certain; we need not doubt but in this neceſſity it will be cloſed with, and put in practice. This income will defray

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the Intereſt of Four Millions at 4 per Cent. and becauſe the *Occaſion* is *preſſing*, let the old method be once more put in practice, and that Sum be borrowed on it at the rate aforeſaid, with *a Premium of Ten Pounds for every Hundred* ſubſcribed; and let Books be opened for a General, Fair Subſcription.

Theſe terms may be thought high ones by the perſons who are to be taxed for this; but the queſtion is, will the Monied Men, who are to be the Lenders, be of the ſame opinion? Will the *Hebrew Jews*, the *Engliſh Jews*, and the *Dutch Jews*, who alone have it in their Power to furniſh ſuch a Sum as this, and have formerly made 30 or 40 per Cent. of their Caſh upon leſs preſſing occaſions than this, be content with *four* now? The laws of charity, Chriſtian charity, can hardly be expected to be the Rule of action to *Jews*. The general Maxim of theſe men is, That another man's loſs is their gain; and their conſtant practice is, to make the moſt they can of their neighbour's neceſſities.

Let the determination of ſuch men, in ſuch a caſe as this, be as favourable as you can ſuppoſe it, yet ſurely moſt deplorable is the ſituation of that Prince, and that People, who, from the ſummit of wealth and grandeur, ſhall be reduced ſo low, as to have their counſels ſubject to the controll of Bankers and Stockjobbers, and the meaſures that are neceſſary for their ſafety, obſtructed by a ſet of men who have got all their wealth under that very Government which they now refuſe to aſſiſt. For to ſuppoſe that men of this ſtamp will deny their aſſiſtance, and withhold their Money, except their own exorbitant terms are complied with, is a much more reaſonable ſuppoſition than the oppoſite one. If Fame ſays true, ſomething like this did hap-

pen within leſs than a century, in a country not far from our own. The ſtory ſays, that under much the ſame ſituation, and nearly upon the ſame terms that I have mentioned, a Subſcription was propoſed in a neighbouring Nation. Upon hearing of it, a ſet of the chief monied men entred into a combination, and in conſequence of it, made a propoſal to the Government, That if they might have ſuch a ſhare of it as they mentioned, they would engage their own and their friends Purſes to furniſh the ſum that was wanted. The Share they demanded was of that nature, that it was plain, if they were poſſeſſed of it, they would have it in their power to make their own markets, and ſell the Government Bonds, which they gave a hundred Pounds for, at Twenty per Cent. immediate profit. This was not thought fair and equal dealing, and ſo the propoſal of the Clan was rejected, and the Subſcription left open. The conſequence was, that though a third part more was ſubſcribed for than demanded, yet theſe men ſo effectually locked up their own and their collegues cheſts, and ſtopped the Remittances from abroad, that when the Army took the field, and the Money was wanting, there was not caſh enough to be got out of the whole Subſcription to make good the firſt payment. So that had not the Miniſtry *ſurpriſingly* exerted themſelves, the Army muſt have been ruined by Mutiny, Famine, or the Enemy; or the Nation have been compelled to violate every engagement it had entred into.

Let this ſtory be true or falſe, as it will, the thing is poſſible; and though we are not liable to any thing like this at preſent, yet it may come to paſs in future ages, if the Neceſſities of the Government ſhall riſe ſo high, as to ſubject

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it to raiſe its extraordinary Supplies upon ſuch terms as *Change-Alley* and *Lombard-ſtreet* ſhall vouchſafe to grant. If this ſhould ever come to be our caſe, though Wiſdom and Virtue preſided at our councils, and directed all their determinations to the publick Good, yet would they be all inſignificant, for want of Power to carry them into execution.

If this ſuppoſition of a wiſe and good Prince, and a wiſe and good Miniſtry, ſeem too romantick to exiſt together, let us frame a different one. — Imagine then in the ſame country of *Utopia*, a King endowed with every perſonal good quality requiſite to make a people happy, but curſed in a Prime Miniſter; a Villain! who, by a train of low ſervices, ſhall work himſelf into the Royal Favour, only to abuſe it: a friend to the Perſon and Family of the Prince upon the Throne in profeſſion, but entirely devoted to the Intereſts of an oppoſite Claimant in his Heart: who therefore, like *Satan* crept into Paradiſe, ſhall inſinuate himſelf into confidence, that he may accompliſh thoſe ends by treachery, which he knows it impoſſible to effect by open force.— If ſuch a Wretch as this ſhall have the art to gain his Prince's ear, and the precaution to bar it againſt every body elſe, it is no abſurd ſuppoſition, to imagine him filling it with ſuch doctrines as theſe: " That the *Utopians* are natu-
" rally a turbulent factious People; and that the
" only way to keep them quiet, is to keep them
" poor. That the only methods of ſecuring the
" Allegiance of any order of men, are either
" Intereſt or Force. That the Monied Men, as
" they are poſſeſſed of the Sinews of War, are
" the true ſtrength of every Nation; and that
" the ſure way to unite them to the Crown, is
" to borrow their Money: For the more Debts

" a King has, the more friends he gains; becauſe " his Creditors will be loyal out of Intereſt. " That the Landed Men are to be managed by " the oppoſite means; for though they projected, " undertook, and completed a great Scheme " ſome years ago, whereby the Crown was ſettled " where it now reſts, yet are they every man of " them diſaffected; and therefore, the only way " to make them obedient, is to reduce them ſo " low that they ſhall not have it in their power " to be otherwiſe."

By ſuch maxims as theſe may a very good Prince be deceived, and purſue bad meaſures; not for want of intending, but for want of knowing better. Inſtead of ſuppreſſing Faction, he may think it his buſineſs to encourage it, that he may balance one party againſt another, and make ſure at leaſt of one ſide. Inſtead of uniting all his ſubjects together, and connecting them to the Crown by the tie of common Intereſt, he may judge it to be for his ſecurity to divide them, and gain one rank of men by Favours, to help him to manage the other by Force. Hence he will drain one part of his ſubjects to enrich the other; and whilſt one ſet of men wallow in affluence, another, by variety of Taxes, ſhall be exhauſted to the laſt penny, and treated like a conquered province.

This, I take it, would be ſomething like the conſumptive plan mentioned in the pretended *Apology of a late Miniſter*; and if ever there ſhould riſe a man ſo wicked as that perſon is there pictured, who ſhall be able to get as much confidence repoſed in him, as the pretended author is ſaid to have enjoyed; then may the world expect to ſee another Prince added to the liſt of thoſe, who have been brought to deſtruction by their own Counſellors. In ſuch a caſe, it would be no

wonder

wonder to ſee ſuch meaſures recommended and eſpouſed at Court, as would naturally alienate the hearts, and inflame the paſſions of the Country: It would be no wonder to ſee ſuch a man as this firſt adviſing oppreſſive meaſures, and then underhand fomenting the heart-burnings they occaſioned; prevailing with his Maſter to adopt his pernicious projects, on purpoſe that they may inflame; and going on from one ruinous ſtep to another, till he has made the people mad, and brought his Scheme to full ripeneſs: Then the maſk is pulled off, and the man blames as a Patriot what he had adviſed as a Counſellor, joins in the cry which himſelf had raiſed, and throws all the hatred of an injured, inſulted Nation upon the Throne; and from a boſom-friend becomes a betrayer, and makes his terms with the New Prince upon the ſolid merit of ſelling the Old one.

If you think neither of theſe caſes probable, let us try a third imaginary poſſibility. Suppoſe a Prince of an enterpriſing genius mounted upon the Throne, who may not reliſh being a King upon ſuch terms, as a conſtitution limited like ours preſcribes; but may be deſirous of being ſuch a King as we read of upon the Continent near us; in a word, who ſhall aim at ruling without any Parliaments at all, or with *ſuch* Parliaments, as ſhall have nothing but the *outward appearance* of any one quality which theſe auguſt Aſſemblies among us enjoy in *reality*. Should this Prince then reſolve to make himſelf maſter of the liberties of *Utopia*, I imagine he muſt proceed by one of theſe two ways, which are common both to Military and Civil Engineers; that is, he muſt either work by Sap and Undermining, or attack by open Force and downright Storm—Soldiers ſay, the former is the ſafer, and yet as certain a method of carrying a place as the latter. Conſider

ſider then, whether the *manner of collecting* ſuch a Revenue as ours is, and the great number of Officers that may in time be employed in it, may not ſo influence Elections, and thereby affect the very Conſtitution of Parliament, that the members of it ſhall be any thing you pleaſe to call them, but the Repreſentatives of the people. Or if this be not done, let it be conſidered, whether the Revenue itſelf may not be applied by Court Candidates, to b—be a ſet of Electors with part of thoſe Taxes which they themſelves have paid, and which will be ſure to be laid thicker and heavier upon them, in proportion to the Sums ſpent among them at a Voting. Or it may be conſidered, if Corruption becomes general there, both within doors and without (beyond any thing we ever heard of) and Candidates for Parliament ſpend a Thouſand Pounds among their Electors, that they may receive ten times as much in Places and Penſions, whether a Prince or his Miniſter may not govern in as arbitrary a manner with *ſuch* Parliaments, as if there was no Parliament at all.

On the other hand, if the Prince ſhall be of a more generous way of thinking, and have too much of the Hero in his compoſition to ſubmit to this low way of dealing by Bribery and Penſions, and ſo ſhall prefer the latter way of proceeding openly and avowedly; let it be conſidered, whether (if their Taxes riſe higher than ours are) the thing which is impracticable here, may not be very feaſible there:—If the maxim ſo often mentioned be true, that Power follows Money, I think it may. The examples of ſome of our beſt Princes, who were never ſuſpected of having any deſigns upon our liberties, might be alledged for keeping up a ſtanding army of 20,000 men in times of peace. Now if theſe Troops be well

diſciplined,

diſciplined, well armed, and eſpecially if they be properly commanded, by ſuch Officers as *Cromwell*'s Agitators were, reſolute *Soldiers of Fortune*, who had nothing to loſe, and therefore nothing to fear but offending their General, from whom they had every thing to hope; I think they would ſcarce meet with a force able to cope with them; eſpecially if the higher rank of Gentlemen in *Utopia* ſhould be complimented with a power of the ſame nature as our *Game Laws*, it is eaſy to ſuppoſe, they would as effectually diſarm their Tenants and neighbouring Yeomanry, as the *Highlanders* are now diſarmed by law for Rebellion, and thereby make all reſiſtance impoſſible.

Nothing could be wanting here but Subſiſtence Money, and if the ſame perſon who commiſſions and pays the Military Officers, ſhould commiſſion and pay likewiſe the Officers of the Revenue; if the Intereſt of the Debt collected by them ſhould be about Four Millions, and the Prince's ſettled Revenue about Two more, I think proviſion might be made for this point very eaſily: At leaſt if the current coin there be ſuppoſed about Fourteen Millions, as ours is, near half the National Caſh might be in the Prince's coffers, before his intentions were known; and then if it was his Royal Will and Pleaſure to place part of it in the hands of a gallant and truſty Soldiery, inſtead of letting it be polluted by the dirty hands of *Jews* and Uſurers, I do not ſee who would dare to contradict him.

We of this nation are in no manner of danger of ſeeing our affairs in ſuch a ſituation as I have been figuring of *Utopia*; at leaſt we are ſecure at preſent, and let poſterity take care of itſelf. Some people indeed have had ſtrange thoughts what this new Conſtitution of things, as to diſtribution of property among us, may at laſt end in; eſpecially

eſpecially if our Taxes proceed in growth for a few years longer: But whether they have concluded that any of the caſes I have mentioned may be our lot, I know not. Some men I imagine have ſuſpected as much, and I gueſs ſo from the various methods they have had under conſideration, for taking away, or at leaſt ſtopping the growth of this unnatural part of our conſtitution. Some were for reſuming and taking back what the lenders to the publick had exorbitantly gained by high Premiums and immoderate Intereſt; and this no doubt would have ſunk the principal Debt very much.

Others were for doing that to *publick* Creditors, which has been often, without effect, aimed at as to *private* ones; that is, they were for taxing their Money, which in this caſe it was not poſſible to conceal, as it was practiced in the other. This was but juſtice; for as Money at Intereſt brings the moſt eaſy and certain profit of any kind of property, it ought in reaſon to pay a proportionable ſhare to the expences of the Government, under which the Proprietors live: And laſtly, another way propoſed, was to reduce the Intereſt of thoſe Sums, which were borrowed at high rates, to the ſame level as the reſt, and to apply the ſavings thus made to the diſcharge of ſome of the Principal yearly; by which it was plain, the whole Debt would in time be paid off. This method was pitched upon, and the Surpluſage, yearly riſing from the Intereſt thus abated, was the famous *Sinking Fund.* This was eſtabliſhed in the year 1716, and by the plan of it, there was full proviſion made for the payment of every Debt then ſtanding out in Two and Thirty Years: And had this Scheme been as well executed as it was wiſely planned, your buſineſs in Parliament this Seſſions would have been to raiſe the neceſ-

ſary Supplies for the year 1749, which would have been all the Taxes we ſhould have had. But alas! though this Maſter-piece of a political Engine has been all this while at work, and ſhould by this time have drawn off all our Debts, they are, by ſome means or other, roſe from Fifty to Eighty Millions. What means of relief muſt now be applied, the wiſdom of the Nation muſt determine.—The caſe is bad, and the Event may be fatal. To aſk redreſs of Grievances is the privilege of an *Engliſhman*; and it is no Faction to apply for it in a modeſt, legal manner. What method you may chooſe to proceed in, I know not; but was I any conſiderable Proprietor of theſe Funds, I ſhould not be eaſy till I ſaw ſome method fixed upon for leſſening both the Debt and the Taxes; nay, I ſhould deſire it, though it was by taxing my Principal in proportion to the rate the Freeholder pays for his Land: And I am put upon this way of thinking from a Chriſtmaſs Game, which the Servants are now playing at by the fire-ſide, which in the end may poſſibly bear ſome reſemblance to the Stocks, if ſome remedy be not applied: The Game is this;—They ſtand in a circle, and deliver a Fire-ſtick from one to another, which every one is obliged to hold while he repeats a ſet form of words; and he, in whoſe hand it goes out, is the ſufferer. It would be a very proper diverſion for *Change-Alley*, and very eaſily learned. All the form is, "*Jack's alive*, "*and alive like to be*; *Jack's alive, and alive like* "*to be*; *but if he dies in your hand, your back ſhall* "*be ſaddled*, &c.

I am, *&c.*

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

Extracts from the Journals of the Houſe of Commons, *relating to the* Revenue of the Crown.

N° I.

1660. *Sept.* 4. £. S. d.

SR *H. Finch* reports from the Committee to conſider of a Revenue to be ſettled on the King, and the ſtate of the late King's Revenue. An eſtimate of the preſent Revenue, and ſeveral Reſolves of the ſaid Committee, *viz.*

The late King's Revenue from 1637 to the year 1641 incluſive, communibus annis, did not amount unto —— —— 895,819 5 0

Whereof did ariſe, partly by Payments not warranted by Law, partly expired —— — 210,493 17 4

685,315 7 8

That

	£.	S.	d.
That the Expences of his late Majesty's Government were about 200,000 a year above the Receipt, in which computations the Incomes arising by Ship-money are not included.			
That by estimation, the present Revenue of the King may be computed at about 819,398 *l. viz.*			
By the Customs	400,000	0	0
The Composition for the Court of Wards	100,000	0	0
The Revenue of Farms and Rents	263,598	0	0
The Office of Postage	21,500	0	0
The Proceeds of *Dean* Forest	4,000	0	0
The Imposition of Sea Coal exported	8,000	0	0
Wine Licenses and other additions	22,300	0	0
	819,398	0	0
Of which Sum, being part of the 263,598 *l.* for Farms and Rents, is casual and for the most part lost, *viz.*	45,698	17	7
So agreed to be certain and good	773,699	2	5
Resolved, that the present King's Majesty's Revenue shall be made up 1,200,000 a year			

N° II.

1661 *June* 18.

SR *Philip Warwick* reports, the Revenue that

	£. per Ann.	would fall short	£.
The Cuſtoms formerly valued, at —	500,000		100,000
The Exciſe valued	300,000		50,000
The Crown Lands valued at ——	120,000		40,000
That the eſtimate upon the Advance of the Queen's Jointure at —— —	50,000		40,000
That forfeited Eſtates eſtimated at—	38,000		25,000
That the Wine Licenſes eſtimated at	25,000		10,000
	1,033,000		265,000
So that the clear Revenue was only—	768,000		

Which was leſs than King *Charles* I. had.

Referred to a Committee to conſider how to make up the defects.

N°

N° III.

£. S. d. Future full Value per Ann.			1663 *June* 4 A Report of the preſent Value of the ſeveral Branches of the Revenue.	£. S. d. Per Ann.		
			The Cuſtoms let to farm from Michaelmas 1662 for 5			
400,000	0	0	years at ———	390,000	0	0
			The Revenues in Lands, and Rents in the Exchequer, and Dutchies of *Lancaſter* and *Cornwal*, including, The Queen's Jointure, if well managed, beſides Foreſts, Parks & Chaſes un-			
100,000	0	0	improved ———	100,000	0	0
			Dean Foreſt, Sir *John Winter* being ſatisfied, and 1,400 Acres incloſed and improved, may raiſe			
5,000	0	0	conſtant ———			
			Exciſe of Beer and			
274,950	0	0	Ale, now worth—	274,950	0	0
			Hearths and Stoves			
170,603	12	0	as now certified —	170,603	12	0
			Firſt Fruits and			
18,800	0	0	Tenths, com. ann.-	18,800	0	0
			The Coinage and Pre-emption of Tin			
26,000	0	0	now valued at ——	21,500	0	0
995,353	12	0	Carried over	975,853	12	0

£.	S.	d.		£.	S.	d.
995,353	12	0	Brought over	975,853	12	0
26,000	0	0	The Poſt Office in leaſe, 4 years to come	21,500	0	0
20,000	0	0	Wine Licenſes, as now ſettled	20,000	0	0
2,600	0	0	Alienation Office produceth, communibus annis, 3600*l.* whereof 1546*l.* 12*s.* is paid into and accounted for by the Hanaper, ſo produceth clear	2,050	8	0
3,153	14	0	The Profits of the Seals of the King's Bench and Common Pleas in leaſe, at 1653*l.* 14*s.* paid into the Hanaper yearly, but eſteemed worth 1500*l.* per ann. more	1,653	14	0
			The Profit of Sixpenny Writs in Chancery, in leaſe at 1000*l.* per ann. paid into the Hanaper yearly, but eſtimated to be worth more, com. annis, 375*l.* clear	1,000	0	0
			The Hanaper Office receives 1546*l.* 12*s.* out of the Alienation Office, and 1653*l.* 14*s.* for the farms of the Seals of the King's Bench & Common Pleas, and 1000*l.*			
1,047,107	6	0	Brought over	1,022,057	14	0

£.	S.	d.		£.	S.	d.
1,047,107	6	0	Brought over	1,022,057	14	0
			1000 *l.* for the Six-penny Writs in Chancery, and all Profits of the Great Seal computed at 1500 *l.* per ann. but all is ſpent in this			
1,500	0	0	Office.			
			Poſt Fines in Leaſe			
3,000	0	0	at ——— ———	2,276	6	0
			Iſſues of Jurors in			
1,068	0	0	Leaſe at ——— ———	1,000	0	0
			Greenwax in leaſe			
1,068	0	0	at ——— ——— ———	577	5	5
			D° in the Dutchy			
200	0	0	of *Lancaſter*———			
3,000	0	0	*Alnage* in leaſe at-	997	1	11
			Newcaſtle Coals at 1 *s.* per Chaldron for the inland vent			
8,000	0	0	only ——— ———	1,834	12	6
			Balaſt of Ships enjoyed by Trinity			
1,000	0	0	Houſe———			
			Faculties included			
400	0	0	in the Hanaper	400	0	0
			Licenſe of Exportation of White			
800	0	0	Cloth leaſed at —	100	0	0
			Priſage and Butlerage of Wines in			
2,000	0	0	leaſe at —— ——	500	0	0
			Traitors Eſtates eſtimated at 8000 *l.* per annum, whereon were 27000 *l.* Debt, and many Incumbrances & Jointures,			
5,000	0	0	reckoned clear——	5,000	0	0
1,074,143	6	0	Carried over	1,034,742	19	10

Recuſants

£.	S.	d.		£.	S.	d.
1074,143	6	0	Brought over	1,034,742	19	10
			Recusants Estates as they were before the Troubles.			
18,000	0	0	There are no Convictions.			
			Future	Present		
1,092,143	6	0	Whole Revenue.	1,034,742	19	10

N° IV.

The Crown Revenue and its Allotments in King Charles II. *Time.*

	July 22. 1668. Sr *Wm. Coventry.*	Ending at Chriſtmaſs 1675. The Lord Treaſurer.	Reduced for the next Year.	January 26. 1675-6. Allotment of Council.
	£.	£.	£.	£.
Navy	200,000	300,000	300,000	300,000
Army and Garriſons	182,000	212,000	212,000	212,000
Tangier	55,000	57,200	57,200	57,200
Houſhold	90,000	107,000	50,000	52,247
Buildings and Repairs [Works]	8,000	14,000	12,000	10,000
Privy Purſe	12,000	38,000	36,000	36,000
Intelligence	4,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Treaſurer of the Chamber	20,000	30,000	20,000	20,000
Great Wardrobe	16,000	22,000	16,000	16,000
Penſioners [Band of]	3,000	6,000	6,000	3,000
Robes	5,000	5,000	4,000	4,000
Jewel Houſe	2,000	5,000	4,000	4,000
Ordinance, Ordinary & Extraordinary	30,000	50,000	30,000	40,000
Queen Conſort 23,000 Queen Mother 40,000 [Penſions wherein the Queen, &c. D. of York]	63,000	181,000	100,000	110,000
Ambaſſadors, Envoys, and Preſents	30,000	50,000	40,000	40,000
Judges, Ludlow Court, Mrs. of Chancery and Requeſts [Fees and Salaries]	14,500	81,000	61,000	49,000
Angel Gold for Healing [Healing Medals]	1,200	2,000	2,000	2,000
Maſter of the Horſe, and Mr of the Stud [Stables]	2,500	11,000	10,000	10,000
Creation Money	1,500			
Lord Privy Seal's Diet	1,400			
Liberates out of the Exchequer	1,500	2,000	1,5000	1,500
Dormant Privy Seal [Caſual Diſburſements]	3,00	15,000	10,000	10,000
Officers of Falconry and Hawks	1,000			
The Harriers	7,00	2,000	1,500	1,500
Tents and Toyls	5,00			
Tower Expences for Priſoners-	7,68	7,68	7,68	7,68
Keepers of Game and Foreſts	1,07			
[Secret Service]				20,000
[New Years Gifts]				3,600
[Management of Cuſtoms, Exciſe, and Law Duty]				63,500
	745,975	1,251,968	992,968	1,075,315
Intereſt Money per Gueſs	150,000	100,000	100,000	100,000
	595,975	1,351,968	1,092,968	175,315

N° V.

The chief Branches of the Revenue, according to a Computation delivered to the House of Commons at the Beginning of the Revolution, stood, clear of all Charges in the Collection, as follows.

	£.
THE Tunnage and Poundage, including the Wood, Farm, Coal-Farm, and Salt-Farm, was computed at	600,000
The Excise on Beer and Ale, *&c.* year ending the 24th of *June* 1689. did produce	666,383
The Hearth Money about	245,000
The Post Office about	65,000
The Wine Licences about	10,000
New Impositions upon Wine and Vinegar, granted for four years, ending *Sept.* 29. 1688	172,901
Duty on Tobacco and Sugar, for the same time, and in the same year, about	148,861
Duty on French Linnen, Brandy, Silk, *&c.* which was to continue to *June* 1, 1690. for the year ending *Sept.* 29, 1688. produced	93,710
Total	2,001,855

Essay on Ways and Means, 8vo. 1695. p. 36.

N°

N° VI.

A List of the Acts of Parliament *passed in the Reign of King* Charles II. *relating to the Revenue, whether ordinary or extraordinary, with their respective Appropriations, as far as appears from the Acts themselves, or the Journals of the* House of Commons.

		£.
N° I.	Statute 12. *Car.* II. C. 2. AN Act for putting in execution an Ordinance mentioned in the said Act — This Ordinance was for levying 70,000 *l.* a month for three months, from *June* 24, 1660. J. D. C. *May* 18. Had the Royal Assent *June* 1. To the Army. J. D. C. *Nov.* 6, 1660. *Dec.* 3.	210,000
II.	C. 4. A Subsidy granted to the King of Tunnage and Poundage — —— —— The Customs for life; they were farmed for five years of this Reign at 390,000 *l.* a year, and the improved value of them was reckoned 4000,000 *l.* per ann. J. D. C. *June* 4, 1663. This Act commenced *July* 24, 1660. As Trade improved this Re-	400,000

		£.
Stat. 12. *Car.* II. C. 2.	venue improved, and might at an Average, after the Dutch War, be 500,000 *l.* per ann.	
N° III.	C. 5, 8. Two Acts for continuing the Exciſe, till *Aug.* 20, and *Dec.* 25, 1660. The Produce unknown.	
IV.	C. 9. For the ſpeedy proviſion of Money, for diſbanding and paying off the Forces of this Kingdom both by Sea and Land. Explained & amended C. 10. — — — A Poll Tax, and it was intended to raiſe 400,000 *l.* J. D. C. *May* 18, 19. 1660, but there came in upon it on *Nov.* 26, 1660. only 252, 167 *l.* which was all paid to the Army, J. D. C. *Dec.* 3, 1660.	252,167
V.	C. 20. An Act for the raiſing of Sevenſcore Thouſand Pounds for the compleat diſbanding of the whole Army, and paying off part of the Navy — — — — — An Aſſeſſment for two months, at 70,000 *l.* per month, commencing *Nov.* 1, 1660. J. D. C. *Sept.* 8, 1660.	140,000
VI.	C. 21. An Act for the ſpeedy raiſing of Seventy	

Thouſand

		£.
Stat. XII. *Car.* 2. C. 21. N° VI.	Thouſand Pounds for the ſpeedy ſupply of His Majeſty — — —— — — An Aſſeſſment for a month, commencing *Sept.* 29, 1660. J. D. C. *Sept.* 7, 1660.	70,000
VII.	C. 23, 24. An Act for certain Impoſitions upon Beer and Ale, *&c.* An Act for taking away the Court of Wards, *&c.* and for ſettling a Revenue upon His Majeſty in lieu thereof. The Exciſe Acts; the rates in both are the ſame; and as the laſt was given in lieu of Wards, it is ſtiled *The Hereditary Exciſe*, and was eſtimated at 100,000 *l.* and ſo together were intended for— J. D. C. *Nov.* 21, 1660. They afterwards produced more, but at preſent there were Debts upon it, and Charges made by this Parliament *for paſt Services.* Commenced *Dec.* 25, 1660.	200,000
VIII.	C. 26. An Act for the levying the Arrears of the twelve months Aſſeſſment, commencing *June* 2, 1659. and the ſix months Aſſeſſment, commencing *Dec.* 25, 1659. The Produce unknown. Appropriated to pay the Army. J. D. C. *Dec.* 3, 1660.	

£.

Stat. 12. *Car.* II. N° IX. C. 27. An Act for granting unto the King Four Hundred and Twenty Thousand Pounds, by an Assessment of 70,000 *l.* per month, for six months, for disbanding the remainder of the Army, and paying the Navy —— 420,000

A Clause was ordered to be inserted in this Act for satisfying the people of the Kingdom, that the laying these Assessments for 6 months is from a present necessity, to take off the burthens that lie upon the Kingdom in order for a future ease, and not with intention that this way of charging the people shall for the future be continued. J. D. C. *Nov.* 23, 1660.

However it fell short of paying the Navy, there remaining a Debt of 150,000 *l.* upon it. J. D. C. *July* 27, 1661.

And though here was intended to have been a new Provision of Stores made for the Navy, estimated at 200,000 *l.* yet by this deficiency in the Navy's pay there was not. When the *Dutch* War broke out in 1665, 'There was not 'in all the magazines and

'stores,

£.

Stat. 12. *Car.* II. C. 27. N° IX. ‘ ſtores, Arms enough to ‘ put into the hands of 5,000 ‘ men, nor proviſions e- ‘ nough to ſet out ten new ‘ Ships to ſea.’ Chancellor’s Speech to Parliament, *Oct.* 9, 1665.

X. C. 29. An Act for the ſpeedy raiſing of 70,000 *l.* for the preſent ſupply of His Majeſty — ——— — This was for the Coronation, and to ſet Jewels in the Crown. J. D. C. *Dec.* 17, 21, 28. 70,000

XI. C. 35. An Act erecting & eſtabliſhing a Poſt Office — The firſt legal one; had Royal Aſſent *Dec.* 29, 1660. This was part of the ordinary Revenue, and eſtimated at 26,000 *l.* per ann. improved value. J. D. C. *June* 4, 1663. It was farmed from Chriſtmaſs 1660, to Midſummer 1677. at 21,500 *l.* ibid. See its improved value at the Revolution in N° V. *Appendix.* In this Reign, after Midſum^r 1667. it produced about 37,000 *l.* per ann.

XII. C. 30. An Act for the Attainder of ſeveral perſons [Regicides.] The forfeited

Eſtates

£.

Eſtates of theſe perſons, as
Stat. 13. appears by J. D. C. *June* 18,
Car. II. 1661. amounted to ——— 13,000

N° XIII. C. 3. An Act for the declaring, veſting, &c. all Monies, and which were received in theſe late times, and are remaining in the hands of any Treaſurers, &c. not pardoned by the Act of Oblivion. Produce unknown.

XIV. C. 4. An Act for a free and voluntary Preſent to His Majeſty. Produce unknown.

XV. C. 13. An Act for veſting Arrears of Exciſe, and new Impoſt in His Majeſty, *viz.* ſuch as were due from perſons not pardoned by the Act of Oblivion. *vid.* Preamble.

Produce unknown. But if theſe Traitors had conveyed away their Eſtates, ſo that only 13,000 *l.* could be got from them all, as appears by Journal D. C. *June* 18, 1661. It is not to be ſuppoſed much was got by theſe Articles, N° XIII, and XV. *vid.* J. D C. *May* 31, 1660. Theſe three had the Royal Aſſent, *July* 30, 1661.

C. 3.

		£.
Stat. 2. *Car.* II. N° XVI.	C. 3. An Act for granting unto the King's Majesty Twelve Hundred and Three-score Thousand Pounds, to be assessed by an Assessment of 70,000 *l.* a month for 18 months — — — — This commenced Christmas 1661. and so produced 840,000 *l.* for the year 1662. ending at Christmas, and 420,000 *l.* for the first half year of 1663, ending at Midsummer, charges of collecting excepted, which if the same as reckoned in J. D. C. *Feb.* 18, 1688. for the same Sum, was 1180 *l.* for each month, and so 21,240 *l.* for the whole.	1,260,000
XVII. Stat. 13, & 14.	C. 8. An Act for distributing 60,000 *l.* among the truly loyal and indigent Officers —— ——— — A Parish Rate like 43 *Eliz.* C. 3.	60,000
XVIII.	C. 10. An Act for establishing an additional Revenue on His Majesty, his Heirs and Successors —— The Hearth Money, whereby every Hearth or Stove was taxed at Two Shillings a Year. This by Report, *June* 4, 1663.	170,603

£.

Stat. 13. & 14. *Car.* II. C. 10. N° XVIII. 4, 1663. brought in 170,603 *l.* And when the King was empowred by Parliament, 16 *Car.* II. C. 3. to collect it by his own Officers, it brought in above 200,000 *l.* per ann. This Tax was abolished 1 *Will.* and *Mary*, C. 10. as a badge of Slavery. It commenced *March* 25, 1662.

XIX. C. 14. An Act directing the prosecution of such as are accountable for Prize Goods. Produce unknown. By Journal D. C. *May* 23, 1660. there was an Arrear standing out of 41,495 *l.* which the Treasury was desired to get to pay publick Debts as shall be designed by Parliament. By the Act for ordering the Forces of the Kingdom, C. 3. S. 23. the King was enabled to raise 70,000 *l.* a year (in case of apparent danger) for paying such as he could raise. This Power was continued for three years, and the Money seems to have been raised, for in Stat. 29. *Car.* II. C. 9. the Commissioners of Account are to examine into the application of it.

C. 9,

£.

Stat. 15. *Car.* II. N° XX. C. 9, 10. Acts for granting four entire Subsidies from the Temporality, and as many from the Clergy —— 282,000

By the famous Remonstrance of *Dec.* 15, 1642. six Subsidies, and a Poll Bill estimated as equal to six more, are reckoned in all at 600, 000 *l.* or Fifty Thousand Pounds a Subsidy. And it is certain, that Parliament would not under-rate them. The Clergy's was 20,000 *l.* The Revenue was given in this Year at 1,034,742 *l.* of which the Wine Licenses and Post Office, amounting to 41,500 *l.* were by Parliament 15 *Car.* II. C. 14. appropriated to the Duke, and reduced the King's Revenue to 993,240, and with these Subsidies, which were to be paid by *May* 1. 1663. J. D. C. *June* 23. 1662. it amounted to 1,273,240. This seems to be the first establishment of the Revenue that was well planned since the Restoration. The Debts standing out before the Restoration, and the disbanding the Army, amounted to more; and, as

appears

£.

Stat. 15. *Car.* II. C. 9, 10. N° XX. appears by the frequent Acts paſſed for better collecting the Cuſtoms, &c. the Grants hitherto had produced leſs than was expected. Even in theſe Subſidies the Queſtion was put *June* 22. that 1000 *l.* per ann. Eſtate ſhould be reckoned but at 20 *l.* on the Roll; and though it was loſt, it ſeems to have been loſt by thoſe who intended the charged ſhould be lower; for the King at opening the next Parliament ſaid, 'that Eſtates of '3, or 4000 *l.* a year did not 'pay 16 *l.* for all four Subſi-'dies."

Stat. 16, 17 N° XXI. C. 1. An Act for granting a Royal Aid unto His Majeſty of 2,477,500 *l.* to be raiſed in the ſpace of three years —— —— —— 2,477,500

This was a Land Tax. J. D. C. *Dec.* 15, 1664. and was intended for carrying on the *Dutch* War. But this Eſtimate of 825,833 *l.* a year for 1665, 6 & 7. would not anſwer. It was ſtrictly appropriated and accounted for, Stat. 29. *Car.* II. C. 9. as were the three following Articles,

C. 1.

		£.
Stat. 17. *Car.* II. N° XXII.	C. 1. An Act for granting the Sum of 1,250,000 *l.* to His Majesty —— — It was by a proportionable addition to the Royal Aid. J. D. C. *Oct.* 11, 1665. and commenced that Year at Christmas, and made the Sum of 2,075,833 for the *Dutch* War for 1666. There was a month's Tax of 120,000 *l.* now given to the Duke, which was to be levied when the Royal Aid ceased, *viz*, after Christmas 1667.	1,250,000
XXIII. Stat. 18.	C. 1. An Act for raising money by a Poll, towards the maintenance of the present War. It was estimated Journal D. C. *Dec.* 17, 1666-	500,000
XXIV. Stat. 19.	C. 8. An Act for granting to the King 1,256,345, for the maintenance of the present War — — —— This was the additional aid mentioned above, N° XXII. continued commencing when that ceased, *viz.* at Christmas 1666, and made 2, 582, 178 *l.* for the *Dutch* War for 1667.	1,256,345
XXV. Stat. 20.	C. 1. An Act for granting His Majesty Three Hundred and Ten Thousaud Pounds by an Imposition on Wines- This was appropriated for	310,000

£.

Stat. 20. *Car.* II. N° XXV. setting out a Fleet in 1668. upon the concluſion of the Tripple Alliance, and was to be accounted for quarterly, *vid.* the Act, S. 20, 23. The 10,000 *l.* was allowed for charges in collecting.

XXVI. Stat. 22. C. 3. An Act for granting His Majeſty an Impoſition on all Wines and Vinegars imported between *June* 24, 1670. and *June* 24, 1678. The Keeper, in his Speech to the Parliament, *Feb.* 14, 1669. ſaid, 'That if the 'preparation towards the 'War be taken to be for the 'uſe of the War, a great 'part of the King's own Re- 'venue had been applied to 'it, to the amount of ſeve- 'ral Hundred Thouſand 'Pounds, beſides the Sums 'given for it, which had 'no Part of them been ap- 'plied to any other uſe, and 'that he had examined the 'accounts himſelf in his 'own Royal Perſon;' and added, 'That the Cuſtoms, 'the Exciſe, and the Hearth 'Money, had ſuſtained a 'loſs of near 600,000 *l.* by 'the War, the Plague, and 'the Fire.'

This is probable; and proviſion was made for the Debts occaſioned hereby by this

Bill,

		£.
Stat. 22. *Car.* II. C. 3. N° XXVI.	Bill, which was intended to raise 400,000 *l.* J. D. C. *Nov.* 26, 1669. and afterwards, one year was added more to it, on account of the Duke's loss by it in his Wine Licenses. J. D. C. *Dec.* 6, 1669. so that at first it was estimated at about Fifty Seven Thousand Pounds a year.	
XXVII.	C. 6. An Act for advancing the sale of Fee Farm Rents, the Produce unknown.	
XXVIII. Stat. 22, 23.	C. 3. An Act for granting a Subsidy to His Majesty, for supply of his extraordinary occasions — — ——	800,000
XXIX.	C. 5. An Act for an additional Excise upon Beer and Ale — — —	
XXX.	C. 9. An Act for laying Impositions on Proceedings at Law — — — —	400,000
	N° XXVIII. was a Tax of a mixed Nature, laying 15 *s.* on every 100 *l.* belonging to Bankers; 15 *s.* on every 100 *l.* lent to the King at above 6 per Cent. personal Estates 6 *s.* per Cent; all publick Offices and Places 2 *s.* in the Pound; Land and Mines 12 *d.* per Pound. The additional Excise charges the same Rates as the other Excises did; only where they charge 15 *d.* on Ale, this	

Stat. 22, 23. *Car.* II. C. 9. N° XXX.

charges but 9 *d.* and where they charge Cider, &c. imported at 5 *s.* this charges 4 *l.* The third is the Stamp Act, which is since much extended. The first was for one year, ending at Lady-Day, 1672. The second was for six years, commencing *June* 24, 1671. and continued in 1676. for three years longer. The third was for nine years, commencing *May* 1, 1671. and continued in 1678. for three years more. The first was estimated at 800,000 *l.* J. D. C. *Dec.* 10, 16, 1670. The other two at 400,000 *l.* ibid. *Dec.* 9.

£.

They were intended to pay the King's Debts, of which a List was given in *Oct.* 31, 1670. but not entered, and fitting out a Fleet, *France* being then armed.

The Duke's Revenue by Wine Licences having been deficient, he had now in exchange for it 24,000 *l.* per ann. out of the Excise. C. 7. The Exchequer shut up *January* 2, 1671-2. There was the Sum of 79,566 *l.* assigned on the Exchequer for paying the Interest of the Money now detained at the rate of 6 per Cent. which shews the Sum to have been 1,326,100 *l.*

nearly.

Stat. 22, 23. *Car.* II. C. 9.	nearly. J. D. C. *April* 27, 1689. or, as the moiety of it is there ſet, to 1,328,526*l.* which moiety is now part of the National Debt among the Annuities.		*J.*
N° XXXI. Stat. 25.	C. 1. An Act for raiſing the Sum of 1,238,750*l.* for ſupply of His Majeſty's extraordinary occaſions —— It was an Aſſeſſment for 18 months, at 68,819*l.* a month, or 825,828*l.* a year, which is 8*l.* ſhort of the Sum. It was for the ſecond *Dutch* War.	1,238,750	
XXXII. Stat. 29.	C. 1. An Act for raiſing 584,978*l.* for the ſpeedy building 30 Ships of War - A War with *France* was now expected. This Money was ſtrictly appropriated. The King ſaid in his Speech, *Jan.* 15, 1677-8. that theſe Ships had coſt 100,000*l.* more than was given, and that he had laid out the 200,000*l.* borrowed on the additional Exciſe (now given for 3 years more) in buying Stores.	584,978	
XXXIII. Stat. 29, 30	C. 1. An Act for raiſing Money by a Poll and otherwiſe, to enable His Majeſty to enter into an actual War [with *France.*] A Reſolution had paſſed *Feb.* 18, 1677-8. for raiſing a Million for entering on actual	150,000	

War

		£.
Stat. 30. *Car.* II. N° XXXIV.	War with *France*, but gave only this Poll Bill, which, by Journal D. C. *June* 3, 17. 1678. raiſed 150,000 *l.* C. 1. An Act for granting a ſupply to His Majeſty of 619,388 *l.* for diſbanding the Army, and other uſes. It was by a Land Tax, J. D. C. *June* 26, 1678. By J. D. C. *July* 8, 1678. it appears thus; 'The engroſſed 'Bill for raiſing a ſupply, 'not exceeding 414,000 *l.* 'read and paſſed, and that 'the Title be, An Act for 'granting 619,388 *l.* 11 *s.* '9 *d.* for diſbanding the Army, *&c.* —— —— The uſes this Sum was intended for, appear thus from the Journal, *viz. June* 3, 4. For diſbanding the Army in full, for Levy Money and Pay to the laſt of *June*, 1678. 200,000 *l.* — *June* 8, 21. For repayment of Money borrowed on the additional Exciſe, which the Houſe is obliged to, 200,000 *l.* — *June* 17. Extraordinary uſe of Navy and Ordnance 200,000 *l.* — *July* 21. Princeſs of *Orange*'s Fortune 40,000 *l.* In all, 640,000 *l.* To which was added 6,462 *l.* more, for diſbanding the	414,000

Army

		£.
Stat. 30. *Car.* II. C. 1. N° XXXIV.	Army by Vote, *July* 3, 1678. And yet by Vote *June* 20. on Report from the Committee for repayment of the ſecond Article of 200,000*l.* and the Princeſs's Fortune, it is ſaid, the new Impoſts on Wines ſhould be continued three years longer for paying them. Q. How they were paid? The Army however was kept up longer, and at laſt paid by	
Stat. 31. N° XXXV.	C. 1. An Act for granting His Majeſty a ſupply of 206,462*l.* 17*s.* 3*d.* for paying off and diſbanding the Forces raiſed *Sept.* 29. 1677. Which was the laſt Money Bill paſſed this Reign.	206,462

F I N I S.

By reaſon of the AUTHOR's diſtance from the Preſs, the following Errors have eſcaped the Printer, which the Reader is deſired to correct.

PAGE 8. Line 7. for *perſon*, read *Parſon*.
P. 15. l. penult, after 6 *Millions and a half*, add *then*.
P. 19. l. 16. for *Sums*, r. *Sum*.
Ibid. l. 30. dele *have*.
Ibid. l. 30, 31. dele *Things have been differently repreſented, and*.
Ibid. l. 36. r. *ſeem to*.
P. 20. l. ult. for 992,167 *l*. read 922,167 *l*.
P. 21. l. 14. dele *of* 413,000 *l*.
Ibid. l. 16. for *it* is plain, r. *It* is.
P. 22. l. 9. for 226,665 *l*. r. 326,665 *l*.
Ibid. l. 12. for 100,000 *l*. r. 10,000 *l*.
Ibid. at bottom of the page, add, vid. *Appendix* N° III.
P. 26. l. 8. for *Revenue*, r. *Revenues*.
P. 29. l. 25. for *then*, r. *They* e'en.
P. 31. l. 16. r. *unintelligible*.
Ibid. l. 30. for *ſhould*, r. *ſhall*.
P. 32. l. 32. for *paid*, r. *raiſed*; and l. 34. for *raiſed*, r. *paid*.
P. 33. l. 31. dele *ſaid to be*.
P. 34. l. 13. There ſhou'd be a full Stop after *Troops*.
And for *all*, r. *All*.
P. 38. l. 8. for *tell*, r. *tells*.
P. 39. l. 14. for *hurts*, r. *hurt*.
P. 40. l. 15. for *conſiſts*, r. *conſiſt*.
P. 42. l. 34. dele one of the *ours*.
P. 43. l. 4. dele *of*.
P. 48. l. 1. for *were*, r. *where*.
P. 72. l. 8. after *unknown*, add, *See* N° VII.
P. 73. l. 24. for *it*, r. *them*.

[Nugent, Robert earl]

CONSIDERATIONS

UPON A

REDUCTION

OF THE

LAND-TAX.

LONDON:

Printed for R. GRIFFITHS, at the *Dunciad*, in St. *Paul*'s *Church-Yard*.

MDCCXLIX.

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S I R,

THE publick Character which you bear, hath marked you out to the author of the following Diſcourſe, as the moſt proper perſon to whom it can be addreſſed. He neither means to *flatter* nor *abuſe* you. *Things*, not *Men*, have long been his *object:* And his *circumſtances* are ſuch, as render the *publick welfare* of greater importance to him, than the *ſmiles* or *frowns* of any party.

For the *Publick*, therefore, he makes this his firſt *eſſay*, as an *author*. His *inaccuracies* will, upon this account, be *forgiven*. He claims no *forgiveneſs*, and pleads no *excuſe*, for the want of *ornaments* in *ſtile* and *diction*. Truth is better without them; and he means not to burniſh *falſhood* with the *tinſel* of *modern oratory*.

It hath been, *Sir*, your *misfortune* to preſide at the head of the T------y, when greater ſums have been raiſed upon the *Publick*, and a greater *debt* accumulated, than ever were *before*, in the *ſame number of years*. Through your hands thoſe ſums muſt alſo paſs, while

you remain in your preſent *ſtation*, which muſt ſtill be levied on the *P---le*. And ſhould *theſe* be *miſapplied*, whatever *indulgence* may have been ſhewn to your *former conduct*; and however ſtrong the *plea* of *neceſſity* may have appeared, for carrying on a war to its *final period*, which you diſapproved in its commencement; no ſuch *pretence* will be admitted in this *new* ſcene of affairs: The *guilt* of *malverſation* will be *yours*: The *guilt* of being a *principal* in every ſuch *tranſaction*, or the *guilt* and *diſgrace* of being a *ſubordinate accomplice*, in a *ſtation* where you ſtand forth as the *capital agent*.

Pretences may ever be found to palliate *unneceſſary expences*; and *majorities* have been found to vote for *them*: But *Hobbes* hath, long ſince, obſerved, that *the powers of numbers muſt fail to prove the particulars of an account right, where the ſum total is wrong*. And it was wrong, beyond the force of *human wit* to juſtify, that, during a *long peace*, the debts contracted in a *preceding war*, ſhould, at the *foot* of the *account*, remain *almoſt unleſſened*.

One of the *cauſes* of that *unhappy management* is the *chief ſubject* of this *eſſay*. But altho' the *reaſoning* be, in ſome meaſure, confined to *this cauſe*, yet it *virtually* reaches to *all the others*. For if it be proved expedient to continue a *neceſſary tax*, for the *payment*

ment of our debt, or the *diſcharge of more burdenſome taxes*, the inference is ſtrong, therefore *unneceſſary expences ought to ceaſe*. And if the *miniſter* greatly ſinned, who formerly departed from this *maxim*, how muſt the like offence be heightened in *you*, when a *greater debt*, and a more *precarious peace*, may render it *fatal to your Country?*

Conſider, Sir, one whole year is elapſed ſince the *Definitive Treaty* of *Aix la Chapelle*; and yet, far from making the leaſt advance towards leſſening the burdens laid upon us, we have added ſtill more; we have increaſed the *principal* of our *debt*; we have farther engaged the *Sinking Fund*; we have *anticipated* the *clear reſidue* greatly beyond its *annual produce*; and the *ſupplies*, in the *firſt year of peace*, amount to 8,082,409 *l.* 1 *s.* 7 *d.* halfpenny; a larger ſum than ever was raiſed in *any year* of *any war*, except that war, in which you was m------r.

Look the *Items* over which compoſe this account, and ſay, whether ſome do not evidently fall under the deſcription of *unneceſſary expence!* no matter to what amount. A ſhilling, idly ſpent by a beggar, is profuſion; and the ſmalleſt exceeding, in circumſtances which demonſtrate ruin, if *millions* be not *ſaved*, is *profuſion* and *madneſs*.

Look over that *account* once more! Peruſe the ſervices for the year 1749, ſeparated

from every other head of ſupplies: Deduct whatever is not likely to remain in all *future eſtimates*, upon the reaſoning which prevailed *laſt year:* Turn your eye upon the means of anſwering theſe demands, and, inſtead of deviſing more ſpecious arguments in ſupport of the ſame cauſe, find out, if you can, one ſolid reaſon to ground a hope of greatly leſſening our debt, with ſuch *means*, and ſuch a *plan of permanent expence.*

I ſay, greatly leſſening our debt, becauſe it hath been greatly increaſed. And no man living knows better than you, how far, and how fatally, that increaſe had like to have operated, and how it ſtill may operate.

But if the taſk here propoſed be a hard one, and it will prove ſuch in the Trial, with all the *means* of the Publick *undiminiſhed* to aſſiſt you; what muſt it be, in a ſuppoſition that near an annual *million* is to be abridged, by an *abatement of the land-tax?* Indeed, Sir, the part you have to act is already ſufficiently difficult, and prudence is better demonſtrated by foreſeeing and preventing *impoſſibilities*, than by fruitleſs endeavours to overcome them.

I am aware, that the intereſt of *four per cent.* is propoſed to be reduced; but I am, at the ſame time, as well appriſed of what will be loſt by the *meaſure* intended to accompany

company it. And it requires no great knowledge to be convinced, that the natural tendency of this *meaſure* is againſt the *expedient*.

When this nation had, for ſome years, gathered the fruits of *peace* concluded at *Utrecht*; and altho' *that peace* wanted many of thoſe advantages *we* had a right to expect, yet it wore every appearance of *ſecurity and duration*; the ſtrength of *France* broken by land, *annihilated by ſea*, and her *name* ſcarcely ranked among the *commercial powers of Europe*; the intereſt upon funds was reduced, in the years 1717 and 1720, to *five* and to *four per cent*.

At both theſe *periods*, great ſums were provided to pay off ſuch creditors as ſhould refuſe to accept a lower intereſt; and that ſcarce any ſuch appeared in the year 1717, is far from being a proof that the precaution was not neceſſary.

What meaſures are now taken, to fruſtrate intrigue and combination, are beſt known to you. But whether you tread in the old path, or depart from it, ſurely a reduction of the *publick means* will be an odd prelude to whatever is to follow; and ſtill more odd, if ſome circumſtances leſs favourable, exiſting now, rather call for an increaſe of *means* to overcome increaſed difficulties.

Theſe *means* are not to be found in the *will* of the moſt *potent*, nor in the wiſhes of the moſt *honeſt adminiſtration*. The neceſ-

ſity

ſity which requires the *event*, will be far from bringing it *forward*. It is the production of *plenty*, not of *want*. Prudence may watch and take advantage of a proper ſeaſon, and a ſufficient growth; but the ſoil muſt be ſpontaneous, and the leaſt *degree of compulſion* would be utterly *deſtructive*.

But I will ſuppoſe all obſtacles ſurmounted, and the ſcheme infallibly to ſucceed in its *utmoſt latitude*; yet the effect cannot be immediate; ſome time muſt be given to the *creditors* of the *Publick*. I repeat it once more; one year is elapſed ſince peace was concluded at *Aix la Chapelle*; another muſt paſs away, without bringing any Relief. We owe 32,318,220 *l.* more than we did at the commencement of the laſt war. Conſult the Definitive Treaty! compare it with any that hath been made for many ages; compare the circumſtances of theſe times with any other period! Is it poſſible that ſuch a peace can endure, until by ſuch methods the *additional debt* is diſcharged? And is it not as plain as Experience can make it, that a *new war*, with this *new debt* upon *us*, muſt effect our *deſtruction?*

It is true, ſuch threats, and ſuch prophecies had been often uſed before. They have been uſed by greater *authorities*, and with greater ſtrength of expreſſion; and yet this *country* is not totally undone.

But

But facts are not leſs certain becauſe *men* have exaggerated. I will contract what I have to ſay, into a narrow compaſs.

Was not *trade* prejudiced by *taxes* before the *war?* Did not our *rivals* gain advantages over us from this *cauſe?* Was not *France* become a great *mercantile power?* Was not our *debt* ſuch at the *commencement* of the *war*, as rendered the load unmanageable during its *progreſs?* Did not national *credit* ſink, and *intereſt of money* riſe? Did not *payment* upon *ſubſcriptions* fail? And hath not *peace* been concluded, merely becauſe we could not carry on *war?*

If our *taxes* were grievous, they are now multiplied: If our *debt* was heavy, it is now increaſed: If the *Sinking Fund* was caſually *applied* to the current ſervice of the year, it is now deeply *mortgaged:* And if *France* ſuffered in her trade during the *war*, ſhe is now at liberty to repair thoſe loſſes. *She* hath the ſame *ſkill*, the ſame *induſtry* and *parſimony*, the ſame *good policy*, the ſame *poſſeſſions:* She hath *numbers*, ſhe hath *wealth*; and a more extenſive influence is derived to her, from the peace ſhe gives *us*, than from that ſhe formerly received at our hands. She hath *experience* where ſhe hath been *unſucceſsful*, to improve the advantages of her *ſucceſs*.

Theſe are *unaggravated facts*. *Theſe* cannot, like general *epithets*, be applied to all *times*,

times, and to all *nations*. They ſpeak our *ſpecifick ſituation*; and they would ſpeak it as ſtrongly, were the words *Bankrupt* and *Ruined* expunged out of the *Engliſh language*.

It behoves you, Sir, ſeriouſly to attend to *theſe truths*. Theſe are circumſtances which require *abilities* to *vanquiſh*, but *none* to *diſcover*. The *evidence* and *magnitude* of the *danger* may aſſiſt you in the *conflict*.

There are many *ſuch* inſtances in our *annals*: Perils, which threatened *all*, and were apparent to *all*, have frequently united *many*. And *difficulties overcome* give a ſtrength to government, which never could be derived from *ſecurity*.

But *you* may *fail* in the *experiment*. You may have, and you probably will have, obſtacles to ſtruggle with, from *various quarters*. You may fear for your *power*; you may fear for your *credit*; you may hazard *both*: The *meaſure* here recommended may be *unpopular*. But you owe the tryal to *Him* from whom you received your *power*: You owe it to *thoſe* with whom you would maintain your *credit*; and to decline the *attempt*, were to betray both *Him* and *them*.

CON-

CONSIDERATIONS

UPON A

REDUCTION

OF THE

LAND-TAX.

IN the various political controverſies, which have at different times divided and diſturbed this nation, the chief points inſiſted upon by one ſide as intolerable grievances, were ſupported by the other ſide as ſalutary means, upon which the ſafety of the people and the ſecurity of government depended.

Plauſible arguments were ſometimes urged by both, ſuch as were ſufficient to give the ſemblance of truth to opinions diametrically oppoſite; and much more than ſufficient to convince *thoſe*, whoſe intereſt or prejudices had already prepared them for conviction.

In this predicament almoſt the whole nation was involved, towards the cloſe of the late *Lord Orford*'s long adminiſtration. For however

great the numbers might have been, who began by differing, through a real difference of ſentiments; or who, thinking the conteſt *perſonal*, and of ſmall importance to the *Publick*, either took no part at all, or thought themſelves at liberty in their choice to purſue private views and particular conſiderations; or, laſtly, if there were ſuch, who on the one ſide ſet out reſolved to ſacrifice every thing to the preſervation of power and its emoluments; and on the other ſide who were not leſs reſolute, at the ſame expence, to inveſt themſelves with their ſpoils: I ſay, however great the number of *theſe* might at firſt have been, with different motives, different habits, and different complexions, few remained long in their *original ſituation*, but were almoſt *all* drawn in to the common vortex of *party hatred* and *party affections*. Opinion in *politicks* became *political enthuſiaſm*; and although providence ſaved us from ſome of the fatal effects, which the ſame kind of rage often produces in *religious controverſies*; yet few were ſaved from the guilt of wiſhing the moſt bloody of thoſe effects upon the proſcribed heads of them, with whom they differed.

If there were *ſome honeſt* enough to wiſh themſelves out of *party*, there were hardly *any brave* enough to make the trial. To *depart*, were to *deſert*; and no ſpecies of *deſertion* was ever eſteemed more criminal and more infamous: blind adherence was ſtiled conſiſtency, *paſſive obedience* to the will of *chiefs*, was the firſt eſſential ſtep towards *general liberty*; and he was fitteſt to repreſent and to act for others, who never dared to think or act for himſelf.

The

The moſt *zealous* were the moſt *honeſt*, and the moſt *honeſt* in this ſenſe, were, in not a few inſtances, deſtitute of every other merit. But party, like ancient *Rome*, received *all* who came; and in *party*, as in ancient *Rome*, the *baſe* and the *profligate* became *law-givers* and *patriots*; *patriotiſm*, like *charity*, *covered the multitude of ſins*. It did more; it clothed ſome offences in the robes of innocence, and thoſe, which it could not ſhroud, were loſt in its blaze, or purified in its holy fires.

When in this inflamed diſpoſition of the minds of men, the moſt *deſigning* and *ſelf-intereſted* became, in reality, what, perhaps, at firſt they only appeared to be, thoroughly in earneſt; and therefore deemed by their friends, and even by themſelves, thoroughly honeſt. No wonder if propoſitions always controverted, and in their nature always controvertible, ſhould be eſteemed certain and invariable maxims, as they ſerved or as they obſtructed the purpoſes of either *party*.

Hence aroſe the various and almoſt innumerable debates and pamphlets, upon *ſtanding armies*, or a *militia*; *annual*, *triennial*, or *ſeptennial parliaments*; *riot*, *ſmuggling*, *place* and *penſion bills*; *commiſſions of the peace*, *votes of credit*, *right of creditors to the Sinking Fund*; with many other topicks, upon which the being of the commonwealth was equally ſtaked by *both ſides*, with the ſame warmth, and perhaps with the ſame truth: So very poſſible it is for extremes to be equally wrong, and for general propoſitions to fall into ſuch extremes.

Happy it were, had the *effects* of *theſe diſputes* been confined to matters problematical and uneſſential; but as perſons were the great object;

and as on the *one ſide* it became a maxim to *oppoſe* every thing that was offered by *the other*; ſo, on the *contrary ſide*, the *principle* was as invariably obſerved, of *rejecting every thing*, *however expedient*, that had its riſe from *ſuch opponents*.

By *theſe*, the *adminiſtration* was accounted the *heavieſt* of innumerable *grievances*, and their *removal from power* the greateſt of poſſible *bleſſings*; while the adminiſtration, in their turn, repreſented the ſucceſs of their enemies, as ſurely productive in the future, of all thoſe calamities, which then had being only in their unjuſt Repreſentations.

The defeat of *each* was thus eſteemed by *each*, and the doctrine became univerſal, as a *good* not to be compenſated by any *other advantage*, nor too dearly purchaſed by any *national evil*.

Every *right thing* done, was done as means ſubordinate to this *purpoſe:* Every *evil* neceſſary for this *purpoſe* was held as *ſanctified* by its end; and the *good* or *evil* indifferent to this *purpoſe*, was little attended to by *either ſide*.

Upon ſuch *principles of righteouſneſs*, things confeſſedly *right* in themſelves, were oppoſed and rejected; oppoſed and rejected the rather becauſe they were *right*; as an admiſſion of them might reflect credit and ſtrength upon *that ſide* from whence they proceeded. Upon theſe principles alſo, *things evidently wrong* were ſometimes acquieſced in by *all*; and the nation was doomed to ſuffer by *oppoſition*, *inattention*, and *agreement*.

So far *both parties* concurred in *principles*, and theſe were almoſt the only principles in which they did concur; while in the proſecution of them,

them, as has been before obſerved, implicit belief was held as a religious duty; an obſervance of which was not more rigorouſly exacted by the *ſovereign pontiff* of the *adminiſtration*, from thoſe of his *communion*, than by the numerous train of *preachers*, who diſſented from him, among their devoted *followers*.

I have mentioned, as one ſubject of controverſy, a right, which the *creditors* of the *publick* were ſuppoſed to have, to an *invariable appropriation of the Sinking Fund*. But however that queſtion ſtood; and whether, if they had the right, it were, or were not for their advantage, that ſuch *application* ſhould be invariably obſerved; and laſtly, whether the *ſervices* for which the *annual ſupplies* had been granted, were, or were not *neceſſary* (and theſe were the great points chiefly debated upon that *ſubject*) yet, certain it is, in *either of theſe ſuppoſitions*, that *reductions* of the *land-tax*, from *four ſhillings in the pound*, to *three*, to *two*, and to *one*, were *prejudicial* to this *country*; and, that far from producing any *real eaſe* to *thoſe*, for whoſe *ſake* they *ſeemed* to be *calculated*, they have been ſince attended with an *immoderate expence*, entailed upon *them* and their *poſterity*.

And yet in this *meaſure* the *majority of both parties unanimouſly concurred*. The *multitude* concurred, becauſe of the *fair appearance*, which it bore of *favour* and *relief* to the *landed intereſt*; and the *leaders* of the *multitude*, becauſe they would not ſtake their *own credit*, and give advantages to their *enemies*, by ſtemming the torrent of *popular prejudice*. For, as the *people* have a *right* to be *undone* in their *own way*, they ſometimes inſiſt upon that *right*; and their *leaders* the

the more willingly comply, becauſe ſuch *compliance* enables them after, with *greater certainty*, to compleat the *deſtruction in their way*.

Beſide, in this inſtance, the *ends* of *oppoſition* were better ſerved by the *conſequences*, than by a *prevention*, of the *evil*; ſince *many* who wiſhed the *cauſe*, would be ſure to object to the *effects*; while on the *other hand*, when the *ſervices of the year were higher than the general opinion deemed neceſſary*, the *miniſter* thought an *application* of the *Sinking Fund* in aid of the *land-tax*, a cheap purchaſe for ſome relaxation of the *clamour* raiſed againſt him. Thus, an *increaſed expence*, and the application of one fund to purpoſes different from its *firſt inſtitution*, became motives for leſſening the only reſource remaining with the Publick, when every argument became ſtronger, from theſe very cauſes, for continuing it as it was.

But the intereſt of the nation was not the preſent concern; how to eſcape the imputation of an abuſe was the miniſter's only conſideration; and a real abuſe was found the beſt expedient.

Thus the national debt ſeemed to be forgot by both parties; and while they contended about the creditor's right to the Sinking Fund, they over-looked or betrayed the people's right to ſome alleviation of that burden, and of the moſt grievous of thoſe taxes, rendered neceſſary by it. As if the *manner*, and not the *thing*, were of importance.

In this inſtance we have a full view of the policy of *that oppoſition*; and of the means employed to defeat it, by *power* ſupported upon *temporary expedients*.

And

And the effect hath been, that during a long peace, the load contracted in a former war remain'd very near unleſſen'd: That this load, increas'd by the expences of a ſucceeding war, became almoſt too heavy for the nation to bear; and that the peace, which we now enjoy, hath no other plea for its juſtification.

But theſe effects naturally and neceſſarily flow from ſuch principles: Much more amazing it is, that ſuch recent and fatal experience doth not deter all degrees of men from treading in the ſame path, which now leads to more certain and irretrieveable deſtruction.

Many there are who ſtill inſiſt upon the creditor's claim to the Sinking Fund; and who compute the nation's loſs thro' a violation of that ſacred depoſite. But no words of a *ſtatute*, however plain and poſitive, can convey a clearer *title*, than *that* which the publick hath, from juſtice and reaſon, to be eas'd of its burdens by *means* the moſt *effectual* for that purpoſe.

And as the benefit of taxes to the *Publick* reſults only from the clear income, and the evil to individuals extends not only to the groſs produce, but to every other expence and loſs incident and conſequential; that tax is moſt beneficial to the publick, and leaſt hurtful to the ſubject, which produces a large ſum thro' a cheap collection, and which is free *from every* other eventual charge. To uſe a familiar inſtance; he who attends to his own affairs, lives upon his own land, employs but one ſteward, at a ſmall ſalary, to receive his rents, and buys at the firſt-hand, may, from a ſmall and a compact eſtate, thus conducted, ſpend and ſave more than the *lord* of an immenſe *rental*, widely diſperſed,

perſed, gather'd by many hands profuſely paid; he living at a diſtance, and purchaſing what he conſumes, from the fourth or fifth retailer. Let thoſe therefore, who are loudeſt for reducing the land-tax, firſt point out among the duties that now ſubſiſt, or which poſſibly can be deviſed, any *one* more conformable to this inſtance. And if this can not be done, as it certainly cannot; let them add to the calculation of what hath been loſt by miſapplying the Sinking-fund, thoſe annual ſums, of which the Publick hath been defrauded, by the clamours and influence of the *landed-intereſt*.

Let the *authors* of *both meaſures* ſhare the blame, with this diſtinction, that while neceſſity, ſupported by, at leaſt, plauſible arguments, was urged in favour of the *one*, no ſuch appearance could be found to countenance the *other*. Even ſelf-intereſt was wanting to account for this ſacrifice of the *whole* by the *landed gentry*.

And let thoſe, who now perſiſt in extorting the ſame compliance, from poſſibly a more *weak*, certainly a more *yielding miniſtry*, contemplate well the evils which may enſue; as far beyond their abilities *now* to eſtimate, as they may *hereafter* be to prevent or redreſs them.

In order therefore to aſſiſt in theſe conſiderations, it becomes neceſſary farther to expatiate upon this important ſubject. And as the good of our country ſhould be the only object of ſuch diſquiſitions, and truth the only medium thro' which it ought to be attain'd, advantage ſhall not be taken of a *maxim* favourable to the opinion here profeſs'd, altho' it hath been long receiv'd, and is ſupported by the *greateſt authorities*.

The

The maxim intended is, that *taxes, wherever laid, fall ultimately upon land*; which, with all due deference to thoſe who firſt eſtabliſh'd it, and to thoſe who have ſince adopted and argued from it, ſeems to go farther, than reaſon and experience will warrant.

The arguments, by which it hath been maintain'd, ſeem rather calculated to puzzle than to convince; for altho' every man cannot anſwer the premiſes, yet ſcarce any will aſſent to the concluſion, *that in fact and in reality, all the taxes in this nation are paid out of its lands.* And ſtrange it were, if *many* did agree in the *propoſition*; for it is certainly *falſe*.

When a tax is laid upon any *commodity*, it becomes a *circumſtance* of expence, of the ſame nature with any other attending upon it. Therefore no reaſon can be aſſign'd, why the tax ſhould neceſſarily fall upon land, that will not equally conclude for every other ſuch circumſtance, and for ſettling the whole charge of national expence and conſumption upon the ſame bottom.

But this is impoſſible: for it is agreed by the beſt authors of political arithmetick, that the rents of lands, houſes, and mines, are not more than a fourth part and a half of the annual expences of the nation.

In Sir *William Petty*'s computation of *ſeven millions* of people in *England*, who, one with another, expended for their lodging, feeding, and clothing, ſeven pounds a head, the annual expence and conſumption of the whole people, amounted to forty-nine millions; and Doctor *Davenant*'s calculation of rents, does not exceed fourteen.

The quantities are ſince, no doubt, conſiderably increas'd; but as moſt probably, the proportions remain very little unalter'd, it is fair to argue upon them, as has been done by the beſt writers upon theſe ſubjects. But Mr. *Locke* having treated of a tax upon land, a few extracts may not be improper from that *incomparable author*, which, with ſome reſtrictions, ſhall after be apply'd to the preſent purpoſe.

" A tax laid upon land ſeems hard to the " land-holder, becauſe it is ſo much money go- " ing viſibly out of his pocket: and therefore, " as an eaſe to himſelf, the land-holder is always " forward to lay it upon commodities. But if " he will thoroughly conſider it, and examine " the effects, he will find, he buys this ſeeming " eaſe at a very dear rate; and though he pays " not this tax immediately out of his own purſe, " yet his purſe will find it by a greater want of " money there at the end of the year, than that " comes to, with the leſſening of his rents to " boot; which is a ſettled and laſting evil, that " will ſtick upon him beyond the preſent pay- " ment.

" To make this clear, let us ſuppoſe in the " preſent ſtate of affairs in *England*, that the " rents of *England* are twelve millions, and that " the charge and neceſſities of the government " require a ſupply of three millions from the " parliament; which is laid on land.

" Here is one fourth part of his yearly in- " come goes immediately out of the landlord " and land-holder's pocket. This is a burden " very apt to be felt. The country gentleman, " who actually pays the money out of his " pocket, or finds it deducted out of his rent " at

" at quarter-day for taxes, fees and very ſenſibly
" obſerves what goes thus out of his eſtate: but
" though this be a quarter of his yearly income,
" and out of an eſtate of four hundred pounds
" a year, the publick tax now openly takes away
" one hundred; yet this influences not at all
" the yearly rent of the land, which the rack-
" renter, or under-tenant pays; it being the
" ſame thing to him, whether he pays all his
" rent to the king, or his landlord; or half, or
" a quarter, or none at all to the king: the
" caſe is all one to him, what hand receives his
" rent, when due: ſo trade flouriſhes, and his
" commodities go off well, he will be able to
" pay his rent on. This leſſens not any more
" the value of his farm, than an high or low
" chief-rent does, paid out of it to the lord of
" the fee: the tenant's bargain and profit is
" the ſame, whether the land be charged, or
" not charged, with an annuity payable to an-
" other man.

" But ſuppoſe, to ſhift off the burden from
" the land, ſome country gentlemen ſhould
" think fit to raiſe theſe three millions upon
" commodities, to let the land go free. Firſt,
" it is to be conſider'd, that ſince the publick
" wants require three millions (for that we ſup-
" poſed for argument ſake; let it be three mil-
" lions, or one million, that's all one) and ſo
" much muſt go into the king's coffers, or elſe
" the neceſſities of the government will not be
" ſupplied, that for raiſing theſe three milli-
" ons on commodities, and bringing ſo much
" into the exchequer, there muſt go a great
" deal more than three millions out of the ſub-
" jects pockets. For a tax of that nature can-

" not be levied by officers, to watch every little
" rivulet of trade, without a great charge, e-
" ſpecially at firſt trial. But ſuppoſing no more
" charge in raiſing it, than of a land-tax, and
" that there are only three millions to be paid,
" 'tis evident, that to do this out of commodi-
" ties, they muſt to the conſumer be raiſed a
" quarter in their price; ſo that every thing,
" to him that uſes it, muſt be a quarter dearer.
" Let us ſee now, who at long run muſt pay
" this quarter, and where it will light. 'Tis
" plain, the merchant and broker neither will
" nor can; for if he pays a quarter more for
" commodities than he did, he will ſell them at
" a price proportionably raiſed. The poor la-
" bourer and handicraftſman cannot: for he
" juſt lives from hand to mouth already; and
" all his food, clothing, and utenſils, coſting a
" a quarter more than they did before, either
" his wages muſt riſe with the price of things,
" to make him live, or elſe, not being able to
" maintain himſelf and family by his labour, he
" comes to the pariſh; and then the land bears
" the burden a heavier way. If the labourer's
" wages be rais'd in proportion to the increas'd
" rates of things, the farmer, who pays a quar-
" ter more for wages, as well as all other things,
" whilſt he ſells his corn and wool, either at the
" ſame rate, or lower, at the market (ſince the tax
" laid upon it makes people leſs forward to buy)
" muſt either have his rent abated, or elſe break
" and run away in his landlord's debt: and ſo
" the yearly value of the land is brought down.
" And who then pays the tax at the year's end,
" but the landlord; when the tenant, not able
" to raiſe his rent by his commodities, either

runs

" runs away in his landlord's debt, or cannot be " continued in the farm without abatement of " rent ? For when the yearly charge in his farm " is greater by the increaſe of the labourer's wa- " ges, and yet his product ſells cheaper, by rea- " ſon of the tax laid on his commodities ; how " will the farmer be able to make up his rent at " quarter-day ? For this may be worth our " notice, that any tax laid on foreign commo- " dities in *England*, raiſes their price, and makes " the importer get more for his commodity ; " but, on the contrary, a tax laid on your na- " tive product, and home-made commodities, " leſſens their price, and makes them yield leſs " to the firſt ſeller.

" If therefore the laying of taxes upon com- " modities does, as it is evident, affect the land " that is out at rack-rent, it is plain it does e- " qually affect all the other land in *England* " too ; and the gentlemen will, but the worſt " way, increaſe their own charges, that is, by " leſſening the yearly value of their eſtates, if " they hope to eaſe their land by charging com- " modities. It is in vain, in a country whoſe " great fund is land, to hope to lay the pub- " lick charge of the government on any thing " elſe : there at laſt it will terminate. The " merchant (do what you can) will not bear it ; " the labourer cannot ; and therefore the land- " holder muſt : and whether he were beſt do it, " by laying it directly where it will at laſt ſettle, " or by letting it come to him by the ſinking " of his rents, which, when they are once fall- " en, every one knows are not eaſily raiſed " again, let him conſider."

Some

Some paſſages, in the foregoing abſtract, ſeem to be too *general*, and, poſſibly, not quite *conſiſtent* one with the *other*.

For it is not eaſy to conceive, if *taxes laid upon commodities raiſe the price proportionably to the conſumer*, why *the farmer muſt ſell his corn and wool either at the ſame rate, or lower, at the market* ; or, if the reaſon aſſigned be a good one, that *the tax laid upon it, makes people leſs forward to buy*, why that reaſon ſhould not have the ſame operation upon other commodities, not ſo indiſpenſably neceſſary for the uſe of man ; and why *a tax laid upon our native product and home manufacture*, may not *make them yield leſs* to *others*, beſide the *firſt ſeller*.

And it certainly often hath this effect. For as the demand for commodities is proportioned to the quantity of money ſubſiſting in the market, traders muſt adapt their prices to that quantity ; and if additional taxes be laid, while the money, with which commodities are to be purchaſed, remains unincreaſed, they muſt be contented with ſmaller gains, or not trade at all. And the firſt part of the alternative will always be the caſe, where the profits of a flouriſhing trade may well ſupport ſome diminution.

If trade be extended, and profits be multiplied, additional taxes may ſtill be borne by the trader. And from hence it is, that our trade hath hitherto ſupported increaſing weights, and furniſhed ſums for publick ſervice, which belye the calculations and predictions of the ableſt men in the laſt century. Therefore, that *the merchant* and *broker neither will nor can bear a tax* ; that *if he pays a quarter more for commodities than he did, he will ſell them at a price proportionably*

tionably raiſed, are propoſitions which ſeem too general: and Mr. *Locke*, in a ſubſequent paſſage, appears ſenſible that they required ſome qualification; where, after an aſſertion, that, *lay your tax as you pleaſe, the traders will ſhift it off from their own gain*, he ſubjoins theſe words, *the merchants will bear the leaſt part of it, and grow poor laſt*. And a little farther (would to God the paſſage were writ in letters of gold, upon the walls of every country-houſe in *England!*) *a country may thrive, the country gentleman grow rich, and his rents increaſe (for ſo it has been here) whilſt the land is taxed: but I challenge any one to ſhew me a country, wherein there is any conſiderable public charge raiſed, where the land does not moſt ſenſibly feel it, and, in proportion, bear much the greater part of it.*

Therefore, altho' it be admitted, that Mr. *Locke*'s firſt poſition, taken in its full *extent*, and without any *limitation*, is greatly controvertible, yet it is concluſive as to our preſent ſituation; if it be confeſſed, that the lands of *England* are, in *general*, let at *too high a rent*, and that our *trade* is injured by the *taxes already laid upon it*. For then the inference will be plain; *what* the *farmer* and *trader* cannot pay out of *their gains*, the *land-owner* muſt pay out of *his lands*; or the *farmer* will *fail*, and the *trader* become *bankrupt*.

In this *circumſtance*, better it were, that the tax had been laid immediately upon land; and by conſequence, in this *circumſtance*, and in this *ſuppoſition*, it is abſurd to leſſen that *tax*, and let others lie unleſſened, grievous upon commodities.

For

For the truth of the aſſertion, that lands are let at too high a rent, the land-owners themſelves may be ſafely appealed to; they having already determined the fact, by univerſal complaints of arrears of rents, and of numbers of farms thrown upon their hands. Theſe complaints, which are but too well founded, are urged as arguments for an abatement of the land-tax. But they are, in fact, the ſtrongeſt arguments againſt it. They demonſtrably prove the prevalency of other cauſes, from whence the tenant's inability muſt proceed; for Mr. *Locke*'s obſervation cannot be denied, that a *land-tax does not, in the leaſt degree, influence the yearly rents of lands*, nor *leſſen to the tenant the value of his farm.*

The removal of theſe cauſes is therefore the proper expedient for remedying the evil. And if it ſhould be found to ariſe from a number of taxes to which commodities are ſubject (and this we will ſuppoſe, until a better ſolution is given) the policy is ſtupendous, which would continue theſe taxes unleſſened, and abate the *only tax*, which in no *degree influences that evil.* Nor ſhould it leſſen our wonder, that this proceeds from the deſire of thoſe, who would, in reality, be great and immediate ſufferers by it.

Some are fond of imputing the whole miſchief to the charge of luxury, lately crept in among the lower rank of people. But this, upon examination into the true ſtate of things, will be found a very inadequate cauſe; nor does it at all prevail, where the evil is moſt complained of, in the moſt diſtant and leaſt peopled counties.

This

This Circumſtance helps to a farther confirmation of the real ſource. For altho' luxury be ſlow and late in its progreſs to remote and unpeopled parts, nay they often are enriched by the luxury of others, and gain that trade which is loſt by the luxurious; yet there the effects of the cauſe firſt aſſigned are ever ſooneſt and moſt ſenſibly felt, and cold and languor in the extremities are the early ſymptoms of the diſeaſe.

In either ſuppoſition, one thing is certain, that no good can be produced by taxes upon commodities. They may ſtarve the induſtrious, but they never will induce the idle and extravagant to labour, and to ſave for the benefit of his landlord; and the wiſdom of ſuch landlords, who under this, or any like pretence, would lighten their own burdens, by laying inſupportable weights upon their tenants, is of a piece with that oeconomy, which, to ſwell a large *rental* beyond its natural *ſize*, loſes, by a *riſe* of *rents*, much more in *money* than is gained upon *paper*. And ſure it does not require much logick to demonſtrate, that where the tenant is undone, the landlord muſt proportionably ſuffer.

In order to prove the evils ariſing to our trade from the heavy taxes with which it is incumbered, it were, perhaps, not juſt to conſult the opinions of actual merchants, who, upon this ſubject, are prejudiced judges.

But the teſtimony of thoſe, who have long withdrawn themſelves out of trade, hath ever been deemed the beſt authority; and, as ſuch, the late Sir *Matthew Decker*'s cannot be refuſed.

He tells us, in favour of *his ſcheme*, that " It " would ſet the merchant and ſhop-keeper free " from a multitude of falſe and vexatious, or " frivolous informations, which may now be " lodged againſt them : That the charge upon " the revenue is now computed at above one " million : That, as the duty upon merchan- " dize imported from abroad, as well as upon " our own exciſeable goods, amounts, in an a- " verage to about 50 *per cent.*" (and ſince he wrote, it hath been greatly increaſed by an im- menſe additional duty on imports) " it would " enable the merchant, as well as the ſhop and " warehouſe-keeper, to trade with half the ſtock, " and make his profit the ſame, or *rather in- " creaſe it*, in proportion to the leſſer ſum for " which he can purchaſe the ſame commodity. " This would create a greater plenty of money, " and, of conſequence, greatly help to reduce " the national intereſt.

" It would alſo encourage the great mer- " chants, when they buy any goods upon ſpecu- " lation, as they call it, to keep the ſaid goods at " home, and employ their own warehouſes ; " whereas, as the caſe now ſtands, they are, in " prudence, obliged to ſhip off ſuch goods, as " are entitled to a draw-back of 30, 40, and " even more *per cent.* for *Holland*, or other " places ; whereby *Dutch* ſhips are not only be- " nefited, but we pay commiſſion, warehouſe- " room, and other incidental charges, which " our own people might put in their own poc- " kets, and have the goods in their own poſſeſ- " ſion."

Mr. *Wood*, beſides much excellent reaſoning upon the ſame principle, refers us, for farther proof,

proof, to the cuſtoms, which, " ſince the addi-
" tional duties and impoſitions on ſo many ſpe-
" cies of goods, have not actually produced ſo
" much as before."

It is *computed* by the *Britiſh Merchant*, that out of 49,000,000 *l.* expended and conſumed by our *people* at home, not more than 4,000,000 *l.* are of foreign commodities.

There remain therefore 45,000,000 *l.* for an annual expence and conſumption in home *product* and *manufactures*. Of theſe the *land-owner* can expend and conſume no more than his rents, and they are computed at no more than 14,000,000 *l.* therefore above *two parts in three*, of home product and manufactures, are expended and conſumed by *all other denominations* of our people.

Whatever is expended and conſumed at home, or exported into other countries, whether of home or foreign commodities, is the fruit of our *lands*, of the *labourer* and *artificer*; or is purchaſed by theſe fruits.

In 1713 the *Britiſh Merchant* computed our imports at 5,000,000 *l.* and our exports at 7,000,000 *l.* Of theſe, one million he ſuppoſes to be of foreign commodities. Therefore, even at that time, our home conſumption and foreign exportation amounted to 56,000,000 *l.*

But whatever is produced by *land*, by the *labourer* and *artificer*, is paid for by *thoſe*, who *rent* lands, and *employ labourers* and *artificers*. Therefore the *farmer* and *trader* contribute three parts in four, more than the *land-owner* can, to the employment of our *people*, and to the wealth and expences of the nation.

Landed men are, by *themſelves*, of advantage to the *Publick*, only in what they *ſpend:* Traders are of advantage, by what they *ſpend* and by *what* they *gain*; and the gains by *trade*, exceed the expences of the *trader*. A riſe of rents can only be through an increaſe of employment; ſince lands can only riſe by an increaſe of product and of manufacture; and theſe are the fruits of labour and art. But land-owners, as *ſuch*, can give no increaſe to employment, without a previous increaſe of rents.

Therefore they muſt be indebted for all ſuch augmentations, to trade, *and to an* increaſe of trade. If Doctor *Davenant* ſpeaks truth, the whole rental of *England* in 1600, did not exceed ſix millions, and the price of lands was twelve years purchaſe. In 1688, the rental was fourteen millions, and the price of lands was 18 years purchaſe: So that within this period the landed intereſt roſe, from ſeventy-two, to two hundred and fifty-two millions. And in ſo much at that time, it ſtood indebted to an increaſe of trade. From the ſame cauſe, circulating by induſtry through innumerable different channels, life, and ſtrength, and ſpirit were proportionably derived to the whole: Neceſſaries to the poor, eaſe and comforts to the middle rank, affluence and magnificence to the wealthy and the great.

And ſince that auſpicious Æra, this cauſe, and theſe effects, have been wonderfully improved. Would to God! with *theſe* bleſſings, that luxury and corruption had not mingled their polluted and deadly waters.

They who pay for the employment, expence, and conſumption of others, pay in like degree

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all taxes laid upon theſe articles. Therefore the *farmer* and *trader* pay three parts in four more than the *land-owner*, to the ſupport of *government*; and *mankind* is indebted to them, in the ſame *proportion*, for all *natural* and *civil enjoyments*.

To them and to their proſperity it is owing, that, ſince the *Revolution*, this nation hath been enabled to bear thoſe drains of treaſure, which muſt long ſince have exhauſted her vitals, had ſhe no ſupply to truſt to, but the *landlord's* waſting rents, and the tenant's diminiſhed gains; with ſome ſmall and ſhallow rivulets of foreign trade ſtealing in upon her.

But ſince that happy *deliverance*, a large and prolific flood of commerce hath produced ſums ſufficient to maintain armies and fleets, in defence of our *liberties*, and of that *eſtabliſhment* upon which they are founded; while the tenant hath been enabled, under an increaſing *load* of *taxes*, and of *rents raiſed upon him*, to reclaim, cultivate, and improve the lands of this *nation*.

But a continuation of expences in *peace*, which ought to have ceaſed with *war*, whether from habit, or from leſs *avowable motives*, ſquandered the proviſion, which ſhould have been laid up for the day of danger and *trial*. That day came, and found the nation incumbered, after twenty-ſeven years of peace, with very near the ſame load, that was heaped upon her by two ſucceſſive wars. And the ſame *bad policy*, which lengthened out the expence beyond the occaſion, rendered the burden more heavy, by the *manner of collecting it*.

No wonder, if in theſe circumſtances, trade bleeding at every vein, had not ſtrength, although her growth was miraculous. to ſupport heavier

heavier loads, than ever were before laid upon the ſhoulders of this nation; and that ſome branches of commerce ſhould droop and decay under the baleful influence of taxes; while our *neighbours*, and *rivals*, planted their intereſts where ours once flouriſhed, and gathered the fruits of *better* management.

From the *ſame cauſe*, the tenant can no longer ſupply an advance of taxes out of his declining ſtock; and inſtead of that *good claſs of men*, the peculiar boaſt, and the ancient ſtrength and glory of this country, the *wealthy*, *honeſt*, and *ſturdy yeoman*, a race ſucceeds, of *puny*, *abject wretches*, tamed by *want* into *ſervitude*.

Other countries have had, and poſſibly ſtill have, a *gentry* and *nobility* equal to ours; and out of this ſtock, *warriors*, *ſtateſmen*, and *patriots*, have at different times ſprung up, almoſt in every ſoil: But in this country alone, for many ages, that *middle* maſs of men, *higher than the peaſant*, and *lower than the gentleman*, hath ſubſiſted *independent*; who, like an *iſthmus*, hath divided and withſtood the fury of popular inſurrections, and the arrogant incroachments of greatneſs; ſaving alike this *bounded monarchy* from *confuſion and tyranny*. Pity it is, that ſuch a bulwark ſhould now be undermined, and moulder into ruin.

With the *yeomen*, the *middle gentry*, of ſmall *landed eſtates*, ſeem haſtening to *annihilation*. The few remaining (for they every day decreaſe) are poſſibly the moſt miſerable *beings* amongſt us; with nothing left undiminiſhed that belonged to their fathers, but *pride* and *appetites beyond their fortunes*. And thoſe *taxes*, which have near devoured their little ſubſtance, have,

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in no inconſiderable degree, impaired the poſſeſſions of the *greateſt*.

As theſe decline (and they do and will decline with others) whatever trappings they may wear of titles and honours, their dependent and precarious ſubſiſtence muſt ariſe from a pittance of thoſe taxes, which are levied upon themſelves. *An independent country gentleman* will then be as great a *phenomenon*, as an *independent farmer* is now: And he who purchaſes a greater *dependance* of *others* upon himſelf, by an increaſe of his own *dependance* upon *power*, makes a wretched bargain. *Painful pre-eminence!* Nor is *he* more wretched who ſerves from *neceſſity*, than the *country* that is ſerved by the *neceſſitous*.

But, if inſtead of applying all poſſible methods to the prevention of *theſe evils*, we chuſe the ſureſt means of haſtening and perpetuating them upon us: if, inſtead of leſſening our debt now, in order hereafter to leſſen our taxes, or, if it be thought beſt, to leſſen now the moſt grievous of thoſe taxes, we do neither but, lower *that very tax*, by which our debt can be ſooneſt lightened, or the annihilation of other taxes be ſupplied, and which, as matters ſtand, is an advantage to *thoſe*, upon whom it is levied; what can the conſequence prove, but utter *ruin*, from a *criminal conjunction* of *power* with abſurd *prejudices?*

As I am aware that ſome objections may ariſe, which have received no anſwer in what hath been already ſaid, I ſhall here ſhortly touch upon them.

Firſt, the deficiency of the land-tax from the year 1740, may be urged as an argument upon this occaſion. But it concludes, upon the prin-

principles already explained, for the abatement of other taxes, and not of this. Lands, which grow barren from the want of manure, will be beſt improved, by opening thoſe ſluices which nouriſh and enrich them.

The inequality in laying this tax, a circumſtance much complained of by *ſome*, and juſtified by *others*, in no degree regards the preſent *ſubject*. It may be a proper matter of conteſt between the *owners of land*; and if it be a grievance upon *ſome of them*, ſufficient to deſerve redreſs, parliament ought to grant that redreſs, and alter the particular meaſures by which *they* are rated.

But however that matter may ſtand between the *individuals* of the *landed intereſt*, the propoſition remains in its full force, *that a tax upon land is advantageous to the whole body upon whom it is levied, and moſt effectual for thoſe purpoſes, which render taxes neceſſary.*

Nor is the inequality in laying this *particular tax*, attended with any of thoſe diſadvantages to the Publick, which would ariſe from the ſame cauſe in *taxes laid upon commodities*; ſince, in *this inſtance*, they, who pay more than their ſhare to the *land-tax*, are the only ſufferers; whereas other inequalities fall more diffuſively, and may finally center upon the *whole landed intereſt*.

Another objection, that through a land-tax the *moneyed men* eſcape, is totally devoid of foundation.

For, not to inſiſt upon that ſhare, which ſome of them really pay in the *form* of a land-tax, in every tax *that affects conſumption*, they are taxed like other men, proportionable

to

to *what they conſume*. And, in the ſuppoſition, that *commodities* are already taxed as high as they can bear, *theſe men* cannot be taxed at more, through this *medium*.

Were *mortgages*, or the funds, to be *taxed*, matters would not be mended. For, as taxes, wherever placed, can have no *tendency* to lower the *intereſt of money*; they, who buy into the funds, would buy ſo much cheaper as the tax would amount to, and the lender upon mortgages inſiſt upon a higher rate of intereſt.

Beſides, they, who by lending their money upon *lower terms*, than would be done if the lender were taxed, or by giving *a higher price for ſtocks*, enable *others* the better to pay taxes, contribute, in reality and effect, their ſhare, as much as thoſe who pay them. And in this ſenſe alſo, the *mortgagee* and *ſtock-holder* are equally taxed with the *owners of land*.

But if it be ſtill inſiſted upon, that the *actual poſſeſſors* of the ſoil are the only *payers* to the *land-tax*; this diſtinction will greatly reduce the importance of thoſe, who are the ſubject of our preſent conſideration; ſince a deduction muſt be made, from *that landed intereſt*, of *their intereſt* in *land*, who by *mortgages* are the legal and abſolute proprietors; and alſo of that ſhare abſorbed out of land by every tax, which mediately or immediately affects it.

Laſtly, It hath been ſaid, that in diſtant counties the quantity of circulating money is not ſufficient to ſupply the tax. As in theſe diſtant counties, for much the greater part, the land-tax is lower rated than in a nearer neighbourhood to the *metropolis*; this objection contradicts that, which hath been mentioned in the ſe-

cond place, and ſeems to juſtify the inequality of the *meaſure*, by which *the tax* is raiſed.

But, as the *alternative* is, if the land-tax be abated, other taxes muſt remain, more burdenſome to land (for ſo the queſtion is ſtated, with this farther difference, that in other taxes no allowance is made for the low rents of lands) the objection, ſpecious as it appears, hath no intrinſick weight.

The land-tax operating not upon the quantity, but upon the yearly income or value of lands, is by its nature proportioned to that income, and contains an allowance for the diſadvantages, which leſſen the rents of lands in diſtant counties. But theſe *diſadvantages* are pleaded againſt this *tax*, which *alone* conſiders them, in favour of *others*, which are the *ſame every where, without difference* or *diſtinction*.

We have ſeen how ſmall a proportion land and landed-men, bear to commodities, farmers, artificers, and traders. But ſmall as this is, it entitles them, *by our laws*, to the government and direction of the *whole*. The reaſon of this preference, no doubt is, that while land is a property, which cannot be removed into other countries, it is affected by every *other intereſt*; riſing with their *riſe*, and decaying with their *fall*. How far the ſame reaſons ought to operate in favour of *ſtock-holders*, is no part of the preſent conſideration.

But it becomes our *legiſlators* ſeriouſly to reflect, that while they deal out the *publick wealth*, and lay *burdens* upon the *people*, they diſpoſe of a property, belonging in a much greater degree to *other claſſes*, than to *their own*: that if, in

the

the diſtribution, they would be favourable to themſelves, they commit an iniuſtice, and injure the *many* for the *few*: That their title to the *legiſlature* ariſes from a preſumption of their enacting equal laws. And let their duty be inforced by a remembrance, *that injuries to others fall heavy upon themſelves.*

Beſide the excluſive prerogative of making laws, the execution of them is in many inſtances confin'd to the ſame kind of *qualification*; poſſibly, without the ſame reaſons to juſtify this *diſtinction.*

The influence of this double authority, added to that, which naturally reſults from *landed property* over the *farmer* and *tenant*, and which *increaſes* as every thing elſe *leſſens*, renders the *landed-man*, beyond controverſy, the *main ſpring* in every part of our political ſyſtem, from the *ſenate* down to the *veſtry.*

This influence, directed by falſe and narrow views, hath had in *one inſtance*, and continues to have, a moſt fatal operation; while the ſame miſtaken notions, which make the landed-man prefer all other taxes to a land-tax, prompt him to conſider himſelf, as the ſole pay-maſter of the *helpleſs poor*; and led by one error into another, to conſider an *increaſe of numbers*, as the *greateſt evil* that can befal him.

Like death, a ſolitary king to reign
O'er deſert mountains and a barren plain,

Is become the ambition of almoſt every *ſquire* in every *pariſh*; and taught and ſway'd by him, the *farmer* and *trader* would grow rich by *depopulation.*

lation. In purſuance of this policy, they unite their endeavours to baniſh the preſent inhabitants; and, to prevent a future ſupply, they pull down *cottages*, and diſcountenance *marriages*.

It hath been ſuppoſed, throughout the foregoing ſheets, that a *continuance* of the *land-tax*, as it now ſtands, is neceſſary towards leſſening our debt, and thereby enabling us hereafter to diſcharge other taxes more detrimental to us; or, if it be found more expedient, in the firſt inſtance to remove theſe taxes, and let our debt remain ſo far unleſſened.

Between *theſe two queſtions* no deciſion hath been ventured. And the argument hath been confin'd to a neceſſity of the land-tax for either of theſe purpoſes.

To compleat this deſign, it now remains to take a ſurvey of our preſent ſtate; of the debt we owe, of the expences we are like to incur, and of our means to anſwer theſe expences, and leſſen that debt. In the doing of which, endeavours ſhall be uſed to be as accurate as the *nature* of the *ſubject* will admit. And if theſe *endeavours* ſhould not greatly fail, *ſmall inaccuracies* will not much affect the main purpoſe of this *eſſay*.

The

The National Debt, provided for by Parliament, ſtands thus:

		l.	*s.*	*d.*
Dec. 31. 1748.	Upon the 31ſt *Decemb.* 1748. the debt, excluſive of the articles hereunder mentioned, was — — —	71,340,397	16	9½
	Annuities at 3 *per cent.* charged on the deductions of 6*d.* in the pound on penſions, &c. not included in the above ſum —	01,000,000	0	0
	Annuities for lives, amounting to 67,500*l.* allowed to the contributors to the lotteries 1745 and 1746, eſtimated at fifteen years purchaſe —	01,012,500	0	0
	Total upon 31 *Dec.* 1748. —	73,352,897	16	9½

Dec. 31. 1749. Upon the 31ſt of *December*, 1749, the debt will ſtand thus:

Charged on the Sinking Fund for Navy, Victualling, and Tranſport Bills, and for the debt of the Office of Ordnance, *Anno* 1749. —	03,230,382	5	1

Borrowed

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
Brought over —	03,230,382	5	1
Borrowed upon loans or exchequer bills *anno* 1749, and charged on the firſt aids to be granted this ſeſſion of parliament, to pay off the like ſum upon the head of ſeamen's wages ——	0,1000,000	0	0
Debt upon the 31ſt *December*, 1748, as above ſtated - -	73,352,897	16	9¼
Total upon *Dec.* 31. 1749.	77,583,280	1	10¼

From whence deducting the produce of the ſalt duties in 1749, applied towards the payment of the 1,200,000*l.* borrowed upon thoſe duties in 1741, and, upon a medium of ſix years, ſuppoſed to produce *l.* *s.* *d.* 166,825 0 0

And alſo ſuch part of the annuities for 2 and 3 lives, as, upon a medium of the ſame number of years, hath fallen in by deaths in 1749 1,516 13 4

	00,168,341	13	4
The total of the national debt, provided for by parliament, will, upon the 31ſt of *Decemb.* 1749, amount to —	77,414,938	8	6¼

To

	l.	s.	d.
Brought over	77,414,938	8	6¼
To which being added the reſidue of the Navy debt, unprovided for by parliament —— —	1,347,227	15	2½
£	78,762,166	3	8¾

The whole national debt, provided and unprovided for by Parliament, will, upon the 31ſt of *December* 1749, amount to ſeventy-eight millions ſeven hundred ſixty-two thouſand one hundred ſixty-ſix pounds, three ſhillings and eight pence three farthings, excluſive of any new debt upon the navy, or any other head of ſervice: — A ſum, far exceeding the apprehenſions, even of thoſe, who, in our late conteſts, prognoſticated the worſt for the Publick.

It appears by the liſt of Nominees entitled to the benefit of ſurvivorſhip under the Act 4 *W.* and *M.* commonly called *The Million Act*, that of 1013 nominees only 738 died in 55 years. The medium is therefore nearer 13 than 14 for each year; which would juſtify a much higher valuation, than has been before ſet upon the life annnuities created in 1745 and 1746; but the lower calculation hath been choſen, as no certain allowance can be made for the lives, which, upon the 31ſt of *December* 1749, may have fallen in ſince the eſtabliſhment of thoſe annuities. They, who pleaſe, may eaſily make a deduction at the rate of 15 years purchaſe: but this matter is not capable of certainty; nor, if it was, would it much ſignify to the preſent purpoſe.

The

The Produce of the Sinking Fund, at a medium for ſeven years of peace immediately preceding the year 1740, was *per Ann.*	1,117,198	12	1½
At *Michaelmas* 1748, this Fund ſtood engaged for three ſums, amounting to	1,700,000	0	0
In *March* following it was farther engaged for 3,000,000*l* to diſcharge Navy, Victualling and Tranſport Bills	3,000,000	0	0
And for 230,382*l* 5*s* 1*d* due to the Office of Ordnance	0,230,382	5	1
Total £	4,930,382	5	1

For which Sum of 4,930,382 *l.* 5 *s.* 1 *d.* the Sinking Fund at this day ſtands ſingly engaged.

Beſides the intereſt and charges of management upon this ſum, the Sinking Fund is farther charged with the deficiency of the duty on wrought plate, granted 6 *Geo.* I. and with an allowance to the Uſher of the Exchequer.

The firſt of which charges at a medium of ſeven years, has amounted to	4671	0	6¾
The ſecond, at a like medium	73	18	2

And as 450 *l. per annum* is allowed to the Bank, for charges of management upon 800,000 *l.* in 1742, we imagine 1000 *l. per annum* may not be deemed an unreaſonable allowance upon 3,230,382 *l.* 5 *s.* 1 *d.*

This being premiſed, we ſhall ſtate the account of the ſums annually paid out of the Sinking Fund, as follows:

Sums

Sums annually paid out of the Sinking Fund, not replaced by Parliament.

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
Annuities at 3*l. per cent.* on 600,000*l.* lent on credit of this fund, towards the ſupply for the year 1736. ———	18,000	0	0
Ditto at 3*l. per cent.* on 300,000*l.* lent *Anno* 1738. ———	9,000	0	0
To the Uſher of the Exchequer for neceſſaries furniſhed for paying the ſaid annuities, at a medium of ſeven years ———	73	18	8
Annuities at 3*l. per cent.* on 800,000*l.* lent *Anno* 1742. —	24,000	0	0
To the Bank for charges of management, *per Ann.* ——	450	0	0
Deficiency of the duty on wrought plate, granted 6 Geo. I. at a medium of ſeven years — —	4,671	0	$6\frac{2}{4}$
Annuities at 4*l. per cent.* on 3,230,382*l.* 5*s.* 1*d.* charged on this fund, *Anno* 1749. ——	129,215	5	$9\frac{1}{4}$
Charges of management of ditto, computed at *per Ann.* ———	1,000	0	0
Total *per Ann.*	186,410	4	$5\frac{1}{2}$

Sums payable out of the Sinking Fund to be replaced by Parliament.

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
Intereſt at 3*l.* 10*s.* *per cent.* on 1,000,000*l.* charged on the ſalt duties *Anno* 1745	35,000	0	0
Deficiency of additional ſtamp duties, granted *Anno* 1731, upon a medium of ſeven years *per Ann.*	6,278	16	10
Deficiency of the duty on ſweets, granted *Anno* 1737, upon a medium of ſeven years *per Ann.*	13,829	10	3½
Deficiency of the duty on licences to retail ſpirituous liquors *per* Act 19 Geo. II. upon a medium of three years *per Ann.*	14,113	15	7¼
Deficiency of the additional duty on wines imported, upon a medium of three years from its commencement at *Lady-Day*, 1745, *per Ann.*	31,552	9	6½
Deficiency of the duty on glaſs and ſpirituous liquors, at a medium of two years from *Chriſtmas* 1746, *per Ann.*	74,825	11	2¾
Deficiency of the new duties on houſes, *&c.* eſtimated at *per Ann.* *	60,000	0	0
Total *per Ann.* to be replaced	235,600	3	6
Total, as before, not replaced	186,410	4	5½
Total *per Ann.*	422,010	7	11½

* The Deficiency of theſe duties at *Michaelmas* 1748, was 28,268*l.* 15*s.* 5¾*d.*; which ſum was actually paid out of the Sinking Fund; but as it does not appear, when that deficiency commenced, and ſo, on the other ſide, it does appear, that the deficiency of theſe duties in the ſubſequent half year, ending at *Lady-Day* 1749, was 31,060*l.* 16*s.* 0½*d.* we think the annual deficiency may be fairly ſtated at 60,000*l.*

Of

Of the ſums payable out of the Sinking Fund, to be replaced by Parliament, for the deficiency of the additional duty on wines imported, and on glaſs and ſpirituous liquors, ſince the commencement of theſe duties at *Lady-day* 1745 and 1746, the ſum of 2883 *l.* 18 *s.* $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* part of the deficiency of the former of the ſaid duties, and 139,902 *l.* 3 *s.* $1\frac{1}{2}$ *d*, part of the deficiency of the latter, were made good by Parliament, without being brought to the account of that Fund. But as for ſeveral years before either of the ſaid periods, a ſum not leſs than 1,000,000 *l.* was annually taken out of the produce of the Sinking Fund towards the ſupplies of the year, the charge upon that Fund is the ſame, whether the deficiencies, for which it is ſecurity, be firſt paid out of theſe ſupplies, or replaced out of them in the uſual and more regular manner.

For the ſame reaſon, as it will be demonſtrated, that in a ſuppoſition of the land-tax being reduced to 2 *s.* in the pound, a ſum far exceeding all the deficiencies, as already ſtated, muſt be annually taken from the Sinking Fund towards the ſupplies of the year; the ſums, which are to be replaced by Parliament to that Fund, are as real a charge upon it, as thoſe annuities are, for which it ſtands ſingly engaged.

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
If therefore, upon the foot of this account, from the annual ſum payable out of the Sinking Fund, ſtated as before, at —— —— ——	422,010	7	$11\frac{1}{2}$

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
Brought over —	422,010	7	11½
We deduct half a year's intereſt on 3,230,382*l.* 5*s.* 1*d.* (the annuities for that ſum commencing only at *Lady-day* 1749) — —	64,607	12	10½
And alſo a moiety of the annual eſtimated deficiency of the new duties upon houſes, &c. (that deficiency being made good to *Lady-day*, 1749) —	30,000	0	0
	94,607	12	10½
The remainder will be	327,402	15	1

Which Sum of 327,402*l.* 15*s.* 1*d.* was a charge upon the Sinking Fund at *Michaelmas* 1749; and the whole Sum of 422,010*l.* 7*s.* 11½*d.* will afterwards continue a charge upon it, until, by the falling in of the ſalt duties, an annuity of 35,000*l.* part of that ſum, ceaſes.

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
The annual produce of the Sinking Fund hath been before ſtated, at a medium of ſeven years, to be — —	1,117,198	12	1½
From whence deducting the ſaid ſum of — — —	327,402	15	1
The unappropriated reſidue at *Mich.* 1749, was — —	789,795	17	0¼
At *Michaelmas*, 1750, the reſidue of the Sinking Fund, after the ſaid ſum of 422,010*l.* 7*s.* 11*d.*½ ſhall have been deducted, will be — —	695,188	4	2

Reſidue

	l.	s.	d.
Residue of the Sinking Fund, at *Michaelmas*, 1750, brought over	695,188	4	2
And upon a supposition that from *Lady-day*, 1751, the interest of that part of the national debt, which is now at 4 *per cent.* shall be reduced to 3*l.* 10*s.* *per cent.* as the surplus of the Funds, of which the Sinking Fund is composed, will be larger; the Sinking Fund will consequently gain by that reduction, in the half year ending at *Mich.* 1751, the sum of — — —	54,656	15	7½
And the charge upon the Sinking Fund, upon account of deficiencies, and for annuities, payable out of the said Fund, for Navy, Victualling, and Transport bills, and for the debt of the Office of Ordnance, will in the same half year be lessened — — —	29,822	19	1½
	84,479	14	8¾
So that the clear residue of the Sinking Fund at *Mich.* 1751, will be —	779,667	19	10¾
And in a supposition, that the duties upon salt shall at *Mich.* 1751, have paid off the whole 1,200,000*l.* borrowed upon those duties in 1741, the residue of the Sinking Fund will at *Mich.* 1752, amount to — — —	899,147	13	7½

*. Note, as that part of the national debt, which carries an interest of 4*l.* *per cent.* amounts at this time to 57,801,385*l.* 10*s.* 7*d*½ (exclusive of the remainder of 1,200,000*l.* borrowed upon the salt duties *Anno* 1741) the whole saving to the Publick by the reduction here supposed, will be 289,306*l.* 18*s.* 6*d*.½ *per annum*; but of this sum, only 168,959*l.* 9*s.* 5*d*½. is to be brought to the account of the Sinking Fund, as its proportion of the whole saving.

Which

Which ſum of 899,147*l.* 13*s.* 7*d.* half-penny, will from thenceforth remain the ſurplus of the Sinking Fund, upon the foregoing media, free from all annual charges, except ſuch as have been, or ſhall be, voted towards the annual ſupplies; which from 1739 to 1749, incluſive, have been a charge upon that Fund of 1,000,000*l.* annually. What farther demands of a like nature will probably ariſe, ſhall be enquired into, after we have firſt ſeen how the Sinking Fund ſtands at preſent.

In the ſurplus accounts for 1748, credit is taken for two ſums in part of 1,000,000*l.* voted towards the ſupply for that year; *viz.*

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
For —— ——	222,861	14	1¼
And for —— ——	484,261	7	5¾
Total	707,123	1	7
Remains therefore to be deducted out of the ſurplus of 1749 —— —	292,876	18	5
The ſurplus of the Sinking Fund at *Mich.* 1749, we have before ſtated at —	789,795	17	0½
From whence deducting, to compleat the million voted towards the ſupply 1748	292,876	18	5
The balance of the Sinking Fund, at *Michaelmas*, 1749, was ——	496,918	18	7½

Voted

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
Voted out of the Sinking Fund towards the ſupply for 1749 — —	1,000,000	0	0
Towards which, there remained a balance at *Mich.* 1749, as above —	496,918	18	$7\frac{1}{2}$
Remains to be deducted out of the ſurplus of 1750 ——— —	503,081	1	$4\frac{1}{2}$
The ſurplus of the Sinking Fund at *Mich.* 1750, hath been before ſtated at — — —	695,188	4	2
From whence deducting to compleat the 1,000,000 *l.* voted towards the ſupply 1749 — — —	503,081	1	$4\frac{1}{2}$
The clear balance of the Sinking Fund at *Mich.* 1750, will be —	192,107	2	$9\frac{1}{2}$

If in this ſeſſion of Parliament 500,000*l.* ſhould be granted out of the Sinking Fund, towards the ſupply for the year 1750, then the account will ſtand thus :

Voted out of the Sinking Fund towards the ſupply for the year 1750 ——	500,000	0	0
Towards which, there will remain a balance of the Sinking Fund at *Mich.* 1750, as above —— —	192,107	2	$9\frac{1}{2}$
Remains to be deducted out of the ſurplus of 1751 ——— ——	307,892	17	$2\frac{1}{2}$

The

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
The ſurplus of the Sinking Fund at *Mich.* 1751, hath been before ſtated at	779,667	19	10¼
From whence deducting to compleat the 500,000 *l.* ſuppoſed to be voted towards the ſupply for 1750,	307,892	17	2½
The clear balance of the Sinking Fund at *Mich.* 1751, will then be	471,775	2	8¼

Having thus ſtated the preſent condition of the Sinking Fund, we proceed to ſhew, what will probably be the future annual demands upon the Publick, for the current ſervice of the year.

The ſupplies for the year 1749, amounted to 8,082,409*l.* 1*s.* 7*d.* halfpenny; of which ſum 2,368,294*l.* 4*s.* 7*d.* was appropriated to the ſervice of the current year, conſiſting of the following articles, *viz.*

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
For maintaining 17,000 ſeamen	884,000	0	0
For defraying the charge of 18,857 land-forces	612,230	4	7
For maintaining the forces and garriſons in the plantations, *&c.*	218,864	1	5½
For the ordinary of the navy	285,878	0	8
For the ſupport of *Greenwich* Hoſpital	10,000	0	0
carried over	2,010,972	6	8½

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
Brought over —	2,010,972	6	8½
For the Office of Ordnance for land ſervice	134,366	17	8
For ſettling a colony at Nova Scotia	40,000	0	0
For the out-penſioners of Chelſea Hoſpital	63,274	6	3
For the pay of general and ſtaff officers	16,000	0	0
For penſions to reduced officers widows	3,867	15	7½
For half pay to reduced officers of land forces and marines	67,226	18	0
For allowances to the officers, and private gentlemen of two troops of horſe guards, and regiments of horſe reduced	5,281	16	8
Towards building Weſtminſter bridge	12,000	0	0
For ſupporting the trade to Africa —	10,000	0	0
For improving the colony of Georgia	5,304	3	4
Total	2,368,294	4	7

An article of 6,039*l.* 10*s.* 8*d.* for defraying the charge of the off-reckonings of the two troops of horſe guards reduced, and of allowances to private gentlemen of the ſaid troops, on their retiring from the ſervice, is omitted in this account, as that ſum is payable out of the ſavings of the money granted for relief of the widows of officers killed or dying in the ſervice,

and conſequently included in the charge for guards and garriſons.

Upon the reaſoning of the laſt ſeſſion of Parliament, a reduction will probably be made of ſeven thouſand ſeamen in the year 1750, and by conſequence of 364,000 *l.* for their maintenance, including the ordnance for ſea-ſervice.

Some little ſavings, impoſſible, and not very material, to be ſtated, may alſo ariſe from deaths or promotions in the liſt of reduced officers of land-forces and marines; of officers and private gentlemen of the two troops of guards, and regiments of horſe reduced; of half-pay officers widows; of out-penſioners of *Chelſea Hoſpital*; and of ſea officers upon half-pay, included in the ordinary of the navy.

Nova Scotia and *Weſtminſter Bridge* will probably require the ſame ſums in this ſeſſion of Parliament, as were granted for them in the laſt. The expence for *Greenwich Hoſpital* hath remained the ſame for many years; and the charge of ſupporting our trade to *Africa*, and improving our colony in *Georgia*, will probably be greater than was provided for laſt year.

But whatever deductions it may be held reaſonable to calculate upon theſe ſmaller articles for the year 1750, they will fall very ſhort of balancing the obvious exceedings upon the ſupplies for 1749: And upon whatever medium they may be computed in the future, they will not equal that of ſervices unprovided for and unforeſeen.

The allowance for the ordinary of the navy, were it now amply ſufficient, muſt of courſe be increaſed, when our ſhips, now abroad, ſhall return

return home. That important article was, at at a medium of five years before the war, 216,191 *l.* 19 *s.* 1 *d.* three farthings; and was little leſs even during the war, occaſioned by the great increaſe of our ſhipping.

From this conſideration, we have little reaſon to hope for a great abatement, in the future, of this expence; and from many other conſiderations, we have as little reaſon to wiſh for any. The ſuperiority we now poſſeſs, demands, not only, that our preſent ſtrength ſhould be preſerved intire; but that additions ſhould be made, proportioned to every increaſe, and to every advance of other maritime powers: And when this policy is neglected, our condition will be as hopeleſs, as if the iſland were a part of the continent, with neither walls to ſhelter, nor troops to defend, us.

The remaining articles are his majeſty's guards, garriſons, and land-forces in *Great Britain*, his majeſty's forces and garriſons in the plantations, *&c.* the office of ordinance for land-ſervice, and the pay of general and ſtaff-officers.

And as it is probable, that the reaſoning, upon which the eſtimates for theſe ſervices were ſupported in the laſt ſeſſion of Parliament, will prevail in the preſent, the ſupplies for the current ſervice of the year 1750, without any allowance for the extraordinary charge of building and repairing our ſhips, or for the encouragement of our fiſheries, and abſtracted from every other head of expence, will, in all probability, not be leſs than 2,004,294*l.* 4*s.* 7*d.*

Calculations have indeed been made much lower; which have brought the whole annual ſupplies within the produce of the duties upon

malt, and a land-tax at 2*s.* in the pound; and the neceſſary annual ſervices have been computed at 1,025,900*l.* But ſince theſe calculations, the annual ſupplies have been increaſed by many annual deficiencies, the ſaid computation of neceſſary ſervices hath conſtantly been rejected by every ſucceeding Parliament; and from the *Revolution* to this day (two years excepted) the ſupplies have every year exceeded 2,000,000*l.* And whoever examines that period, will find abundant reaſon to conclude 2,004,294*l.* 4*s.* 7*d.* as ſmall a ſum, as the annual ſervices can be ſuppoſed to require in any future time; ſince from the experience of ſo long a tract, comprehending miniſters, parliaments, and circumſtances, of every different complexion, and every various kind, if *what ought to be*, may not be concluded, *what will be* certainly may. And to this concluſion, which alone imports the preſent ſubject, the friends and enemies of that period muſt alike ſubſcribe.

Therefore, without running into vague ſpeculations upon what would be better than what is, and what is likely to be, we may pronounce their reaſoning, in all ſuppoſitions, wrong, who, judging the preſent meaſures extravagant in expence, would withdraw from the Publick a ſum ſurpaſſing any poſſible ſaving in the moſt *viſionary* hypotheſis. *Parſimony* is indeed neceſſary; but parſimony is only one ingredient, and not the greateſt in quantity, in our beſt political diſpenſatory. Nor are they to be attended to, who, concluding ruin inevitable, would perſuade us to enjoy the preſent, without care of what is to come. Such principles are fatal in

policy,

policy, as they are in religion; and thoſe, who ſuppoſe the impoſſibility, oftenеſt create it. While therefore the author of theſe ſheets diſplay our preſent ſituation as it really is, he means to rouſe the ſecure and the ſupine from ignorance and lethargy, not to plunge them into deſpair, unworthy of men, and greatly unworthy of *Britons*.

				l.	*s.*	*d.*
We have before ſtated the ſupplies for the current ſervice of the year 1750, at				2,004,294	4	7
To which muſt be added,						
Deficiency of the grants for the year 1749, conſiſting of the following articles, *viz.*						
Deficiency of ways and means upon the whole ſum voted — —	*l.* 102,026	*s.* 16	*d.* 6½			
Deficiencies of the land-tax and malt-duties *anno* 1747, made good out of the ſupplies 1749, amounting, upon a medium of nine years, to —	265,800	13	9¼			
Paid upon account of the diſtemper amongſt the horned cattle, which in 1747 was 70,000 *l.*; and in 1748 was 60,000 *l.* but we ſhall here compute it to be only —	50,000	0	0			
				417,827	10	3¼
Carried over —				2,422,121	14	10¾

				l.	s.	d.
	Brought over			2,422,121	14	10¾
Subsidy to the Elector of *Bavaria*	44,744	6	3			
Ditto to the Duke of *Brunswick* ——	30,548	14	6			
Ditto to the Elector of *Mentz* —	8,620	0	0			
				83,913	0	9
To pay off the like sum borrowed upon Exchequer bills *anno* 1749 —				1,000,000	0	0
Total of the supplies for 1750, over and above the sums replaced to the Sinking Fund —— —				3,506,034	15	7

The treaty with the Elector of *Bavaria* continues in force till the 21st of *July* 1750; that with the Duke of *Brunswick*, until the 1st of *February* in the same year; and that with the Elector of *Mentz*, until the 27th of *April* 1751.

In the last session of Parliament, no money was demanded towards fulfilling his majesty's engagements contracted by the treaty with *Russia*, of the 19th of *Nov.* 1749; which was to subsist for two years, and upon which the subsidy for the year 1748, hath only been paid, together with the charge of marching the troops to the frontiers of *Upper Silesia*, and for provisions and forage until their return to the frontiers of *Poland*. The sum paid by *Great Britain* upon these articles amounted to 317,881 *l.* 18 *s.* 10 *d.*

But whether the allowance of 150,000 banco crowns of *Holland*, stipulated in the 3d article of this treaty, for the march of these troops from

from *Ruſſia*, will, be inſiſted upon for their return, with a farther payment of ſubſidy for the year 1749, can be only at preſent conjectured from parallel inſtances: For an abſolute certainty, we muſt wait for the determination of Parliament.

Having ſtated the ſupplies for the year 1750, according to the beſt lights, which could be obtained, and the faireſt meaſure, that can be deviſed, of the future by the paſt, wherein ſome things are certain, and others only probable; we will now proceed to the means, as they are generally underſtood to be intended, of anſwering a demand, for the year 1750, of 3,506,034*l.* 15*s.* 7*d.* three-farthings.

And thoſe are,

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
Land-tax at 3*s.* in the pound ——	1,500,000	0	0
Duties upon malt ——	750,000	0	0
To be iſſued out of the Sinking Fund	500,000	0	0
To be charged upon the ſaid Fund for cancelling Exchequer bills iſſued in 1749 —— ——	1,000,000	0	0
Total of ways and means	3,750,000	0	0
Total of the ſupplies	3,506,034	15	7¾
Balance of ways and means for 1750	243,965	4	4¼

We have ſeen, that, in a ſuppoſition of 500,000*l.* being taken out of the Sinking Fund towards the ſervice of the year 1750, the clear balance of the ſurplus at *Michaelmas* 1751, will, as that Fund now ſtands charged, be only 471,775*l.* 2*s.* 8*d.* farthing; and if the million, rais'd upon Exchequer bills in 1749, ſhould, as

we

we have ſuppoſed, be charged upon the ſaid fund, with intereſt at 4 *l. per cent.* from *Lady-day*, 1750, to *Lady-day* 1751, and at 3 *l.* 10 *s. per cent.* from that time forward, the intereſt payable for the ſaid million, from *Lady-day* 1750, to *Michaelmas* 1751, will reduce the clear ſurplus at *Michaelmas* 1751, to 414,275 *l.* 2 *s.* 8 *d.* farthing; and at *Michaelmas* 1752, the ſurplus, before computed at 899,147 *l.* 13 *s.* 7 *d.* half-penny, will, for the ſame reaſon, be reduced to 864,147 *l.* 13 *s.* 7 *d.* half-penny.

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
And if the reſidue of the Navy debt, unprovided for by Parliament, amounting to 1,347,227 *l.* 15 *s.* 2½ *d.* for which an adequate proviſion muſt be made in juſtice to the creditors, ſhould be likewiſe charged upon the Sinking Fund, with intereſt at 3 *l.* 10 *s. per cent.* a further annual deduction muſt be made of —	47,152	19	4¾
And then the whole unappropriated ſurplus of the Sinking Fund, abſtracted from what may be iſſued for the annual ſupplies, at *Michaelmas* 1752, and in all ſubſequent years, whilſt the rate of intereſt continues at 3 *l.* 10 *s. per cent.* may be eſtimated at	816,994	14	2¾

What the whole annual ſupplies will amount to, as a permanent charge in futurity, after the ſuppoſed reduction of intereſt to 3 *l.* 10 *s. per cent.* and of the land-tax to 2 *s.* in the pound, ſhould thoſe reductions take place, may be thus ſtated, upon the reaſoning of the laſt ſeſſion of Parliament.

For

				l.	*s.*	*d.*
For the current ſervice of the year —				2,004,294	4	7
Deficiency of the land-tax, at 2*s.* in the pound, upon a medium of ſeven years	*l.* 62,092	*s.* 11	*d.* $11\frac{1}{4}$			
Ditto of the malt-duty upon a medium of three years * —	179,104	12	$9\frac{3}{4}$			
				241,197	4	9
Permanent ſupplies in all future years above the ſums replaced to the Sinking Fund — — — —				2,245,491	9	4
Sums to be replaced to the Sinking Fund by Parliament, according to the foregoing media, after deducting the annuity of 35,000 *l.* for the 1,000,000 *l.* borrowed upon the ſalt-duties in 1745, and the ſaving upon the ſuppoſed reduction of intereſt to 3 *l.* 10 *s. per cent.* — —				,140,954	5	$3\frac{1}{2}$
Permanent ſupplies in all future years, comprehending the ſums to be replaced to the Sinking Fund, upon the reaſoning of the laſt ſeſſion of Parliament — — —				2,386,445	14	$7\frac{1}{2}$

* The medium of the deficiency of the malt-duty cannot be carried farther than three years, there being no deficiency in 1743. In the five years preceding 1743, the medium of the deficiency of this duty was 187,803 *l.* 2 *s.* 10 *d.* halfpenny; but we have choſe the lower medium in this ſtate of the ſupplies.

But, as the *Sinking Fund* muſt ſupply the deficiency of other ways and means, it is now clear, that, including the deficiencies upon the land-tax and malt-duty, whatever the exceeding of the annual ſupplies may be above 1,750,000 *l.* (in a ſuppoſition that the land-tax is reduced to 2 *s.* in the pound) that exceeding is virtually, and in effect, a charge upon the *Sinking Fund*, altho' the form be ſtill retained, of replacing to it, out of its own produce, a part of what hath been iſſued from it.

Therefore, fixing the moſt favourable medium of future annual ſupplies at about 2,200,000 *l.* beſides the immediate and collateral incumbrances now lying upon the Sinking Fund, 450,000 *l.* muſt be added to the ſaid ſum of 1,750,000 *l.* out of that Fund, in order to make up the aforeſaid medium of 2,200,000 *l.* and that ſum of 450,000 *l.* being deducted from the clear permanent reſidue before ſtated at 816,994 *l.* 14 *s.* 2 *d.* three farthings, will leave a balance of 366,994 *l.* 14 *s.* 2 *d.* three farthings; which, with 120,347 *l.* 9 *s.* 1 *d.* (remainder of the ſaving by the ſuppoſed reduction of intereſt from 4 *l.* to 3 *l.* 10 *s. per cent.* not brought to the account of the Sinking Fund) and with the duties upon ſalt, the falling in of annuities for lives, and the ſavings of intereſt upon the reduced principal of our debt, will compoſe the whole means of paying off 78,762,166 *l.* 3 *s.* 8 *d.* three farthings. But if, inſtead of reducing the land-tax this year to 3 *s.* in the pound, and in the future to 2 *s.* (which ſeems to be the wiſh and expectation of the Publick) it were to be continued

nued at 4 *s.* we ſhould have an addition to the means, ſtated for the year 1750, of 468,953 *l.* 14 *s.* one farthing, and in all ſubſequent years, of 937,907 *l.* 8 *s.* three farthings. And ſhould the peace we now enjoy, laſt longer than any preceding it for above a century, except the laſt, theſe whole united means might, with proper management, *poſſibly* clear that part of our debt contracted during the laſt war.

This poſſibility, will, however, not receive much ſtrength or countenance from the experience of that period; in which, during the longeſt and moſt ſecure peace this nation ever knew, after a ſucceſsful war, whilſt commerce flouriſhed, and publick credit was high; with a Sinking Fund eſtabliſhed in 1717, and which, gradually riſing from 320,000 *l.* produced, for many years, between 1,000,000 *l.* and 1,200,000 *l. per annum*; the national debt, which, at the higheſt calculation in the year 1717, amounted to 51,068,103 *l.*

Was in the year 1740	—	45,943,946 *l.*
And conſequently, the ſavings of 23 years of peace were only	— — —	5,124,157 *l.*

Yet with this inſtance, recent in every body's memory, and with an experience, ſtill more recent, of its fatal effects, it is now propoſed to ſhorten the ſcanty means of leſſening our enormous debt; and tranſported with the hopes of acquiring, by a fall of intereſt, 295,174 *l.* 19 *s.* 11 *d.* farthing, for a certain term of years after *Lady-day* 1751, and 590,349 *l.* 19 *s.* 10 *d.* half-

penny at ſome more diſtant period, we ſeem deſirous of parting immediately with 468,953 *l.* 14 *s.* one farthing, and with double that ſum in futurity, of the cleareſt revenue belonging to the Publick.

It hath been demonſtrated, that the land-tax is an advantage to the owners of land: But, if it were otherwiſe; if they were to be ſufferers by its continuance as it now is; will there be no ſufferers by the reduction of intereſt upon the funds? If motives of compaſſion were to prevail, can the helpleſs, the aged, the infirm, the widow, and the orphan, be refuſed their ſhare? Many of theſe have their whole in the funds at 4 *l. per cent.* and that whole will, upon the foregoing ſuppoſitions, in a ſhort time be, at one blow, diminiſhed to them one eighth, and in a few years one fourth.

Will this be leſs hard, than to continue a tax nominally at 4 *s.* in the pound? Or does it make a difference in favour of that ſide of the queſtion, and of the landed-man, that the very reduction, which poſſibly undoes the ſtock-holder, muſt be a benefit to the land-owner?

But compaſſion to either is abſurd, when the being of the Publick ought to abſorb all lower conſiderations.

Much pains have been lately employed, and very new doctrines deviſed, to render a great national debt leſs formidable, than it really is, in the opinions of men.

I have

I have two pamphlets now before me, calculated for this purpose: The one, *A defence of several proposals for raising three millions*, &c. *for the year* 1746, with a postscript, *containing some notions relating to publick credit*; and a name prefixed to it, of the highest authority in all *mercantile* and *moneyed matters*:—The other, *An essay on publick credit*, by an anonymous author, published in 1748.

This last, not contented with asserting, that, "if sixty millions of our debt be the property "of the people of *Great Britain*, we are not "the richer, nor the poorer, for that part of the "debt;" proceeds to affirm, that, "It is to the "national debt we owe our publick credit;" and that, "if it were possible honestly to discharge "the whole national debt, which would thereby "annihilate the publick credit, such losses and "inconveniencies would arise, from the loss of "it, to trade and commerce, as would greatly "diminish the riches of our country."

And, "what confirms him in this opinion is, "that, notwithstanding we have been engaged "in two long and expensive wars, since the "commencement of the publick debts, he ve"rily believes, that more riches have been ac"cumulated to *Great Britain*, than any two "centuries can boast of before that time."

And no wonder it should be so, in this author's hypothesis; since, according to his reasoning, war and expence are blessings, as they are the sources of debt: An enormous debt is a blessing, as it is the fountain of Publick Credit: And taxes bring no detriment to trade.

How-

However, ſome inſtruction may be collected from one paſſage in that book; where, ſpeaking of the ſcheme for raiſing 6,300,000 *l.* by an open ſubſcription in the year 1747, is this *obſervation:*

" Although in the worſt ſtate of the caſe that " the mind of man can form, the value of " the funds could only be diminiſhed eight *per* " *cent.* yet there was a fall of twenty-eight *per* " *cent.* brought about by artfully working upon " the paſſions of mankind; and by the great " miſtake of one, who, by not courting the aſ- " ſiſtance of that publick body, where the cir- " culating power is placed, had ruined the cre- " dit of his ſcheme; while another made uſe " of his great credit and influence with the mo- " neyed intereſt to defeat his adverſary."

And the ſcheme had inevitably been defeated, or other great miſchiefs enſued, had not Parliament ſubmitted to the introduction of a dangerous precedent, and allowed farther time, to the ſubſcribers, for their future payments.

A certain and ſtriking proof, of the power of combinations, againſt open ſubſcriptions, or any other ſcheme for the lowering of intereſt, when contrary to the views of moneyed men.

The author of the *Defence of ſeveral propoſals, &c.* does not go ſo far as the laſt mentioned: However, in the poſtſcript, p. 63. " He con- " ceives, that the prices of the funds do not " in the leaſt depend upon the quantity of " them, either taken in the groſs, or any par- " ticular ſort of them: That, if they were double " to what they are now, it would not neceſſa- " rily follow, that the prices would be lower;

" nor

" nor yet, if they conſiſted but of half what they " do now, would the price be from thence in- " creaſed."

The high character of this *author*, acquired by many eſſential ſervices to his *country*, will excuſe even prolixity in the endeavour to confute him; ſince it becomes neceſſary to oppoſe his own words to his authority, which, with multitudes of people, would have greater weight, than the moſt ſubſtantial reaſons from any other.

However uſeful his doctrine might have been, when the exigences of the times obliged the Publick to increaſe its debt (and in ſuch circumſtances, good minds have the biaſs of their wiſhes upon their opinions) yet, the neceſſity of borrowing having now ceaſed, it becomes expedient to remove the vail of honeſt prejudices, and to diſcover the errors of a doctrine, which, through inferences to be drawn from it, may countenance miniſterial profuſion, and popular acquieſcence under unleſſening weights.

For, if a greater or leſs quantity of ſubſiſting funds be quite indifferent as to the raiſing or falling of their value; more remote conſequences will the eaſier give way to any new ſchemes of expence, and to the flattering appearances of preſent eaſe and relief, through a reduction of the land-tax; while the *miniſter* and *land-owner* may be induced to compound for a *mutual gratification.*

Nor in this *author*'s opinion are the moſt diſtant evils to be apprehended, even from an increaſe of our debt beyond what it now is: For, " it is the quantity brought to market,

" com-

" compared with the purchaſers, which riſes or " falls the prices of the funds." And, p. 69. " When funds are ſold directly by the govern- " ment, to perſons who deſign to keep them, " they are immediately out of the market, and " affect the price no more than all the quantity " of the publick funds, which remains in the " hands of perſons, who never think of ſelling " them." Ibid. " And if timely notice were " given every year, there would probably come " in buyers, with a deſign to keep, ſufficient " to take off all the funds created that year: " Provided they may come in freely at the " original price." Ibid.

If this probability be well founded, it ariſes not in a ſmall part, but almoſt in the whole, amongſt thoſe deſcribed in p. 71. " Who live " upon their income, whether by eſtates in " land, or in the funds, or in mortgages; many " of whom are always ſaving a part of their " income, and want to lay it out:" Ibid. and " amongſt people, who thrive in trade, and " who are willing, as they can ſpare money, " to lay it out in ſomething to ſupport them " more at their eaſe." Ibid. And, laſtly, " as " war neceſſarily contracts trade, and conſe- " quently ſo much money cannot be employed " therein, as in times of peace; thoſe, who " have large eſtates in trade, muſt have money " gradually coming in; which, when the funds " are reaſonable, they may chuſe to lay out " therein; and ſome from this beginning, go " on to draw all their money out of trade, to " place it in the funds."

If

If there be any other denomination of men, likely *to buy with a deſign to keep*, they were too inconſiderable to be mentioned by the author.

But, from theſe ſeveral deſcriptions, deduction muſt be made of thoſe, who with their ſavings purchaſe lands or houſes; or who lay out their money on private ſecurities; who increaſe their ſtock in trade in proportion as they thrive; who in time of war contract their trade, in order to enlarge it again in time of peace and ſecurity; and who place their money in the funds, only for a temporary advantage, until an opportunity ſerves of attaining ſome of theſe purpoſes: *Not one of whom is a buyer in the funds with a deſign to keep.*

If to theſe we add, whoever in time of danger or diſtreſs lock their money up, or withdraw it out of the Funds; and if the remaining number *be clear ſufficient to take off every year, all the funds created in that year* (which in the year immediately ſucceeding amounted to 63,000,000*l.*) we may ſafely pronounce the annual gain, thro' lands, mortgages, funds and trade, immenſely higher than ever hath been computed; and the parſimony of our people greatly miſrepreſented by the declamers againſt luxury.

The poſition, in page 74, that *any quantity of new funds to be created and ſold in any one year, will not occaſion there being leſs money the next year*, was falſe in that *very year*, and in the ſucceeding; as it ever will be when new funds are creaed to defray foreign expence, which has been the caſe of almoſt all our funds, and from the nature of things muſt ever remain ſo.

The argument therefore, to be true, ſhould rather have ſtood thus: "Any quantity of new "funds to be created and ſold in any one year, "*will* occaſion there being leſs money the next "year; *becauſe, as the government iſſues out all* "*the money received*" (a great part of which is ſent into other countries) *the ſame quantity will not be in private perſons hands, as the year forc-going.*

If our author's calculation were juſt, it would not only juſtify the doctrine oppoſed by him under a former adminiſtration, that *the creditors of the Publick could not bear to receive above an annual million in diſcharge of our debt*; but would bid fair for proving, with the nameleſs author of the *Eſſay upon Publick Credit*, that our debt is an advantage, and every increaſe a publick bleſſing; ſince it would be hard to ſay, how ſo much ſuperfluous wealth could be otherwiſe diſpoſed of.

Happy it alſo is, that, let the general ſtate of the nation be never ſo precarious during the moſt expenſive and unſucceſsful war (and ſuch was our condition when this author wrote) national calamities ſo little affect the fortunes of individuals, that certain reſources ſtill ariſe from the produce of lands, and from the paſt and preſent fruits of trade, *almoſt alone* ſufficient to ſupply every demand, without *limitation* of *quantity or time.*

But if the reverſe be fact; if even in times of peace, and of general proſperity, many there are, who, inſtead of *always ſaving a part*, are always exceeding their income; and therefore, inſtead of *wanting to lay out money*, want to borrow:

row: if many there are, who, inſtead of *thriving by trade, and being able, by ſparing money*, to lay it out in ſomething to ſupport them more at their eaſe, are willing to take money at high intereſt, to ſupport the trade and the little eaſe they at preſent enjoy; and if their numbers are greatly increaſed by *war* and *general diſtreſs*; they may be near ſufficient, at that ſeaſon, to employ all that can be ſpared by the more fortunate and thrifty, from whom our author's hopes ariſe (page 71) "of large ſums to be laid out "in the funds, more eſpecially when they are "lower than they have been in former times."

But why ſhould they be lower than at former times? and why ſhould "one or two *per cent.* "under the market price, together with ſome "eaſe in payment, be neceſſary to induce buy- "ers, with a deſign to keep, to take off all the "funds to be created in a year." if it be true, that "the prices of funds do not in the leaſt de- "pend on the quantity of them?" That, "if "timely notice were given every year, there "would probably come in buyers, with a de- "ſign to keep, ſufficient to take off all the "funds created that year, provided they may "come in freely at the original price?" and, that "any quantity of new funds to be created "and ſold in any one year, will not occaſion "there being leſs money the next year, than if "no ſuch funds had been created."

And yet, if the demand for publick funds be ſo great, it will be difficult to ſay, if the quantity were leſs, why the Price would not be higher, ſince *the purchaſers would then exceed the quantities to be ſold.* Page 68.

Nor will it be true, *in this ſuppoſition* (page 69) that, "when funds are ſold directly by the go-"vernment, to perſons who deſign to keep "them, they are immediately out of the mar-"ket" (page 68) becauſe, "if the purchaſers "exceed the quantities to be ſold, ſtocks muſt "riſe, until that riſe produces ſellers, which be-"fore were not ſellers."

"When the government have a neceſſity to "create new funds, they muſt diſpoſe of them "at ſuch prices as buyers may be found." *ibid.*

But if, in order to find buyers, the price muſt be lowered, and the intereſt given raiſed; ſuch riſe of intereſt muſt lower the price of all the other funds.

Therefore it ſeems evident, upon this author's own principles, *that the prices of funds do in ſome meaſure depend upon their quantity.*

Beſides, every increaſe of debt, cauſes an increaſe of annuity, altho' intereſt ſhould remain at the ſame rate; and an increaſe of annuity muſt be either defrayed by *new taxes*, or by ſuch an appropriation of the Sinking Fund, as would retard, if not totally extinguiſh, every poſſibility of removing any of the *old.*

Either of theſe would prejudice trade; and what prejudices trade, muſt affect the value of the funds.

Yet our *author* aſſerts, "if they were double "to what they are now, it would not neceſſari-"ly follow, that the prices would be lower; nor "yet, if they conſiſted but of half what they do "now, would the price be from thence increaſ-"ed."

Certain

Certain it is, that as at different times, and in different circumſtances, the ſame quantity of funds, taken in the *groſs*, or in any particular *ſort*, does from apparent cauſes vary in its price; ſo it may happen in a like difference of times and circumſtances, that a greater quantity may bear the ſame or a higher price than a ſmaller quantity did. And this we have experienced in various periods, when real or imaginary dangers have alarm'd the apprehenſions of men. Many other cauſes may concur to produce the ſame effect.

And therefore, in this ſenſe it may be true, that, from the quantity of funds being greater, it does not neceſſarily follow, that the prices would be lower, nor, *vice verſa*. But this proves no more, than that ſeveral cauſes may co-operate upon the prices of funds; ſome with that prevalency, as to ſuſpend the effect of their greater or leſs quantity. It never can prove what the author contends for, that "on this greater "or leſſer quantity, the prices of the funds do "not in the leaſt depend."

Should therefore his hypotheſis prove falſe, that "there would every year probably come "in buyers, with a deſign to keep, ſufficient "to take off all the funds created for that "year;" then all the evils would enſue, which he ſo emphatically expreſſes, p. 69. "when "funds are ſold by the government to traf-"fickers in ſtocks, who deſign to ſell them "again.

"The market will continue in agitation; "and thoſe traffickers, who buy to ſell a-"gain, will have more encouragements, than

"is

" is neceſſary to be given to thoſe, who buy " with a deſign to keep: *ibid.* And when " large ſums are thus to be paid, if any acci- " dent happens, which caſts a damp on pub- " lick credit, people being under a neceſſity " of bringing ſomething to market to raiſe " money, will contribute greatly to hurt pub- " lick credit." p. 70.

To which he might have added, " or by ha- " ving nothing to bring to market, will endan- " ger all thoſe ſervices, for which the funds " were eſtabliſhed." And poſſibly this was the caſe of a ſubſequent ſubſcription.

And if theſe evils, and many more, were to continue, until " the funds by degrees became ſettled in the hands of buyers who keep them;" upon the ſtrength of this reaſoning, " there " muſt be found, at laſt, buyers with an inten- " tion to keep; or elſe traffickers cou'd not get " rid of what they buy." p. 69.

And if none but the firſt buyers cou'd purchaſe with a view to profit by a future ſale; the time, I fear, wou'd not be near at hand, when " a " good part at leaſt of that immenſe profit, " which is now made by theſe traffickers, wou'd " remain with the government;" or when " new " created funds wou'd affect the price no more " than all that quantity of the publick funds, " which remains in the hands of perſons, who " never think of ſelling them."

It is not admitted, and the author falls very ſhort of having proved, that all the quantity of old funds does not affect the price; and that they, who are poſſeſs'd of them, may not think of ſelling them. Some no doubt are lock'd up from

from circulation, for a time, by ſettlements, minorities, and other like cauſes; and thoſe of the oldeſt date are moſt in this predicament; which poſſibly may be a reaſon why old annuities are at a higher premium than new. But theſe inſtances will not ſerve our author's purpoſe.

Late experience hath taught us, when large ſums muſt be expended and muſt be borrowed, how very ſoon a combination of money'd men can raiſe the price to the borrower. Nor does the evil end here; for the ſame combination will after operate, probably more effectually, towards preventing its reduction; as it is found eaſier to advance the price of things upon thoſe who are in want of them, than to lower the price when once advanced.

Such combinations are great and powerful, in proportion as the debt is great. And if it be rais'd to ſuch a ſize as to admit no probability of ever diſcharging it, or if the means for ſuch diſcharge be neglected or miſapplied, other men may be deter'd from releaſing the Publick out of this bondage to their creditors, by new loans. And credit will be affected by an increaſe of principal, let the intereſt be never ſo well ſecured.

Whatever the advantages may be reſulting from the funds, thro' the facility of transfers, the punctuality of payments, and the certainty and ſufficiency of the ſecurity; yet they receive a conſiderable diminution from this ſingle circumſtance, that the creditor is not entitled to demand the principal, in any future riſe of intereſt; but muſt, if call'd upon by neceſſity, ſell out at loſs.

This

This condition, as it was not felt, was not much attended to, in ſettled times, when the price of money was likely to remain unalter'd. But at other ſeaſons, we have ſeen it become an object of great importance. And it is now of weight and of importance to thoſe who apprehend, that if all poſſible means be not employ'd to leſſen our debt, future exigences, poſſibly not far off, may ſeize us unprepared, ſufficient to ſwallow up the whole Sinking Fund in one perpetual mortgage.

Extravagant as this apprehenſion may appear to *ſome*, it will not be ſo to *thoſe*, who compute the debt accumulated by the laſt war, and find it amount to 32,818,220*l.* And lamentable will our ſituation be, if the only ſecurity againſt ſuch another occaſion, be an impoſſibility of ſupporting the expence.

In this ſituation, therefore, the apprehenſions of men may go yet farther, and tranſport them to a time, when, after having appropriated every thing fundable, new expences may become neceſſary. What the effect woud be, imports us *all* to conſider, for it regards us *all*: Ruin'd *credit*, *total ſtagnation*, *univerſal bankruptcy*.

It is true, a nation cannot be powerful where the individuals are poor: but then it is certain on the other hand, that the individuals of a nation may be rich, and the community poor and without reſources.

This was evident throughout the late war in the caſe of the *Dutch*. And if after being driven to an impoſſibility of raiſing the neceſſary ſupplies, even at an immoderate rate of intereſt,

we can now reduce intereſt to three and a half *per cent.* this country will furniſh another inſtance of the ſame truth, within the ſame period: For ſuch reduction will be an inconteſtable proof of the wealth of individuals, altho' that wealth was unavailing to the *Publick* in the *day* of *trial.*

But wherever this caſe exiſts, it conſtantly proceeds from the ſame cauſe; from a load of debt, overburdening the frame of publick credit, frightening money'd men from ſettling within its reach; while all uniform and general means are exhauſted of drawing farther ſupplies from the drain'd bulk of the people.

Thus far it hath been endeavour'd to ſhew, how falſely and dangerouſly they reaſon, who wou'd center our whole concern in the reduction of intereſt, and regard the principal of our debt as an immaterial circumſtance.

We have ſeen, upon what ſlight foundation this doctrine, big with miſchief, is ſupported by a celebrated hand, in a late pamphlet; which, without even a ſuppoſition of any determin'd ſums to be rais'd, of the nature of the times, or of the numbers and quality of buyers, truſts to a fortuitous coincidence of theſe varying, unconnected, and often diſcordant circumſtances; by turns adhering to, and departing from that well-known ſtandard of the price of things, which reſults from the quantity and the demand; and ſuppoſing an increaſe of buyers, proportionable to the increaſe of a commodity, which for a thouſand reaſons, becomes leſs ſecure as it increaſes.

The influence of taxes upon commodities, hath been alſo amply conſider'd.

But whether in the dilemma of hurting trade by their continuance, or of hazarding an evil, which operates alike, wherever it prevails, by continuing the principal of our debt unleſſen'd; it may be thought better to give immediate relief, or to truſt for ſome time longer to the advantages of our ſoil and ſituation, to our ſkill in manufacture and commerce, to our eſtabliſh'd credit, and the happy form of our government (bleſſings, in which no other people under the ſun are our equals) is a matter far above the author of this Eſſay to determine.

If to the advantages of nature and of our conſtitution, we would add the fruit of well-underſtood polity; or if we did not rather oppoſe bad policy to theſe advantages; we might perhaps, under all our heavy burdens, ſtill prove an over-match for any of our competitors.

But while we ſhut our doors to foreign invention, and induſtry, and cheap labour, by excluding foreigners; while we exclude our own people from trade and commerce, by locking up ſome of its moſt valuable branches in companies and monopolies; while we ſuffer other monopolies, not leſs prejudicial, to prevail in our plantations among individuals; while we ſtint the growth of theſe colonies, and of *Ireland*, by abſurd and tyrannical prohibitions; while we render law impervious to juſtice, by intricacies and expence; and laſtly, while ill-concerted regulations, for the maintenance of our poor, coinciding with ſenſeleſs prejudices, tend to leſſen our preſent numbers, and prevent a fu-

ture

ture increaſe of the human ſpecies; it ſeems miraculous, that, without any other weight, we have not long ſince fallen beneath the load of our own contrivances. Poſſibly, the bleſſings we derive from nature, and from the conſtitution of our government, are inſuperable by *folly and ignorance.*

F I N I S.

ERRATA.

PAGE 37. l. 26. for 19*s.* 10$\frac{3}{4}$*d.* read 18*s.* 10$\frac{3}{4}$*d.* p. 40. l. 3. for 19*s.* 10$\frac{3}{4}$*d.* read 18*s.* 10$\frac{3}{4}$*d.* l. 8. for 2*s.* 8$\frac{1}{4}$*d.* read 1*s.* 8$\frac{1}{4}$*d.* p. 41. l. 10. for 18*s.* read 18*s.* 4*d.* p. 45. l. 3. for *diſplay*, read *diſplays*: p. 46. l. 13. To the total of the ſupplies for 1750, add $\frac{3}{4}$*d.* p. 47. l. penult, for 2*s.* 8*d.* farthing, read 1*s.* 8*d.* farthing: p. 48. l. 7. for 2*s.* 8*d.* read 1*s.* 8*d.* p. 49. wanting a line under the total of the deficiencies of the land-tax and malt duties.

APPENDIX.

ESTIMATE of the Amount of the National Debt upon the 31ſt of *December* 1749, diſtinguiſhing the ſeveral Rates of Intereſt paid for the ſame.

		l.	*s.*	*d.*	*l.*	*s.*	*d.*
At better than 7 *l. per cent.*	Annuities for long terms — — —	1,836,275	17	10¾			
At 7 *l. per cent.*	Ditto for lives, with the benefit of ſurvivorſhip —	108,100	—	—			
At 12 *l. per cent.*	Ditto for two and three lives * — — —	96,830	14	10¾			
					2,041,206	12	9½
At 4 *l. per cent.*	Annuities on the plate act 6 *Geo.* I. — —	312,000	—	—			
	To the *Eaſt India* Company, *per* acts 9 *Wil.* III. and 6 and 9 *Annæ* — — —	3,200,000	—	—			
	To the Bank for cancelling Exchequer Bills 3 *Geo.* I.	500,000	—	—			
	To Ditto, purchaſed of the *South Sea* Company —	4,000,000	—	—			
	Annuities, charged on the ſurplus of the fund for lottery 1714 — — —	1,250,000	—	—			
	Ditto, charged upon the duty on coals, *&c.* ſince *Lady-day* 1719 — — —	1,750,000	—	—			
	Ditto, charged on licences for retailing ſpirituous liquors *per* act 19 *Geo.* II. — — —	986,800	—	—			
	Ditto *anno* 1746, charged on the duties on glaſs and ſpirituous liquors — —	3,000,000	—	—			
	Ditto *anno* 1747, charged on the new duties on houſes, windows and lights — —	4,400,000	—	—			
	Ditto *anno* 1747, charged on the duty on coaches, *&c.*	1,000,000	—	—			
	Ditto *anno* 1748, charged on the additional ſubſidy of poundage on goods imported — —	6,930,000	—	—			
	Ditto *anno* 1749, charged on the Sinking Fund	3,230,382	5	1			
	To the *South Sea* Company on their capital ſtock and annuities 9 *Geo.* I. — —	27,302,203	5	6½			
					57,861,385	10	7½
At 3 *l.* 10 *s. per cent.*	Annuities *anno* 1731, charged on the additional ſtamp-duties — — —	400,000	—	—			
	Charged on the ſalt-duties further continued *anno* 1745	1,000,000	—	—			
					1,400,000	—	—
At 3 *l. per cent.*	Annuities for *Nevis* and *St. Chriſtoper*'s debentures —	37,821	5	1¼			
	Ditto for the lottery 1731, charged on the additional ſtamp-duties — — —	800,000	—	—			
	Ditto *anno* 1736, charged on the Sinking Fund —	600,000	—	—			
	Exchequer bills, charged on the duties on ſweets *anno* 1737 — — —	499,600	—	—			
	Annuities *anno* 1738, charged on the Sinking Fund	300,000	—	—			
	Ditto *anno* 1742, charged on ditto — —	800,000	—	—			
	To the Bank on their original fund from 1ſt *Auguſt* 1743 — — —	3,200,000	—	—			
	Annuities *anno* 1743, charged on the additional duties on low wines, ſpirits, *&c.* — —	1,800,000	—	—			
	Ditto *anno* 1744, charged on the ſurplus of ditto —	1,800,000	—	—			
	Ditto *anno* 1744, charged on ditto — —	1,000,000	—	—			
	Ditto *anno* 1745, charged on the additional duties on wines imported — — —	2,000,000	—	—			
					12,837,421	5	1¼
	To which muſt be added				74,140,013	8	6½
	Reſidue of the 1,200,000 *l.* borrowed upon the ſalt-duties *anno* 1741 †				260,225	—	—
	Exchequer Bills made out for intereſt of old bills (for which no intereſt is charged) — — — —				2,200	—	—
	Borrowed in 1749, to pay off the like ſum upon the head of ſeamen's wages				1,000,000	—	—
	Reſidue of the Navy debt unprovided for by Parliament —				1,347,227	15	2½
	Annuities at 3 *l. per cent.* charged on the deductions of 6 *d. per* pound on penſions, *&c.* — — —				1,000,000	—	—
	Annuities to the contributors to the lotteries 1745 and 1746 (valued at 15 years purchaſe) after deducting, at the ſame rate, what may have fallen in by deaths — — — —				748,125	—	—
	And then the Total of the National Debt, upon the 31ſt of *December* 1749, may be eſtimated at — — — —				78,497,791	3	8¾

* Theſe annuities, upon the 31ſt of *December* 1748, amounted to 98,347 *l.* 8 *s.* 2 *d.* three farthings: a deduction is therefore here made of what, upon a medium of ſix years paſt, may be ſuppoſed to have fallen in by deaths in the year 1749.

† This debt, upon the 31ſt of *December* 1748, was 427,050 *l.* from whence deducting the produce of the ſalt-duties in 1749, which, upon a medium of ſix years paſt, hath been before ſtated at 166,825 *l.* the remainder will be, as above.

INDEX

F. 2. 17-10-62.

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A computation of the increase of London, and parts adjacent

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